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This thesis adopts a broad view of conservative financial reporting—managers can use two 
ways to communicate business uncertainties to outsiders, namely, conservative accounting via 
timely loss recognition and narrative risk disclosures about a firm’s downside risk. I posit that 
managers trade off conservative accounting and risk disclosures because they both can alleviate 
information asymmetry about downside risk and reduce shareholder litigation, and they both 
impose significant costs on firms. Using a sample of U.S. industrial firms from 1995 to 2018, I 
find support for this substitutive (trade-off) relation when narrative risk disclosures were voluntary 
but not when they were mandatory in annual reports. Moreover, I hypothesize and find evidence 
that firms have stronger incentives to make such trade-offs in order to reduce overall reporting 
cost, when they are planning seasoned equity offerings, are closer to debt covenant violations, face 
higher proprietary costs, or have greater needs for debt financing. Additional tests show that 
external monitoring, by financial analysts or by shareholders through litigation threats, constrains 
firms’ flexibility in making such trade-offs. For the period after 2005 when the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated risk factor disclosures in annual reports, I find firms 
with lower analyst following or lower litigation risk exhibit a significant substitutive relation 
between these two accounting choices. Stock return tests show that, while investors fully 
anticipated managers to make such trade-offs when risk disclosures were voluntary, they reacted 
negatively to firms that appear to have made trade-offs between these two choices in the period 
after the SEC has mandated risk disclosures. Collectively, my research suggests that firms trade 
off conservative accounting recognition and risk disclosures, especially in the period when 
qualitative risk disclosures were voluntary, even though investors appear to prefer consistent 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This thesis examines the relation between accounting conservatism and qualitative risk 
disclosures. Accounting conservatism communicates business uncertainties quantitatively through 
timely recognition of bad news in financial statements. Risk disclosures communicate business 
uncertainties by providing qualitative information about factors that may negatively affect firm 
performance. Their common link to business uncertainties suggests that managers may coordinate 
their reporting and disclosure choices when making financial reporting decisions. Specifically, this 
thesis provides insight into whether and how managers coordinate these two choices, what factors 
they may consider in such coordination, and what are stock market consequences of different 
coordinating strategies. To answer these questions, I focus on risk disclosures in annual reports 
because such comprehensive reporting packages provide the main venue through which firms 
provide risk information (Kravet and Muslu 2013; Campbell et al. 2014). 1 
This study is motivated by the importance of risk disclosures. According to the FASB’s 
Conceptual Framework, the primary objective of financial reporting is to provide useful 
information for investors, lenders, and other stakeholders to assess “the amount, timing, and 
uncertainty of (the prospects for) future net cash inflows to the entity” (FASB 2010, OB3). Risk 
disclosures are crucial because they provide a special type of information useful for financial 
statement users to assess the uncertainty surrounding future cash flows of a firm. Recognizing the 
 
1 I use “annual reports” and “10-K filings” interchangeably. My test is based on texts extracted from 10-K 
filings. Despite the claim that investors do not appear to rely on 10-K filings as indicated by the small 
number of downloads recorded on the EDGAR server log (Loughran and McDonald 2017), prior studies 
show that investors do react to 10-K filings and the reaction varies with the quality of disclosures (Griffin 
2003; Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016). Moreover, investors can obtain the same information from the annual 
reports posted on firms’ websites, which are much easier to navigate than the EDGAR platform. 
2 
 
importance of risk disclosures, standard setters and regulators have long encouraged and required 
firms to disclose risks and uncertainties surrounding their operations and future cash flows.2 Most 
recently in August 2020, the SEC approved amendments to modernize certain disclosures under 
Regulation S-K, which include risk factor disclosures.3  
This study is also motivated by the paucity of prior studies examining managers’ joint decisions 
on reporting and disclosure choices. 4  Prior theoretical studies (Gigler and Hemmer 2001; 
Gietzmann and Trombetta 2003) and survey evidence (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005) 
suggest that managers make mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure decisions jointly. This 
is consistent with the intuition that firms should have an integrated reporting and disclosure 
strategy since their common goal is to provide information to outsiders. However, extant empirical 
research tends to examine these two types of choices as independent decisions (Tucker 2015). 
Unlike these studies, I take a holistic view towards understanding whether and how managers 
coordinate their reporting decisions in timely loss recognition (i.e., accounting conservatism) and 
their disclosure decisions in qualitative risk information (i.e., risk disclosures).  
This study is also motivated by the recent call of Guay and Verrecchia (2018) for taking a 
broad view of conservative financial reporting. These authors propose that conservative financial 
reporting should include not only timely recognition of probable expenses and liabilities in 
financial statements but also timely disclosure of potential bad realizations of economic outcomes. 
They call for studies that “consider conservative financial reporting within the broader context of 
overall corporate disclosure policy, as opposed to the more narrow emphasis on income statement 
 
2 Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of the related regulations.  
3 More details about the amendments can be found at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-192.  
4 By reporting choices, I mean managers’ choices over the reporting of recognized accounting numbers on 
the face of financial statements. By disclosure choices, I mean managers’ decisions over supplying 
additional information, financial or non-financial, other than such accounting numbers.  
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and balance sheet presentation” (Guay and Verrecchia 2018, 88). Embracing this broad view of 
conservative financial reporting, I examine the relation between accounting conservatism in the 
form of timely loss recognition and qualitative disclosures about a firm’s downside risk.  
Prior studies find that accounting conservatism alleviates information asymmetry between 
insiders and debtholders, and lowers the cost of debt (Ahmed et al. 2002; Zhang 2008; Sunder, 
Sunder, and Zhang 2018). Prior research also finds risk disclosures provide useful information for 
debtholders because they are naturally concerned about downside risk (Chiu, Guan, and Kim 2018). 
Since both accounting conservatism and risk disclosures can mitigate information asymmetry 
about downside risk, the supply of accounting conservatism may affect managers’ incentives to 
provide risk disclosures, and vice versa. This is because both accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures impose significant costs on the firm, and managers likely consider the relative costs of 
these two choices so that they can achieve their reporting and disclosure objectives at the lowest 
overall cost possible by choosing the appropriate level for each choice. For example, if timely loss 
recognition becomes more cost-effective, then managers would rely more on accounting 
conservatism and less on risk disclosures to maintain information transparency on business 
uncertainties.  
Prior research finds that both accounting conservatism and risk disclosures can reduce 
litigation risk. Several studies show that conservative reporting can protect firms (Qiang 2007; 
Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang 2016) and managers (Chung and Wynn 2008; Levy, Shalev, and Zur 
2018) from shareholder litigation. Studies also document that disclosures (Field, Lowry, and Shu 
2005; Billings and Cedergren 2015) generally deter shareholder litigation, and firms facing greater 
litigation risk provide more risk disclosures (Nelson and Pritchard 2016). With two accounting 
choices that can achieve the same purpose, managers would weigh the relative costs of these two 
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choices, assuming that they, as rational decision-makers, are motivated to minimize the overall 
cost in maintaining litigation risk at the desired level. Since both accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures can benefit the firm by mitigating information asymmetry and reducing litigation risk, 
I conjecture that accounting conservatism and risk disclosures likely serve as substitutes.  
Although Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse (2009) suggest that accounting conservatism reduces 
managers’ incentives to provide management earnings forecasts because conservative reporting 
can reduce the net benefit of such voluntary disclosure, empirically it is not clear whether managers 
would trade off accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Unlike quantitative management 
forecasts, risk disclosures in annual reports are largely qualitative and they have become 
mandatory after 2005. Moreover, accounting numbers and risk disclosures are provided in the 
same financial reporting package. Investors can detect disagreements between hard (quantitative) 
and soft (qualitative) information from the same source and react negatively to conflicting signals 
(Henry 2008; Baginski et al. 2016; D’Augusta and DeAngelis 2020). This suggests that 
conservative accounting and risk disclosures can be in a complementary relation because managers 
face pressure to provide consistent signals from quantitative and qualitative information. If 
managers report aggressively and at the same time provide a high level of risk disclosures, 
investors may question why those risks and uncertainties are not reflected in the reported 
accounting numbers.  
As mentioned above, my main hypothesis posits that managers trade off accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures according to their relative costliness. When there is a larger 
difference in cost between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures, firms have greater 
incentives to make such trade-offs because doing so would have a greater effect in reducing the 
overall cost for revealing information about firms’ business uncertainties. Therefore, I predict a 
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stronger negative relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures when the 
difference in cost between these two choices becomes larger; for example, when firms are planning 
for additional equity financing, or when they are close to debt covenant violations. Conservative 
reporting becomes significantly more costly for such firms because timely loss recognition can 
affect the market valuation of the firm or trigger earlier debt covenant violations. On the other 
hand, risk disclosures have a much smaller effect on firm valuation or covenant violations. The 
different effects of conservative accounting and risk disclosures increase the incentives for trade-
offs in these two scenarios. Following the same logic, I expect to observe a similar effect for firms 
facing greater proprietary costs, because concerns over divulging proprietary information 
significantly increase the cost of risk disclosures but do not significantly change the cost of 
conservative accounting. On the benefit side, conservative reporting can lower the cost of debt. I 
expect that firms with greater needs for debt financing have stronger incentives to make such trade-
offs due to the greater anticipated benefit from conservative reporting relative to risk disclosures.  
I further examine factors that may mitigate the predicted trade-off. The first factor is litigation 
risk. When firms face high litigation risk, they need to provide both conservative reporting and 
risk disclosures at high levels to create a powerful litigation shield. Such firms have less room for 
trade-offs between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Therefore, the substitutive 
relation is likely to be weaker when firms face higher litigation risk. The second factor I consider 
is external monitoring by sophisticated information users. As described earlier, investors are 
sensitive to disagreements between different signals from the same information source. 
Sophisticated information users such as financial analysts have superior information processing 
ability (Price 1998; Bonner, Walther, and Young 2003; Callen, Gavious, and Segal 2010) and are 
better able to detect such disagreements. Therefore, a high level of analyst following may constrain 
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managers’ ability to trade off accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Additionally, I 
examine whether disclosure committees, as a corporate governance mechanism, may mitigate such 
trade-offs. If the mitigating effects of these factors are strong enough, I may not observe a 
substitutive relation or may even observe a complementary relation for certain groups of firms.  
To test my hypotheses, I use a sample of 53,779 firm-year observations that have accounting 
data, stock returns, and 10-K filings for fiscal years from 1995 to 2018.  I measure accounting 
conservatism by using three firm-level measures, namely, earnings skewness relative to cash flow 
skewness (Givoly and Hayn 2000), C-Score (Khan and Watts 2009), and conservatism ratio 
(Callen, Segal, and Hope 2010). I measure risk disclosures in 10-K filings based on the proportion 
of sentences that contain risk-related keywords identified by Kravet and Muslu (2013).  
Consistent with my prediction, I find that accounting conservatism is negatively associated 
with risk disclosures in the period before 2005 when the SEC mandated narrative risk disclosures, 
suggesting that managers treat these two choices as substitutes. The negative relation also holds in 
the period after 2005 for firms facing lower litigation risks and lower analyst following. This 
suggests that the regulation constrains managers’ ability to trade off these two accounting choices 
for firms subject to stronger external monitoring. Supplemental analysis shows that the negative 
relation is robust to a change model. This alleviates the concern of correlated omitted variables 
and also addresses the stickiness of corporate disclosures (Brown and Tucker 2011; Dyer, Lang, 
and Stice-Lawrence 2017). To explore whether the substitutive effect extends beyond the current 
year, I include lag variables and find that the effect is mostly contemporaneous. Using the SEC’s 
mandate on risk factor disclosures as an external shock that increases the level of risk disclosures, 
I find that firms decrease their levels of accounting conservatism in response to this change. This 
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additional evidence corroborates my main finding that firms trade off accounting conservatism 
and risk disclosures. 
Conditional analyses suggest that the negative relation is more pronounced for firms that are 
planning for equity offerings, closer to debt covenant violations, facing higher proprietary costs, 
or having greater needs for debt financing. I also find that the negative relation is mitigated when 
firms face high litigation risk or have more analyst following. However, firms with low litigation 
risk or analyst following exhibit a negative relation between the two choices in both voluntary and 
mandatory periods, suggesting that the SEC’s mandate does not fully mitigate the trade-off for 
firms facing lower monitoring by other parties. Further, I do not find that disclosure committees 
play a significant role in constraining trade-offs between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures.  
Additional analyses show that executive overconfidence, an executive trait that prior research 
finds to have significant effects on many reporting and disclosure outcomes, has a limited impact 
on the coordination between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Among various 
components of executive compensation, I find the sensitivity of a CFO’s equity portfolio to stock 
return volatility (i.e., Vega) is positively associated with the level of risk disclosures. This suggests 
that CFOs, usually heavily involved in the preparation of annual reports, likely understand the 
implication of risk disclosures. A higher level of risk disclosures may lead to greater stock return 
volatility (Kravet and Muslu 2013)5, which increases the value of CFOs’ equity portfolios.  
To understand the implications of different trade-off strategies, I conduct stock return tests and 
find that there is no significant difference in abnormal returns between firms that provide 
 
5 This finding seems to be counter intuitive. The intuition behind this finding is that risk disclosures may 
increase information uncertainty if the disclosures reveal unknown risk factors which market participants 
interpret differently.  
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accounting conservatism and risk disclosures in a more substitutive or complementary manner for 
the period before 2005. This suggests that the stock market fully anticipated such firm behaviors 
when risk disclosures were voluntary. For the period after 2005 when risk disclosures have become 
mandatory, I find that firms having engaged more in such trade-offs underperformed in stock 
returns. This suggests that investors expect firms to provide more complementary information in 
conservative accounting numbers and risk disclosures, and punish firms that deviate from this 
expected behavior after the SEC mandated risk disclosures.  
This study makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, it adds to the conservatism 
literature by shedding light on how the large literature on accounting conservatism integrates with 
the even larger literature on corporate disclosures, particularly qualitative disclosures. The extant 
literature on accounting conservatism tests the various determinants of conservative accounting 
choices and examines its costs and benefits for various stakeholders.6 By documenting a negative 
relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures, this study broadens our 
understanding of managers’ conservative financial reporting systems that produce both 
quantitative and qualitative information. A recent study by D’Augusta and DeAngelis (2020) also 
examines the relation between accounting conservatism and qualitative disclosures. They find that 
accounting conservatism can constrain upward tone management. My study differs from their 
study in that I do not assume a governance role of accounting conservatism and I focus on the 
amount of qualitative risk disclosures, rather than the sentiment of qualitative disclosures in 
general.  
Second, this study adds to the literature on the relation between managerial choices for 
recognition and qualitative disclosures. Prior empirical studies on this relation focus on overall 
 
6 I review related literature on accounting conservatism in Chapter 2.  
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disclosure quality (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 2008), management forecasts (Hui, Matsunaga, and 
Morse 2009), and detailed disclosures of specific balance sheet accounts (Cassell, Myers, and 
Seidel 2015). In contrast, my study focuses on a special form of qualitative disclosure—textual 
risk disclosures. Two recent studies document that firms likely having managed their earnings 
appear to have also managed the tone of earnings press releases (Huang, Teoh, and Zhang 2014) 
and readability of annual reports (Lo, Ramos, and Rogo 2017). My research extends this line of 
literature by providing insight into how managers make joint decisions on timely loss recognition 
and qualitative risk disclosures to fulfill a broader conservative reporting purpose.  
Finally, this study contributes to the risk disclosures literature. Prior studies focus on the 
determinants of risk disclosures (Abraham and Cox 2007) and the informativeness of various 
forms of risk disclosures, such as market risk disclosures (e.g. Roulstone 1999; Rajgopal 1999; 
Akhigbe and Martin 2008) and risk factor disclosures (e.g. Campbell et al. 2014; Beatty, Cheng, 
and Zhang 2019). My research views risk disclosures as an integral part of a firm’s information 
package and investigates its interplay with managers’ reporting choices in financial statements. 
My study provides evidence on how managers’ decisions about conservative accounting affect 
their incentives in supplying risk disclosures.  
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides the background of 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Chapter 3 reviews the related literature. Chapter 4 
examines the overall relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Chapter 5 
investigates how the relative costs and benefits of accounting conservatism and risk disclosures 
moderate the relation between these two choices. Chapter 6 examines how internal and external 
monitoring affects the relation between these two choices. Chapter 7 examines the effects of 
executive characteristics and executive compensation on the relation between these two choices. 
10 
 
Chapter 8 tests the stock market implications of managers’ coordination of conservative reporting 
and risk disclosure decisions. Chapter 9 concludes.  
11 
 
Chapter 2  
Theoretical and Regulatory Background 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide theoretical and regulatory background about accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. In Section 2.1, I discuss the definition of accounting 
conservatism and the difference between conditional and unconditional conservatism. I also 
explain why my thesis focuses on conditional conservatism. In Section 2.3, I describe the evolution 
of risk disclosures in annual reports, including the most recent regulation regarding risk factor 
disclosures. My thesis focuses on risk disclosures in annual reports because these comprehensive 
reporting packages are the main venue through which firms provide risk information. At the end 
of this chapter, I provide in Appendix A1 and Appendix A2 some sample risk disclosures from 
annual reports. 
2.2 Accounting Conservatism 
Accounting conservatism refers to the application of accounting policies or choices that 
lead to a downward bias in reported earnings and net assets values relative to their economic values. 
Under the current accounting standards, the reporting system is inherently conservative in that the 
measurement basis is historical costs for many types of assets and liabilities. The downward bias 
is reinforced by other commonly accepted accounting principles such as the expensing of R&D 
expenditures, inventory valuation at the lower of cost or market, and goodwill impairment. 
However, when managers apply accounting standards, they have considerable discretion. This 
gives rise to variation in accounting conservatism across firms and across reporting periods for the 
same firm even though they follow the same standards.  
12 
 
Fundamentally, accounting conservatism is a mechanism for addressing measurement 
uncertainty in the accounting for operating results and financial position of a firm. The Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) once made this point clearly in Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2., with the following definition: 7 
Conservatism is a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties and risks 
inherent in business situations are adequately considered. Thus, if two estimates of amounts to be 
received or paid in the future are about equally likely, conservatism dictates using the less 
optimistic estimate; however, if two amounts are not equally likely, conservatism does not 
necessarily dictate using the more pessimistic amount rather than the more likely one. (SFAC2 
FASB 1980, para. 95) 
Researchers define accounting conservatism in line with the spirit of the standard setter’s 
definition. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) define accounting conservatism from the balance sheet 
perspective as choosing the lowest value among all possible values of an asset but the highest value 
among all possible values of a liability. This definition highlights the importance of accounting 
conservatism as a mechanism to counteract managerial optimism that tends to overstate assets and 
understate liabilities. As researchers further investigate the property of conservative accounting 
numbers, a few academicians propose other definitions of accounting conservatism from the 
perspective of income recognition. These definitions have the advantage of being easier to 
operationalize for empirical analysis. For example, Basu (1997, 4) interprets accounting 
conservatism as the “tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news 
than bad news in financial statements.” Watts (2003, 207) defines conservatism as the “differential 
verifiability required for recognition of profits versus losses.”  
 
7 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has removed conservatism or prudence as a desired 
quality of accounting information from the 2010 conceptual framework on the grounds of its inconsistency 
with neutrality (FASB 2010). Despite the FASB’s de-emphasis of conservatism, prior studies find that 
conservative reporting offers many benefits, as described in greater detail in Chapter 3. Recognizing these 
benefits and in response to comments from academics, practitioners and other stakeholders (e.g. Bauer, 
O’Brien, and Saeed 2014), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has partly reintroduced 
prudence into its 2018 conceptual framework as a sub-characteristic of neutrality. 
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The more recent definitions of accounting conservatism (Basu 1997; Watts 2003) suggest 
that accounting earnings and net asset values may be understated relative to their economic values 
due to timelier recognition of losses relative to gains. Negative economic news on anticipated 
future losses requires a lower degree of verification and is thus recognized in earnings in a timelier 
manner than positive economic news on anticipated future gains. This form of accounting 
conservatism is known as conditional conservatism because the recognition decision is conditional 
on economic news of unrealized future losses or gains. Its dependence on economic news is 
contrary to the other form of accounting conservatism, commonly known as unconditional 
conservatism, which exists largely as a result of prudent accounting standards such as immediate 
expensing of R&D expenditures and accelerated depreciation of capital assets. Firms are required 
to make these accounting choices consistently with little regard to macro, industry-level, or firm-
level economic news. Managers, therefore, often have less discretion over unconditional 
conservatism. For this reason, most studies on conservative accounting focus on conditional 
conservatism. My thesis also focuses on conditional conservatism. Other than involving a greater 
degree of managerial discretion, conditional conservatism has a clearer theoretical link to risk 
disclosures, the other key variable of my thesis. Prior studies show that conditional conservatism 
is driven mostly by contracting demand and litigation demand. Risk disclosures provide 
information that serves contracting and litigation purposes. I elaborate on this linkage in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4. 
2.3 Risk Disclosures 
Regulators usually responded to market-wide fluctuations by urging firms to provide more 
risk disclosures (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). Standard setters and regulators have long 
required and encouraged firms to disclose uncertainties surrounding their operations. In 1995, the 
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Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) introduced a safe harbour provision, which 
provides legal protection for public firms to disclose meaningful risk information as part of firms’ 
forward-looking disclosures. In 1997, the SEC issued Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48, 
requiring firms to disclose their market risk exposure related to derivatives and other financial 
instruments (SEC 1997). One year later, the FASB issued SFAS 133 and SFAS 155, requiring 
firms to disclose their market risk exposure associated with derivatives and hedging positions 
(FASB 1998a; 1998b). In 2005, the SEC imposed requirements on all public firms, except for 
smaller reporting companies8, to disclose risk factors that make their securities risky or speculative 
in section Item 1A of 10-Ks filed on or after December 1, 2005. 9 Prior to the SEC’s mandate on 
risk factor disclosures, qualitative risk disclosures in 10-K filings were largely voluntary. After 
that, it becomes mandatory for firms to make comprehensive risk factor disclosures in their 10-K 
filings and regularly update them for material changes. Studies find that the mandate on risk factor 
disclosures significantly increased the length of 10-K filings (e.g. Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence 
2017). 
My thesis looks at risk disclosures throughout annual reports and for periods both before 
and after the SEC’s mandate. Since I have not formally introduced how I measure the level of risk 
disclosures, I provide, in this section, the length of risk factor disclosures that firms are required 
to provide in Item 1A of annual reports since November 2005, to demonstrate the significance of 
such disclosures. In Chapter 4, I provide detailed statistics about risk disclosures based on my 
measure.  
 
8 Smaller reporting companies are firms whose public float is less than $75 million or whose revenues were 
less than $50 million in the previous year when public float is not available. 
9 Due to this regulation, I extract the entire Item 1A section in 10-Ks in addition to risk disclosures in other 
sections in the post-2005 period and construct an alternative measure based on these, as elaborated later in 




Table 2-1 presents the length of risk factor disclosures in annual reports. The risk factor 
disclosures section (i.e., Item 1A) accounts for approximately 13% of the length (in word count) 
of an average annual report in 2006, the first full calendar year this section was mandated. The 
percentage was on the rise ever since and exceeded 24% in 2019, the last calendar year of my 
sample period. The increase in the length of this section is probably due to the increasing 
complexity of the operating environment as well as firms’ general tendency to add new disclosures 
without removing outdated ones.  
Table 2-1: Length of Risk Factor Disclosure Section in Annual Reports 
 
Year WordCount_10K WordCount_Item1A Percentage 
2006 33,208 4,266 12.85% 
2007 35,513 4,680 13.18% 
2008 37,101 5,271 14.21% 
2009 39,426 5,833 14.79% 
2010 40,244 6,187 15.37% 
2011 40,819 6,622 16.22% 
2012 41,998 7,131 16.98% 
2013 43,020 7,670 17.83% 
2014 44,328 8,442 19.04% 
2015 45,695 9,285 20.32% 
2016 46,857 9,936 21.21% 
2017 47,683 10,436 21.89% 
2018 48,980 11,148 22.76% 
2019 49,651 12,025 24.22% 
 
Note: This table provides the lengths of annual reports (10-K) and risk factor disclosures section (Item 1A) 
from 2006 to 2019. The Year column presents the calendar year in which annual reports were filed. The 
WordCount_10K column presents the average word count of all annual reports filed each year. The 
WordCount_Item1A column presents the average word count of the risk factor disclosures section (Item 
1A) in annual reports filed each year. The Percentage column provides the relative length of the risk factor 
disclosures section as a percentage of the length of the annual report, i.e., WordCount_Item1A / 
WordCount_10K × 100.  
 
In August 2019, the SEC proposed amendments to modernize disclosures of risk factors as 
well as business descriptions and legal proceedings in 10-K filings. After one year of deliberation, 
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the SEC adopted the amendments on August 26, 2020.10 Regarding risk disclosures under Item 
105 of Regulation S-K11, the amendments made several important changes intended to improve 
the informativeness of such disclosures. For example, if the risk factors section (Item 1A) in a 10-
K is longer than 15 pages, firms must provide a summary of no more than two pages at the 
beginning of the section so that readers can have a quick overview of all the risk factors. Firms are 
required to organize risk factors under relevant headings and place generic risk factors at the end 
of the section under a separate heading. The amendments also require firms to disclose only 
material risk factors that are relevant for investors’ decisions.  
Appendix A1 presents several sample risk disclosures for periods before and after the SEC 
mandated risk factor disclosures. These disclosures provide information about factors that can 
negatively affect firms’ operations. Appendix A2 presents a sample risk factor summary, which 
some firms start to provide in their annual reports on and after November 11, 2020 in accordance 
with the recent SEC amendments. The sample of risk factor summary offers a glimpse into the 
breadth of risk information that firms provide in annual reports.  
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discuss the definitions of accounting conservatism and explain why I focus 
on conditional conservatism for my thesis. I also describe the history of risk disclosures and 
provide several sample disclosures in Appendices 1A and 1B. Accounting conservatism remains 
a controversial topic and further research in this area can provide evidence that may inform the 
 
10 https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-192.  
11  Regulation S-K prescribes reporting requirements for various SEC filings for public firms. These 
requirements are organized into numerous items. For example, Item 105 governs risk factor disclosures and 
Item 303 governs MD&As. An annual report filed on the 10-K Form consists of a large number of sections 
numbered from Item 1 through Item 16 with subsections for some items, e.g., Item 1A, Item 7A. To comply 
with the requirements set forth in Item 105 of Regulation S-K, firms provide risk factor disclosures in the 
section numbered as Item 1A in the 10-K.  
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debate over its role in financial reporting. Risk disclosures constitute a significant part of the annual 





Chapter 3  
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I review prior studies related to my thesis. Section 3.2 covers the related 
literature on accounting conservatism. There is a large literature on accounting conservatism. A 
few survey papers provide a synthesis of the conservatism literature from various angles. For 
example, Ruch and Taylor (2015) review this stream of literature focusing on the impacts of 
conservative reporting on various financial statement users. Mora and Walker (2015) review and 
comment on the conservatism literature from the perspective of its implications for accounting 
standard-setting. Zhong and Li (2017) focus on the definition, measurement, and determinants of 
accounting conservatism as well as the impact of conservative accounting on investment efficiency 
and capital costs. Bloom (2018) reviews both professional and academic literature to track how 
the concept of accounting conservatism has evolved. Most recently, Penalva and Wagenhofer 
(2019) survey the literature related to the contracting role of conservative accounting, covering 
both theoretical and archival studies.  
Section 3.3 reviews the related risk disclosure literature. Elshandidy et al. (2018) provide 
a comprehensive review of recent archival studies on risk disclosures. They synthesize the 
literature around two themes, namely, the incentives and the informativeness of risk disclosures. 
Many of the studies covered in their survey use international data. Few studies use the US settings, 
and even fewer studies use US data before the SEC mandated risk factor disclosures in 2005. The 
SEC’s mandate in 2005 attracts considerable academic attention and generates many studies 
investigating risk factor disclosures. Isiaka (2018) provides a comprehensive survey of the related 
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literature. There is continued interest and research activity in risk disclosures. In particular, the 
SEC’s recent amendments intended to improve the informativeness of risk factor disclosures 
among others generates new research opportunities. 
Section 3.4 surveys the literature on the relation between recognition and disclosure 
decisions. This is the intersection of literature that my thesis is most closely related to. 
Traditionally, most studies treat recognition and disclosure decisions as independent of each other 
(Tucker 2015). There is a growing awareness of the importance to examine these two decisions 
together. 
This chapter reviews the literature related to my main research question. In later chapters, 
I discuss additional research in hypothesis developments, research designs, and result 
interpretations for specific research questions and supplemental tests.  
3.2 Literature on Accounting Conservatism 
The extant literature on accounting conservatism focuses on the determinants, costs, and 
benefits of conservative reporting. Conservatism exists and persists due to four demands that 
favour downward biased accounting numbers, namely, contracting, litigation, taxation, and 
regulatory (Watts 2003). Prior studies have provided empirical evidence supporting these four 
demands as drivers of conservative reporting. For example, Qiang (2007) finds that conditional 
conservatism is driven by contracting and litigation demands, and unconditional conservatism is 
driven by litigation, taxation and regulatory demands.  
Contracting demand is a major driver of conservative accounting because debtholders 
naturally prefer conservative accounting numbers, especially in the form of timely loss recognition, 
due to their asymmetric payoffs (Basu 1997; Watts 2003). Studies focusing on the debt contracting 
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role of conservatism largely find that conservatism is an efficient contracting mechanism12 that 
benefits both borrowers and lenders (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2002; Zhang 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman 
2008). For example, Ahmed et al. (2002) find that firms facing greater conflicts over dividend 
policies report more conservatively, and in turn, they enjoy a lower cost of debt. Zhang (2008) 
finds that conservative accounting provides timely signalling of default risk, and lenders offer 
lower interest rates to encourage borrowers to report more conservatively. Callen, Chen, Dou, and 
Xin (2016) find that firms committed to more conservative accounting and tighter performance 
covenants enjoy lower interest rates when information asymmetry is high.  
Litigation demand is another key driver of accounting conservatism. Several studies find 
that litigation risks lead to conservative accounting choices, for both firm-level litigation risk 
(Qiang 2007; Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang 2016) and executive-level litigation risk (Chung and 
Wynn 2008; Levy, Shalev, and Zur 2018; Basu and Liang 2019). For example, Ettredge, Huang, 
and Zhang (2016) document that firms reporting more conservatively enjoy more favourable 
litigation outcomes for class-action lawsuits. Chung and Wynn (2008) find that when managers 
face lower personal legal liability, they reduce the level of conservative reporting. 
Many studies examine the costs and benefits of conservative reporting. Such costs and 
benefits often depend on what stakeholders or financial statement users are being considered. From 
the valuation perspective, conservatism tends to bias accounting numbers and make them less 
useful for predicting future firm performance. This reduced usefulness can affect financial 
statement users who use accounting numbers to predict the future operating results of the firm. 
Prior studies find that conservatism reduces earnings persistence (Dichev and Tang 2008; Chen et 
 
12  A few theoretic studies challenge the role of accounting conservatism as an efficient contracting 
mechanism. In some conditions, conservative accounting could lead to inefficient debt contracting. For 
example, it can trigger false alarms of covenant violations (Gigler et al. 2009; Li 2013). 
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al. 2013) and predictability (Kim and Kross 2005; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2010). Prior studies also 
find that conservative accounting makes earnings less useful for financial analysts (Heflin, Hsu, 
and Jin 2015; Kim et al. 2019). From the debt contracting perspective, conservative accounting 
numbers can trigger earlier debt covenant violations (Zhang 2008). Covenant violations affect 
shareholders, managers, and many other stakeholders such as suppliers and customers. These costs 
associated with conservatism affect firms’ incentives in reporting conservatively. I elaborate on 
some of these costs in later chapters in the context of how they can indirectly affect managers’ 
decisions in risk disclosures.  
On the benefit side, accounting conservatism mitigates information asymmetry, lowers the 
cost of capital, and increases firms’ investment efficiency. The benefits that accrue to firms and 
managers are closely linked to the contracting and litigation demands as described earlier in this 
section. By meeting these demands, firms and managers receive certain benefits in return. A few 
studies find that conservatism alleviates information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
investors and increases firm values (LaFond and Watts 2008; Francis, Hasan, and Wu 2013). As 
described earlier, conservative accounting lowers the cost of debt by mitigating agency conflicts 
between bondholders and shareholders (Ahmed et al. 2002; Zhang 2008).13 As another benefit,  
García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2016) show that conservative reporting reduces under-
investment by giving firms better access to debt financing. 
3.3 Literature on Risk Disclosures 
The extant risk disclosures literature focuses on the information content of risk disclosures. 
Early studies examine the informativeness of market risk disclosures for certain industries, such 
 
13Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang (2018) find that balance sheet conservatism measured as the residual Book-
to-Market ratio is also associated with lower borrowing costs. Their balance sheet conservatism measure 
captures mostly unconditional conservatism.  
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as energy and financial services, using small samples (e.g. Roulstone 1999; Rajgopal 1999; Jorion 
2002). More recent studies largely utilize the setting of the SEC’s 2005 mandate on risk factor 
disclosures. These studies focus on the informativeness of narrative risk factor disclosures that 
firms provide under this new regulation. Despite the criticism that qualitative risk disclosures are 
likely to be boilerplate, these studies generally find that risk factor disclosures are informative and 
useful for both equity and debt holders. For example, Campbell et al. (2014) document that firms 
disclose risks specific to their operations. They also find that risk factor disclosures reflect firms’ 
systematic risks and idiosyncratic risks, and such disclosures help reduce information asymmetry. 
Nelson and Pritchard (2016) find that firms facing greater litigation risks provide more risk 
disclosures. Other studies find that firms’ subsequent updates of risk factor disclosures in 10-Q 
filings are also informative in that they predict future firm performance (Filzen 2015; Gaulin 2017). 
Hope, Hu, and Lu (2016) find that risk factor disclosures containing more firm-specific 
information are more useful for financial statement users. For the debt market, Chiu, Guan, and 
Kim (2018) show that risk factor disclosures help debt holders better assess the credit risk of firms. 
In contrast to the studies that focus on mandatory risk disclosures after 2005, Kravet and 
Muslu (2013) examine risk disclosures throughout 10-K filings for a sample period from 1994 to 
2007, which largely belongs to the voluntary regime. They find that an increase in textual risk 
disclosures is associated with higher stock return volatility and trading volume. They interpret the 
finding as evidence that risk disclosures can increase investors’ risk perceptions. This result points 
to a potential cost of risk disclosures since higher risk perceptions may increase the cost of equity. 
A recent study finds that the SEC’s 2005 mandate on risk factor disclosures has a spillover effect 
in that it changes firms’ incentives to provide forward-looking statements in annual reports. Huang, 
Shen, and Zang (2020) find that relative to those firms that voluntarily provided risk factor 
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disclosures before 2005, the adopting firms provided more forward-looking statements in the post 
period.  
An emerging line of literature uses machine learning to generate new measures of risk 
disclosures. Bao and Datta (2014) classify risk factor disclosures into 30 risks using an 
unsupervised topical modelling algorithm, called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA). They then 
test how each type of disclosed risk affects investors’ risk perceptions. Following the same 
approach, Israelsen (2014) and Lopez-Lira (2019) find that the risk topics classified by the LDA 
algorithm have incremental power in explaining cross-sectional stock returns. These studies 
demonstrate the potential of using machine learning to construct refined risk disclosure measures 
for more granular analysis.  
My thesis extends the risk disclosures literature by examining the relation between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures, both of which can communicate business 
uncertainties. Broadly, this research question falls into the relation between recognition and 
disclosure decisions. In the next section, I review studies on this intersection of literature.  
3.4 Literature on the Relation between Recognition and Disclosure Decisions 
Prior research examines the relation between recognition and disclosure using both analytical 
and empirical methods. A few theoretic studies model the optimal timing or level of disclosure 
conditional on earnings news or recognition choices. From a principal-agent contracting 
perspective, Gigler and Hemmer (2001) show that it is optimal for managers to disclose financial 
performance earlier than the mandatory reporting date if the reporting system lacks conservatism. 
Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) model how accounting policy choices and voluntary disclosure 
choices can work together to reduce firms’ cost of capital. They show that optimal disclosure 
decisions depend on whether conservative or aggressive accounting policies have been chosen. 
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Bagnoli and Watts (2007) show that financial reporting affects a firm’s voluntary disclosure 
decisions. Specifically, one of their theoretic predictions is applicable to risk disclosures. Their 
result shows that if the earnings report contains good (bad) news, it is optimal for managers to 
voluntarily disclose the variance of earnings only when the variance is small (large).14 These 
theoretical studies suggest that managers should have an overall strategy for recognition and 
disclosure decisions.  
A few empirical studies examine the relation between recognition and voluntary disclosure. 
Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) document that firms with higher earnings quality provide more 
voluntary disclosures in annual reports. However, they find a negative relation when disclosure 
quality is proxied by management earnings forecasts (whether any forecast is provided and 
whether a point or a range forecast is provided) or proxied by the number of conference calls. Hui, 
Matsunaga, and Morse (2009) find that firms reporting more conservatively are less likely to 
provide earnings forecasts, suggesting that conservative reporting may substitute for voluntary 
disclosure. 15  Cassell, Myers, and Seidel (2015) find that firms providing more transparent 
disclosure in allowance and reserve accounts engage less in accruals-based earnings management.  
A few recent studies provide evidence on the relation between managers’ recognition 
choices and their choices in qualitative disclosures. Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) find that firms 
just meeting or beating earnings thresholds exhibit a more positive abnormal tone in their earnings 
press releases. This suggests that firms likely to have managed their earnings upward also 
strategically inflate the tone of their qualitative disclosures, presumably to maintain consistency 
 
14 This finding is closely related to risk disclosures, which provide information about the dispersion of 
future performance. Theoretical studies typically model risk disclosures as providing a signal about the 
variance of future earnings or cash flows, for example, Heinle and Smith (2017).  
15 These authors do not explicitly make a distinction between conditional and unconditional conservatism. 
The measures used in their empirical tests capture mostly unconditional conservatism.  
25 
 
between quantitative and qualitative information. Lo, Ramos, and Rogo (2017) examine the 
relation between earnings management and the readability of annual reports. They find that firms 
just meeting or beating prior years’ earnings produce less readable MD&As in annual reports. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that firms most likely having managed their earnings try to 
obfuscate their questionable accounting choices by providing complex disclosures. D’Augusta and 
DeAngelis (2020) examine the impact of accounting conservatism on qualitative disclosures. They 
find that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with upward tone management in 
MD&As of 10-K filings. They interpret this finding as evidence that accounting conservatism can 
discipline qualitative disclosures in that it constrains upward tone management.  
In summary, prior studies provide evidence suggesting that recognition and disclosure 
decisions are closely related to each other. These studies examine the relation between recognition 
and disclosure decisions in various contexts. My thesis extends this stream of research by 
examining whether and how managers coordinate their decisions in accounting conservatism and 
narrative risk disclosures.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this section, I review the literature related to the main research question of my thesis. Prior 
studies on accounting conservatism focus on its determinants, costs, and benefits. Prior research 
on risk disclosures focuses on the informativeness of various forms of risk disclosures. My thesis 
connects these two streams of literature to provide new insights into how managers use multiple 




Chapter 4  
Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the overall relation between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures. My baseline prediction is that managers coordinate their decisions in accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. Specifically, I hypothesize that they trade off conservative 
reporting and risk disclosures. In Section 4.2, I develop this main hypothesis by drawing on the 
related literature reviewed in Chapter 3 and other related economic theories. Section 4.3 describes 
the sample selection and research design. Section 4.4 provides the empirical results of testing the 
main hypothesis. Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 provide additional analyses. Section 4.7 concludes 
this chapter with a short summary. 
4.2 Hypothesis Development (Hypothesis 1) 
Conservative accounting and risk disclosures offer two tools that managers can use to mitigate 
information asymmetry, particularly that about downside risk. Debtholders are especially 
concerned about downside risk due to their asymmetric pay-offs. They do not benefit from upside 
potential. When a major downside risk factor materializes, they could lose their entire investment. 
Accounting conservatism protects the interests of debtholders through timelier recognition of bad 
news, which can trigger earlier debt covenant violations and transfer of control rights to 
debtholders. In return, firms are compensated with lower borrowing costs (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2002; 
Zhang 2008). On the other hand, risk disclosures provide information about factors that may 
negatively affect firm operations. Such information is especially useful for debtholders to assess 




Empirically, Chiu et al. (2018) find that debtholders demand a smaller risk premium after the 
SEC’s 2005 mandate that increases firms’ risk disclosures in 10-K filings. Overall, prior research 
suggests that both conservative reporting and risk disclosures help reduce information asymmetry 
about downside risk for debtholders, and firms benefit from a lower cost of debt accordingly.  
Prior studies also find that both conservative reporting and risk disclosures can protect firms 
and managers from shareholder litigation. Litigation concerns induce conservative accounting 
because overstated earnings are more likely to trigger shareholder litigation (Watts 2003). 
Aggressive financial reporting increases firms’ litigation costs (Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008; Jones 
and Wu 2010). Multiple studies suggest that conservative reporting can reduce both firm-level 
litigation risk (Qiang 2007; Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang 2016) and executive-level litigation risk 
(Chung and Wynn 2008; Levy, Shalev, and Zur 2018). On the other hand, disclosing risks and 
uncertainties surrounding firms’ operation can protect firms from shareholder litigation, in case 
that a major risk factor materializes and causes substantial shareholder losses. Prior studies show 
that increased disclosure generally reduces shareholder litigation (Field, Lowry, and Shu 2005; 
Billings and Cedergren 2015), and managers adjust their level of voluntary disclosure in response 
to changes in litigation risk (Houston et al. 2019). In particular, prior research finds that firms 
provide more risk disclosures when they are exposed to greater litigation risk (Nelson and 
Pritchard 2016).  
In summary, prior research suggests that both conservative accounting and risk disclosures can 
benefit firms by reducing information asymmetry about potential future bad outcomes and by 
decreasing litigation risk. These two common benefits make it possible for managers to use 
conservative reporting and risk disclosures as substitutes or complements. It could also be the case 




following, I discuss why managers likely consider them jointly and why managers are more likely 
to consider them as substitutes than as complements.  
Broadly speaking, the relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures falls 
under the umbrella of the relation between recognition decisions and disclosure decisions. As 
elaborated in the literature review in Chapter 3, prior theoretical and empirical evidence suggests 
that managers should and do coordinate these two decisions to achieve their overall reporting 
objectives. Specifically, several theoretical studies model the optimal disclosure decisions 
conditional on the level of a firm’s reporting aggressiveness. For example, Gigler and Hemmer 
(2001) demonstrate that the optimal timing of financial disclosures depends on whether the 
accounting system is conservative or aggressive. Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) show that 
optimal non-financial disclosure decisions vary with the level of accounting conservatism. Bagnoli 
and Watts (2007) model the optimal voluntary disclosure strategy when managers have private 
information useful for investors to interpret mandatory financial information. One of their 
theoretical predictions implies that firms reporting more conservatively should provide risk 
disclosures when the realization of earnings is highly uncertain. These theoretical studies suggest 
that the level of accounting conservatism matters for a firm to make an optimal disclosure decision. 
Prior empirical studies find that the properties of earnings are associated with firms’ voluntary 
disclosure decisions (e.g. Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 2008; Hui and Matsunaga 2014). In 
particular, a few recent studies provide evidence suggesting that managers coordinate recognition 
decisions and qualitative disclosure decisions, e.g., Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) on earnings 
management and linguistic tones of earnings press releases, and Lo, Ramos, and Rogo (2017) on 




suggest that when managers make disclosure decisions, they consider recognition decisions that 
have been made.16  
Closely related to my study, Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse (2009) examine the relation between 
accounting conservatism and voluntary disclosure in the form of management earnings forecasts. 
They find that firms reporting more conservatively provide fewer and less specific earnings 
forecasts in future periods, suggesting that conservative reporting can substitute for voluntary 
disclosure. 17  The underlying rationale is that conservative accounting decreases information 
asymmetry and litigation risk, and so do management earnings forecasts. Therefore, a higher level 
of conservatism can reduce the net benefit of voluntary management forecasts. This reasoning 
likely also applies to risk disclosures, over which managers have considerable discretion due to 
the qualitative nature of such disclosures, even after risk disclosures became mandatory. For 
example, when managers report conservatively by recognizing an asset impairment in response to 
the great uncertainty over the asset’s ability to generate future cash flows, they may not need to 
disclose the related risks and uncertainties in narrative discussions in the annual report. On the 
other hand, when managers decide to defer recognition of asset impairment, they may need to warn 
debtholders and investors of potential future bad outcomes through narrative disclosures. In this 
way, they can maintain the desired level of transparency over bad news, without incurring the full 
costs of conservative accounting and risk disclosures. By trading off accounting conservatism and 
risk disclosures according to their costs relative to each other, firms can reduce the overall cost 
from these two accounting choices.  
 
16  Prior literature largely treats financial statement numbers or recognition decisions as primary and 
disclosures, quantitative or qualitative, as secondary.  
17 Even though Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse (2009) use mostly unconditional conservatism measures for 
their empirical tests, their arguments on information asymmetry and litigation risk apply also to conditional 
conservatism. There is a stronger link between conditional conservatism and voluntary disclosure, 




Based on the above discussion, I predict that conservative accounting and risk disclosures serve 
as substitutes. In other words, managers trade off conservative reporting and risk disclosures. 
Accordingly, we may observe a negative association between them empirically. I state my first 
hypothesis in the alternative form as follows:  
H1: The level of accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the level of risk 
disclosures. 
There are also reasons to believe that managers may not trade off accounting conservatism and 
risk disclosures. Since accounting numbers and risk disclosures are provided in the same reporting 
package, managers face pressure to maintain consistency between quantitative and qualitative 
information. If managers report aggressively and at the same time provide lengthy discussions 
about risks and uncertainties facing firms’ operations, investors may question why reported 
accounting numbers did not reflect these risks and uncertainties. Prior studies suggest that 
investors can detect inconsistency among different signals from the same information package and 
question the credibility of the information (Henry 2008; Baginski et al. 2016). Managers seem to 
make an effort to maintain consistency, for example, by providing earnings press releases sounding 
more optimistic than justified when they have managed earnings upward (Huang, Teoh, and Zhang 
2014). If managers feel a strong pressure to maintain consistency, I would not find a negative 
relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures.18  
 
 
18 Overall, the economic incentives for reducing the reporting cost likely outweigh the cost from potential 
reporting inconsistency which may be detected by external and/or internal parties. The large empirical 
literature on earnings management, corporate disclosure, and tax avoidance suggests that internal and 
external monitoring, on average, would constrain but not eliminate managers’ flexibility in making 
accounting choices in these aspects. That is why I have formulated Hypothesis 1 as a directional hypothesis. 
However, this does not rule out that, for certain groups of firms, strong internal or external monitoring 




My first hypothesis assumes that managers coordinate the levels of conservative reporting 
and risk disclosures to minimize the overall cost related to the two choices. Conceptually, it is 
possible that the costs of accounting conservatism and/or risk disclosures might be so trivial 
relative to their benefits that managers choose to provide conservative reporting and/or risk 
disclosures at the highest level possible. An alternative possibility is that the costs may be so high 
relative to the benefits that managers choose accounting conservatism and/or risk disclosures at 
the lowest level possible. When one of the two accounting choices is maintained at its maximum 
or minimum level due to a ceiling or flooring effect, the level of one choice would not vary with 
the level of the other. According to prior studies, these scenarios, on average, do not hold. Prior 
studies find that there is a great cross-sectional and temporal variation in accounting conservatism 
due to the difference in the demands for conservative accounting numbers (Watts 2003; Khan and 
Watts 2009). Prior research also finds that the level of risk disclosures in 10-K filings varies with 
their perceived benefits (Nelson and Pritchard 2016). One possible example of such extreme cases 
is that when firms face extremely high litigation risk, they likely provide accounting conservatism 
and risk disclosures both at high levels for maximum protection from shareholder lawsuits. 
Another possible example is when managers are extremely risk-averse, they may not only report 
at the highest level of conservatism and but also provide a maximum level of risk disclosures. I 
consider these possibilities in later chapters when I explore factors affecting managers’ 
coordination of these two choices.  
4.3 Sample Selection and Research Design 
4.3.1 Sample Selection 
My sample selection process starts with 144,106 firm-year observations in COMPUSTAT 




filing of annual reports before 1995. I exclude 41,901 firm-year observations in financial and 
utilities sectors because firms in these sectors are subject to different regulations, which change 
their conservative reporting incentives relative to industrial firms. After merging with CRSP, I lose 
22,238 observations due to missing stock returns. I exclude 1,215 observations for which no 10-K 
filings are matched due to missing history CIKs. I lose 22,325 observations, which do not have all 
three conservatism measures or all control variables. To avoid the confounding effect of the 
regulation on risk disclosures, I exclude 2,340 observations with 10-Ks filed in the first year after 
the regulation, which took effect for 10-Ks filed on or after December 1, 2005. The majority of 
these observations belong to fiscal year 2005. To have a more balanced panel of data, I also exclude 
the remaining 308 observations for fiscal year 2005.19 The sample selection process results in 
53,779 firm-year observations from 7,175 unique firms for testing my first hypothesis. Table 4-1 
summarizes the sample selection process.  
Table 4-1: Sample Selection Process 
 
 Firm Years 
All firm-year observations in Compustat (1995-2018) 144,106 
Less: financial and utilities firms (41,901) 
Less: missing stock returns (22,238) 
Less: missing history CIKs (for matching 10-Ks) (1,215) 
Less: missing test and control variables (22,325) 
Less: 10-Ks filed in the first year after the SEC mandate in 2005 (2,340) 
Less: remaining observations for fiscal year 2005 (308) 
Sample size 53,779 
 
Note: This table describes the sample selection process. I construct the initial sample starting with the 
intersection between Compustat and CRSP. Next, I match the resulting firms with 10-K filings based on 
history CIKs using the SEC Analytics linking table. Then, I exclude firm-year observations missing test 
variables and control variables. Finally, I drop observations with 10-Ks filed in the first year after the 2005 
regulation as well as the remaining observations for fiscal year 2005.  
 
19 Later analyses for all my hypotheses are robust to the inclusion of these 2,648 (2340+308) observations 
that are excluded. However, a test on these observations alone does not show a negative relation between 




Table 4-2 presents the sample distribution by fiscal year. There are more observations for 
fiscal years before 2005 than after 2005. The number of public firms has been decreasing since 
2000 due to a few reasons. One reason is that increasing compliance costs reduce the benefit of 
being a public firm.20 For example, Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) find that the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has led some firms to go private. For another reason, the rise 
of private equity and venture capital provides an alternative source of funds for private firms. This 
allows private firms to stay in the private status longer. In addition, there is a growing trend for 
venture capital-backed firms to exit via mergers or acquisitions by other listed firms, as opposed 
to via traditional IPOs.21 The number of observations is smaller for 1995 than the following several 
years because not all firms had adopted electronic filing of 10-Ks by then.  
Table 4-2: Sample Distribution by Fiscal Year 
 
Year Frequency Percent 
1995 2,153 4.00 
1996 3,111 5.78 
1997 3,207 5.96 
1998 3,260 6.06 
1999 3,225 6.00 
2000 2,888 5.37 
2001 2,742 5.10 
2002 2,751 5.12 
2003 2,740 5.09 
2004 2,676 4.98 
2006 2,075 3.86 
2007 2,214 4.12 
2008 2,049 3.81 
2009 2,053 3.82 
2010 2,011 3.74 
 
20 For a discussion of this aspect and related reasons, see 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-09/where-have-all-the-u-s-public-companies-gone. 
21 For a discussion of the role played by private equity and venture capital in the shrinkage of the number 





2011 1,999 3.72 
2012 1,936 3.60 
2013 1,889 3.51 
2014 1,870 3.48 
2015 1,797 3.34 
2016 1,756 3.27 
2017 1,716 3.19 
2018 1,661 3.09 
Total 53,779 100.00 
Note: This table provides the sample distribution by fiscal year. The observations for 2005 are removed to 
avoid the confounding effect of the SEC’s mandate in 2005 and to have a more balanced sample.  
4.3.2 Measurement of Accounting Conservatism 
For my empirical tests, I focus on conditional conservatism because prior studies show that 
conditional conservatism is driven mostly by contracting and litigation demands (Qiang 2007). 
Contracting and litigation demands are the two channels that link conditional conservatism to risk 
disclosures. Prior research has used multiple firm-level measures of conditional conservatism. 
Because the literature has no consensus over which of these measures best captures conditional 
conservatism, I construct a composite measure from three commonly used firm-level conservatism 
measures.22 The three individual measures are described as follows.  
The first conservatism measure is Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-Score, which is a firm-year 
variant of Basu’s (1997) cross-sectional asymmetric timeliness coefficient. Khan and Watts (2009) 
start with Basu’s (1997) model (Equation 4-1) and replace the coefficients for timeliness of good 
news (β3t) and bad news (β4t) with linear functions of three firm characteristics. These 
characteristics are size (MV), market-to-book (MTB) ratio, and leverage (LEV), which proxy for 
 
22 Each of these three measures could capture one aspect of conditional conservatism with error. The 
construction of a composite measure can mitigate the impact of measurement errors and increase the 





the four demands of conservatism, i.e., contracting, litigation, regulatory, and tax, as summarized 
in Watts (2003). 
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (4-1) 
𝐺_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽3𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇1𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑡𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇3𝑡𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡   (4-2) 
𝐶_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽4𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆1𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑡𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆3𝑡𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑡𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡   (4-3) 
NI is net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. DRET is an indicator variable, 
set to one when the stock return over the fiscal year is negative and to zero otherwise. RET is the 
stock return over the fiscal year.  
Following their procedure, I substitute Equation 4-2 and Equation 4-3 into Equation 4-1 and 
estimate the coefficients using annual cross-sectional regressions. With estimated coefficients for 
λ1t through λ4t, I calculate the C-Score for each firm-year observation using Equation 4-3. A higher 
value of C-Score indicates a higher level of conservatism.  
The second measure is the skewness of earnings relative to the skewness of cash flows (Givoly 
and Hayn 2000), calculated over a rolling window of 20 quarters, with a minimum of nine quarters’ 
data, from year t-4 to t. Timelier recognition of bad news than good news leads to a negatively 
skewed distribution of earnings (Zhang 2008). The distribution of cash flows is not significantly 
affected by conservative accounting choices. Therefore, a greater level of earnings skewness 
relative to cash flow skewness indicates a higher level of conservatism. 
The third measure is the conservatism ratio developed by Callen, Segal, and Hope (2010), 
using the return decomposition model of Vuolteenaho (2002). The conservatism ratio captures the 
extent that earnings shocks are recognized in current earnings. The numerator is the current 
earnings shock estimated as the residual from a parsimonious model containing previous stock 
returns, previous book returns, and previous book to market ratio as explanatory variables. The 




future earnings surprises. I construct this measure using the program provided by Callen and Segal 
(2010).  
To aggregate these three measures, I first standardize each raw measure by fiscal year through 
a linear transformation in the form of [(raw value – annual minimum value)/(annual maximum 
value – annual minimum value)]. This procedure results in a standardized value bounded between 
0 and 1. For each firm-year, I then construct a composite measure based on the average of the three 
annually standardized values, following prior studies (Beatty, Petacchi, and Zhang 2012; Kim et 
al. 2013; D’Augusta and DeAngelis 2020). 
4.3.3 Measurement of Risk Disclosures 
My risk disclosure measures are based on textual risk disclosures in 10-K filings. To construct 
these measures, I download 10-K filings from the SEC’s online database, EDGAR. I parse 10-K 
filings following procedures similar to Loughran and McDonald (2011), but with additional steps 
to facilitate subsequent identification and extraction of specific sections, for example, tagging 
section headings. Following prior literature, I require 10-K filings to have at least 3,000 words 
because short 10-Ks typically have their key components incorporated by reference. For the period 
after the SEC’s 2005 mandate, I further require that 10-Ks contain a risk factor disclosure section 
(Item 1A) and the section has at least 100 words. The screening criterion based on the existence 
and length of an Item 1A section rules out smaller reporting companies, which are exempted from 
risk factor disclosures. This screening also rules out firms, which incorporate risk factor 
disclosures into 10-Ks by reference. Appendix B1 provides greater details about the steps for 
downloading, parsing, and cleaning 10-K filings and for constructing textual risk measures. 
I identify risk disclosures by extracting all sentences that contain any of the risk-related 




uncertain*, likely to, subject to, potential*, vary*/varies, depend*, expos*, fluctuat*, possibl*, 
susceptible, affect, influenc*, and hedg* (where * denotes suffixes). I calculate the main risk 
disclosure measure as the number of risk-related sentences divided by the number of all sentences 
in the 10-K, multiplied by 100. A major benefit of the sentence-level measure is that it avoids 
double counting of keywords.  
For the period after the 2005 regulation, I create an alternative measure by identifying textual 
risk disclosures as the entire risk factor disclosure section (Item1A), plus risk-related sentences in 
other sections in 10-K filings. I find this alternative measure is almost perfectly correlated with the 
main measure with a coefficient of 0.96, and all inferences remain the same. This suggests that the 
keywords developed by Kravet and Muslu (2013) accurately capture risk disclosures in 10-Ks and 
work well for fiscal years after the regulation change.  
Figure 1 shows the trend of risk disclosures based on the main risk disclosure measure as well 
as the trend of the length of 10-K filings. Both the length of 10-K filings and the level of risk 
disclosures have increased significantly over time. This is partly because the operating 
environment becomes increasingly more complex. Another reason is that disclosures in 10-Ks tend 
to be sticky as firms often add new disclosures without removing outdated ones (Brown and Tucker 
2011). Regulations, such as the mandate on risk factor disclosures, also contribute to the increase 
(Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence 2017). The trend line of risk disclosures, represented by the blue 
curve, experiences an apparent jump in 2006. This is due to the SEC’s mandate, which requires 










Note: This figure shows the trends of risk disclosures in 10-K filings and the length of 10-K filings. The 
horizontal axis shows the calendar years in which 10-Ks were filed. The left vertical axis shows the average 
length (i.e., word count) of 10-Ks filed in each year, represented by the vertical yellow bars. The right 
vertical axis shows the level of risk disclosures, as a percentage of risk-related sentences in the 10-K, 
represented by the blue curve.  
I follow prior studies and measure the level of risk disclosures based on the relative length of 
risk disclosure texts in 10-Ks. For textual disclosures in general and textual risk disclosures in 
particular, prior studies use measures such as readability (Li 2008), similarity (Brown and Tucker 
2011), and specificity (Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016) to capture additional attributes of qualitative 
disclosures. My first hypothesis does not directly speak to the relation between accounting 
conservatism and these disclosure attributes. However, I explore the effects of these disclosure 
attributes on the relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures in my later 
empirical tests.  
4.3.4 Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 1 
My first hypothesis predicts that accounting conservatism and risk disclosures are negatively 
associated with each other due to the substitutive relation between them. Prior studies investigating 




















variable as the explanatory variable (e.g. Brown and Tucker 2011; Huang, Teoh, and Zhang 2014; 
D’Augusta and DeAngelis 2020).23 Following this tradition, I test my main hypothesis using the 
model in Equation 4-4, where accounting conservatism is included as the explanatory variable. 
This model assumes that managers make the recognition decision before the disclosure decision.24 
This assumption is reasonable for the following reasons. First, most firms announce their earnings 
days and even weeks before they file their 10-Ks. Second, managers have more discretion over 
risk disclosures than over recognition choices, because financial statements are audited, whereas 
qualitative disclosures are not.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝜷𝟏𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +   ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (4-4) 
As described earlier, I measure risk disclosures as the percentage of risk-related sentences in 
10-Ks. I measure conservatism as the annual average of three commonly used firm-level 
conservatism measures. My first hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on conservatism (β1) is 
negative, reflecting a substitutive relation.  
In Equation 4-4, I control for determinants of risk disclosures following Campbell et al. 
(2014).25 They classify risk into systematic, idiosyncratic, financial, legal, regulatory, and tax risks. 
 
23
 In Section 4.5, I conduct an exploratory analysis using accounting conservatism as the dependent variable 
and risk disclosures as the independent variable. 
24 Although managers can make the two accounting choices sequentially in the sense that textual risk 
disclosure narratives can be finalized after auditors have finished their auditing of numeric financial 
statements, it is also possible that managers make these two choices simultaneously. In the latter case, a 
model using simultaneous equations would be more appropriate. To consider this possibility, I test the first 
hypothesis using simultaneous equations through 2SLS in my robustness check. However, I encounter some 
empirical challenges. I use instrument variables from prior studies, e.g., R&D expenditures and dividends 
used in Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse (2009), and investment cycle and firm age used in DeFond, Lim, and 
Zang (2015). I find that these instrument variables are not valid instruments to address my research question. 
A valid instrument variable should be related to accounting conservatism, but not related to risk disclosures. 
A simultaneous regression model using these instrument variables fails to pass the Hansen 
overidentification test (Hansen 1982). 
25 These variables, in some way, can also control for firms’ risk disclosures in other channels (e.g., earnings 
conference calls), since the annual report is the major, but not the only venue through which firms provide 




I use stock beta (BETA) as the proxy for systematic risk, earnings volatility (EARNVOL) and stock 
return volatility (RETVOL) as proxies for idiosyncratic risk, and financial leverage (LEV) as the 
proxy for financial risk. In addition, I use the litigation risk measure (LITRISK) developed by Kim 
and Skinner (2012) as a proxy for legal or litigation risk, size (SIZE) as the proxy for regulatory 
risk according to the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986), and cash Effective 
Tax Rate (ETR) as the proxy for taxation risk (Campbell et al. 2014). I also control for firm 
performance by including ROA and stock return (RET), and control for the growth opportunities 
by including the market-to-book (MTB) ratio. I control for the governance and information 
environment by including Big N auditor (BIGN) and analyst following (FOLLOW). I also control 
for stock return skewness (RETSKEW) and stock turnover (TURNOVER), which are associated 
with the level of risk disclosures (Campbell et al. 2014). Detailed definitions of these variables are 
included in Appendix B2. 
Due to the regulation change in 2005, I test my first hypothesis separately for fiscal years 
before and after 2005. The SEC’s mandate on risk disclosures and its subsequent reinforcement 
through regular reviewing of annual reports and issuing of comment letters set a lower bound in 
risk disclosure that firms must provide. This likely limits firms’ flexibility in trading off accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. Therefore, I expect that the predicted negative relation is weaker 
for the period after 2005.  
 
Form 10-K. Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999) find that firms relatively larger, more profitable, followed 
by more financial analysts, and having higher market-to-book-ratios are more likely to hold conference 
calls. My control variables such as SIZE, ROA, FOLLOW for analyst following, and MTB can proxy for 
information asymmetries and information demands, and they can control for risk disclosures through 




4.4 Empirical Analysis 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4-3 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used for testing my first hypothesis. 
The mean of risk disclosures (RISKDISC) is 18.34 over the entire sample period, indicating that 
18.34% of sentences in 10-Ks contain some risk information. The standard deviation is 6.98, 
suggesting that risk disclosures vary greatly across firm years. The level of risk disclosures has 
been increasing over time. The mean values of risk disclosures are 14.29 and 22.99 respectively 
for the years before and after the SEC’s mandate in 2005. The mean level of risk disclosures jumps 
from 17.91 in the year immediately before the mandate to 20.05 in the year immediately after the 
mandate. This is consistent with the spike shown in Figure 1.  
The composite conservatism measure (CONS) is the average of the three individual 
measures, namely, CSCORE, EARNSKEW, and CRATIO, standardized to the range of 0 to 1 by 
fiscal year. The mean (median) of CONS is 0.547 (0.548), suggesting that the distribution of this 
variable is approximately symmetric. The litigation risk (LITRISK) is the predicted probability of 
being sued by shareholders in a fiscal year. The mean (median) of this variable is 0.043 (0.026), 
indicating that the distribution of litigation risk is positively skewed. 
Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
RISKDISC 53,779  18.344 6.982 12.790 18.410 23.360 
CONS 53,779  0.547 0.115 0.468 0.548 0.627 
CSCORE 53,779  0.502 0.227 0.344 0.502 0.668 
EARNSKEW 53,779  0.544 0.196 0.430 0.536 0.668 
CRATIO 53,779  0.595 0.160 0.491 0.594 0.713 
SIZE 53,779  6.037 2.085 4.505 6.012 7.453 
LEV 53,779  0.205 0.186 0.019 0.179 0.332 
MTB 53,779  3.052 3.865 1.253 2.041 3.450 




EARNVOL 53,779  0.076 0.089 0.022 0.045 0.093 
ETR 53,779  0.271 0.202 0.077 0.320 0.380 
BIGN 53,779  0.832 0.374 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BETA 53,779  0.924 0.592 0.488 0.900 1.292 
RET 53,779  0.168 0.711 -0.223 0.058 0.373 
RETVOL 53,779  0.034 0.018 0.021 0.030 0.042 
RETSKEW 53,779  0.405 1.266 -0.106 0.323 0.811 
TURNOVER 53,779  7.649 7.363 2.678 5.463 10.040 
LITRISK 53,779  0.043 0.057 0.013 0.026 0.049 
FOLLOW 53,779  1.537 1.016 0.693 1.609 2.303 
 
Note: This table provides the descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions for testing hypothesis 
1. All variables are defined in Appendix B2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
percentiles, except for those log transformed, e.g., analyst following (FOLLOW).26  
Table 4-4 provides the correlation matrix for the key variables with Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations below (above) the diagonal. The correlations show that conservatism (CONS) is lower 
for larger firms and higher for more leveraged firms, consistent with prior research. The three 
individual conservatism measures are positively correlated with each other (CSCORE, 
EARNSKEW, and CRATIO), except that the correlation is rather weak given the large sample size. 
As expected, risk disclosures are greater for larger firms, firms with greater systematic risk (BETA), 
firms with greater earnings volatility (EARNVOL), and greater litigation risk (LITRISK). Overall, 
accounting conservatism (CONS) and risk disclosures (RISKDISC) are negatively correlated with 
each other, albeit weakly.  
 
 
26 Winsorization is a commonly used approach for handling outliers. It reduces the excessive impact of 
outliers on estimates. I acknowledge that this procedure modifies the tail distribution and can affect the 








Note: Pearson (Spearman) correlations are displayed below (above) the diagonal. In general, coefficients greater than 0.02 are significant at 1% 
level. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B2 at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 RISKDISC -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.24 -0.14 0.14 -0.09 0.13 -0.23 -0.05 0.38 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 0.37 0.19 0.23
2 CONS -0.03 0.55 0.57 0.30 -0.49 0.23 -0.34 -0.43 0.15 -0.12 -0.16 -0.19 -0.25 0.39 0.13 -0.18 -0.29 -0.39
3 CSCORE -0.03 0.48 0.04 0.16 -0.62 0.29 -0.41 -0.35 0.14 -0.09 -0.26 -0.25 -0.16 0.30 0.14 -0.30 -0.39 -0.54
4 EARNSKEW -0.05 0.59 0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.22 0.12 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01
5 CRATIO 0.00 0.30 0.07 0.04 -0.20 0.04 -0.10 -0.51 0.11 -0.13 -0.04 0.02 -0.16 0.22 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.14
6 SIZE 0.24 -0.50 -0.52 -0.06 -0.10 0.11 0.48 0.35 -0.31 0.11 0.34 0.44 0.18 -0.58 -0.27 0.48 0.71 0.82
7 LEV -0.11 0.26 0.32 0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 -0.23 0.08 0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.05 0.20 0.10
8 MTB 0.10 -0.19 -0.25 -0.02 -0.01 0.29 0.05 0.33 0.03 -0.05 0.12 0.23 0.29 -0.23 -0.05 0.27 0.19 0.37
9 ROA -0.13 -0.36 -0.22 -0.19 -0.27 0.31 -0.04 0.03 -0.23 0.28 0.06 0.01 0.24 -0.36 -0.12 0.09 0.11 0.24
10 EARNVOL 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.23 -0.18 0.08 -0.28 -0.29 -0.12 0.09 -0.05 0.42 0.15 0.09 -0.17 -0.22
11 ETR -0.18 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 0.13 0.05 -0.06 0.34 -0.26 0.07 -0.10 0.08 -0.19 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.09
12 BIGN -0.05 -0.17 -0.23 0.04 -0.03 0.33 0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.15 0.04 -0.13 -0.09 0.18 0.31 0.33
13 BETA 0.35 -0.17 -0.17 0.02 0.03 0.39 -0.07 0.13 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.15 0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.60 0.45 0.42
14 RET -0.01 -0.14 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.18 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.23 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.05
15 RETVOL -0.08 0.38 0.23 0.10 0.10 -0.56 -0.04 -0.07 -0.39 0.31 -0.22 -0.12 0.04 0.00 0.26 0.07 -0.21 -0.38
16 RETSKEW -0.05 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.05 -0.20 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.24 0.27 -0.13 -0.21 -0.26
17 TURNOVER 0.30 -0.11 -0.15 0.00 0.01 0.31 -0.04 0.13 0.02 0.11 -0.05 0.12 0.50 0.08 0.15 -0.04 0.51 0.56
18 LITRISK 0.09 -0.21 -0.25 0.01 -0.03 0.49 0.09 0.10 0.08 -0.04 0.03 0.17 0.28 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 0.29 0.67




4.4.2 Results of Testing Hypothesis 1 
In Table 4-5, I report the results for testing Hypothesis 1, which predicts a negative 
association between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. I present the results in three 
separate columns for fiscal years before 2005 (Column 1), after 2005 (Column 2), and all fiscal 
years (Column 3).27 In Column (1), the coefficient on the composite conservatism measure28, 
CONS, is negative and significant at less than 1% level (coefficient = −1.9165, t-stat = −3.81), 
consistent with the prediction of H1, for the period before 2005. In contrast, the coefficient is not 
significant for the period after 2005, as shown in Column (2). The coefficient is significant for the 
entire sample period, apparently driven by the strong results of the period before 2005 when 
narrative risk disclosures were voluntary. In terms of economic significance, one standard 
deviation increase in conservatism is associated with a decrease of risk disclosures by 3.8% of its 
sample standard deviation (0.114×1.9165/5.77, where 0.114 is the standard deviation of 
accounting conservatism and 5.77 is the standard deviation of risk disclosures for years before 
2005). The result is not significant after 2005, consistent with my expectation that the SEC 
 
27 Because the SEC regulation in 2005 significantly changed the incentives for risk disclosures, I test all 
my hypotheses separately for the periods before and after 2005. During my sample period, other significant 
events may have changed managers’ incentives for accounting conservatism and/or risk disclosures. For 
example, Lobo and Zhou (2006) document that firms increased their levels of reporting conservatism after 
SOX Act was passed in 2002. The passage of SOX Act occurred during my pre-2005 sample period. To 
investigate the impact of SOX Act, I conduct additional tests for the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods before 
2005. Untablulated results show that firms exhibit a trade-off between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures in the pre-SOX period (1995-July 2002), but not in the post-SOX period (August 2002-2004). 
The coefficient on accounting conservatism is still negative, but not significant, in the post-SOX period 
(August 2002-2004). Other than the impact of SOX Act, the insignificant result for this relatively shorter 
period could also be due to the smaller sample size, which can reduce the power of test. While my tests do 
not control for other potential events, the year fixed effects in my regressions may partly address the impacts 
of these events. 
28 While my tests are based on the composite measure in order to reduce measurement errors and increase 
the power of test, I repeat the tests using each of the three individual conservatism measures. These tests, 
untabulated, show that both CSCORE and EARNSKEW point to a negative relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures for the period before 2005. For the period after 2005, EARNSKEW also 





regulation constrains firms’ flexibility in trading off accounting conservatism and risk disclosures 
because firms must provide an acceptable level of risk disclosures under the regulation.29 Firms 
failing to meet the acceptable level of risk disclosures are at risk of receiving comment letters from 
the SEC demanding an explanation and/or rectification.  
Based on the forgoing evidence, it is unclear whether it is desirable or not that the SEC 
regulation appears to constrain firms’ flexibility in making such trade-offs. On the one hand, such 
trade-offs may reduce the overall reporting cost related to the two accounting choices. On the other 
hand, such trade-offs may lower information transparency. Investors and other financial statement 
users should benefit from more consistent and coherent information between accounting numbers 
and risk disclosures. Such consistency may allow them to better assess the risk and uncertainties 
faced by a firm. In Chapter 8, I revisit this issue by testing how investors react to firms’ trade-off 
strategies. Market reaction tests can provide evidence that sheds light on certain costs or benefits 
of the SEC’s mandate on risk factor disclosures.  
For control variables, the coefficients on earnings volatility (EARNVOL) and stock beta 
(BETA) are positive and significant, suggesting that firms with greater idiosyncratic risk and 
systematic risk provide more risk disclosures. The negative and significant coefficients on size, 
leverage (LEV), and profitability (ROA) show that larger, more leveraged, and more profitable 
 
29 The cross-sectional variation of risk disclosures decreases significantly in the period after 2005 when 
they became mandatory. The mean level of risk disclosures increases from 14.30 (pre-2005) to 22.99 (post-
2005); whereas, the standard deviation decreases from 5.77 to 5.10. Accordingly, the coefficient of variation 
(CV), which measures the dispersion of distribution, decreases from 0.40 to 0.22. This change in 
distribution is consistent with the notion that the SEC’s regulation constrains firms’ flexibility in trading 
off accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Another possible reason for the different result in the 
post-2005 period could be the change in the sample composition. As shown in Table 4-2, the number of 
firms is decreasing over time. Some firms drop out of the sample in the post-period. New firms can enter 
the sample. To rule out this possibility, I repeat the tests using a constant sample. I find that the coefficient 
on accounting conservatism (CONS) is still not significant for the post-2005 period. For the pre-2005 period, 
the coefficient becomes more negative relative to the results of the full sample, even though the significance 




firms provide a lower level of risk disclosures. Highly leveraged firms provide a lower level of 
risk disclosures possibly because their operations are relatively more stable, which allows them to 
carry a high level of debt. Firms audited by BIGN auditors provide more risk disclosures, 
consistent with prior research showing that Big N auditors are more concerned about litigation risk 
(Lennox 1999). Even though qualitative disclosures are not audited, auditors often review such 
disclosures and can influence their contents. Firms followed by more financial analysts also 
provide more risk disclosures, probably suggesting that such sophisticated information users 
demand risk information for their forecasts.  
Table 4-5: Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures30 
 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 9.0345***  18.0022***  9.0047*** 
 (10.85)  (13.64)  (11.14) 
CONS -1.9165***  -0.5921  -1.1181*** 
 (-3.81)  (-1.09)  (-2.96) 
SIZE -0.3283***  -0.3850***  -0.3437*** 
 (-6.09)  (-4.76)  (-6.81) 
LEV -1.8587***  -1.1154***  -1.8695*** 
 (-6.00)  (-2.74)  (-6.96) 
MTB 0.0186  0.0303**  0.0332*** 
 (1.31)  (2.12)  (3.10) 
ROA -4.3105***  -2.6859***  -3.6825*** 
 (-12.34)  (-6.58)  (-13.38) 
EARNVOL 4.4350***  2.6476***  3.8817*** 
 (8.03)  (4.11)  (8.90) 
ETR -1.3950***  -1.1733***  -1.3485*** 
 (-6.47)  (-6.45)  (-9.36) 
 
30 The adjusted R-squared increases significantly for the combined sample period in column (3) relative to 
columns (1) and (2). My further investigation suggests that the R-squared change is related to the apparent 
time-series trend in the dependent variable, RISKDISC, as shown in Figure 1. A robustness test by 
detrending RISKDISC (i.e., regressing it on the time variable and using the residual as the dependent 
variable) produces comparable results, with a much smaller adjusted R-squared value, 0.2645 for the 
combined sample period. R-squared values for the pre-2005 and post-2005 periods also decrease to 0.3087 




BIGN 1.4688***  0.7025***  0.9262*** 
 (9.33)  (3.76)  (7.02) 
BETA 1.0153***  0.3656***  0.8092*** 
 (11.13)  (2.83)  (10.09) 
RET 0.1527***  0.1950***  0.1939*** 
 (3.86)  (3.63)  (5.87) 
RETVOL 4.0142  9.9424*  6.1197** 
 (1.20)  (1.81)  (2.03) 
RETSKEW -0.0510*  -0.0262  -0.0372** 
 (-1.85)  (-1.22)  (-2.15) 
TURNOVER 0.1098***  0.0202**  0.0560*** 
 (11.49)  (2.20)  (7.72) 
LITRISK -0.1441  -1.1081  0.1579 
 (-0.19)  (-0.53)  (0.19) 
FOLLOW 0.6396***  0.9687***  0.8047*** 
 (7.94)  (7.63)  (10.21) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3914  0.3100  0.5984 
N 28,753   25,026   53,779 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
(CONS), using the model in Equation 4-4. All variables are defined in Appendix B2. Column (1) is for the 
period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. 
Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
 
4.4.3 Additional Tests of Hypothesis 1 
In this section, I present and discuss the results of several additional tests. The first test 
explores whether there is a relation between accounting conservatism and two attributes of risk 
disclosures, namely, readability and specificity. More readable and more specific disclosures are 
generally believed to provide greater information transparency (Li 2008; Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016). 
My tests do not find a relation between accounting conservatism and readability or specificity, and 




consideration to these two qualities of risk disclosures when they determine the level of risk 
disclosures conditional on the level of accounting conservatism.  
For the second test, I run a change model using the first differences of all variables to see 
whether the negative relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures still holds. 
Corporate disclosures tend to be sticky. Managers often repeat disclosures of prior years with little 
year-over-year update (Brown and Tucker 2011; Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence 2017). 
Disclosures are more informative when they vary over time to reflect the changing firm 
fundamentals and operating environments. The change specification addresses the concern that the 
raw textual measure does not capture the most relevant part of risk disclosures. The change 
specification also alleviates the concern that the result is driven by omitted firm characteristics. As 
shown in Table 4-6, the coefficient on the main conservatism variable is still negative and 
significant for the period before 2005. Similar to the main results in Table 4-5, the coefficient is 
not significant for the period after 2005, and the coefficient is significant for the entire sample 
period, as shown in Column (2) and Column (3) respectively.  




Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 0.8601***  0.8128***  0.8804*** 
 (3.94)  (6.35)  (5.85) 
ΔCONS -0.5405**  0.0423  -0.2868** 
 (-2.34)  (0.26)  (-1.98) 
ΔSIZE 0.0610  -0.0339  0.0430 
 (1.25)  (-0.93)  (1.35) 
ΔLEV 0.5788**  0.1122  0.3632** 
 (2.35)  (0.58)  (2.17) 
ΔMTB -0.0172**  0.0008  -0.0073* 
 (-1.98)  (0.21)  (-1.65) 




 (-0.63)  (1.72)  (0.18) 
ΔEARNVOL -0.2409  -0.1227  -0.2106 
 (-0.58)  (-0.45)  (-0.85) 
ΔETR 0.0424  -0.0345  0.0028 
 (0.43)  (-0.77)  (0.06) 
ΔBIGN 0.1117  0.1897*  0.1409 
 (0.87)  (1.84)  (1.64) 
ΔBETA -0.0069  -0.0408**  -0.0187 
 (-0.33)  (-2.09)  (-1.17) 
ΔRET -0.5539  -0.3787  -0.1577 
 (-0.29)  (-0.23)  (-0.12) 
ΔRETVOL 0.1021**  -0.0022  0.0686** 
 (2.31)  (-0.07)  (2.31) 
ΔRETSKEW -0.0131  0.0099  -0.0002 
 (-0.89)  (1.27)  (-0.03) 
ΔTURNOVER 0.0255***  0.0033  0.0144*** 
 (4.46)  (0.92)  (4.33) 
ΔLITRISK 0.4287  -0.1356  0.3873 
 (1.21)  (-0.33)  (1.29) 
ΔFOLLOW 0.0946*  0.0708*  0.0911*** 
 (1.76)  (1.96)  (2.66) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.0280  0.0210  0.0250 
N 22,543   20,781   43,324 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
(CONS) using a change specification. All variables are changes over the prior fiscal year. The original 
variables are defined in Appendix B2. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for 
the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are 
included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
For the change specification, I use an alternative measure, the cosine similarity, commonly 
used in the literature to capture year-over-year updates of textual disclosures (Brown and Tucker 
2011; Cohen, Malloy, and Nguyen 2020). I conduct an additional test using this measure as the 
dependent variable. For all other variables, I use the absolute values of changes over the previous 




pair of documents. Table 4-7 provides the results of this additional analysis. The dependent 
variable (MOD_RISKDISC) is calculated as (1-cosine similarity) and captures the year-over-year 
update of risk disclosures. A higher value indicates that the risk disclosures of the current year are 
more different from those of the previous year. The main variable of interest is ABS_ΔCONS, 
which captures the absolute value of the change in the level of conservatism over the previous year. 
The coefficients on this variable are negative and significant across all three sample periods, 
suggesting that firms having greater changes (increases or decreases) in accounting conservatism 
make smaller updates to their risk disclosures. This result provides mixed evidence for a trade-off 
between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. When there is an increase in accounting 
conservatism, a trade-off between the two accounting choices would suggest a smaller update of 
risk disclosures due to the stickiness of corporate disclosures. On the other hand, when there is a 
decrease in accounting conservatism, a trade-off relation between the two accounting choices 
would indicate a greater update of risk disclosures.  
Table 4-7: Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures (Change 
Model Based on Cosine Similarity) 
 
DV=MOD_RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 0.2366***  0.1205***  0.2330*** 
 (10.58)  (11.47)  (15.87) 
ABS_ΔCONS -0.0395***  -0.0162***  -0.0294*** 
 (-2.86)  (-2.98)  (-3.83) 
ABS_ΔSIZE -0.0006  0.0027*  0.0004 
 (-0.26)  (1.95)  (0.27) 
ABS_ΔLEV 0.0835***  0.0271***  0.0586*** 
 (6.06)  (4.61)  (7.26) 
ABS_ΔMTB 0.0008**  -0.0002  0.0002 
 (2.03)  (-1.42)  (1.04) 
ABS_ΔROA 0.0215**  0.0206***  0.0223*** 
 (2.28)  (4.60)  (3.97) 




 (-0.39)  (3.48)  (1.20) 
ABS_ΔETR 0.0166***  0.0101***  0.0135*** 
 (2.89)  (6.13)  (5.20) 
ABS_ΔBIGN -0.0020  0.0049*  0.0008 
 (-0.36)  (1.78)  (0.23) 
ABS_ΔBETA -0.0003  0.0011*  0.0002 
 (-0.36)  (1.77)  (0.25) 
ABS_ΔRET -0.0564  0.0907*  0.0311 
 (-0.53)  (1.72)  (0.47) 
ABS_ΔRETVOL -0.0035  0.0007  -0.0015 
 (-1.22)  (0.52)  (-0.82) 
ABS_ΔRETSKEW 0.0029***  0.0004  0.0014*** 
 (3.20)  (1.54)  (3.59) 
ABS_ΔTURNOVER 0.0000  0.0002  0.0001 
 (0.11)  (1.52)  (0.72) 
ABS_ΔLITRISK 0.1027***  0.1381***  0.1107*** 
 (6.40)  (8.74)  (8.16) 
ABS_ΔFOLLOW 0.0085***  0.0105***  0.0092*** 
 (2.78)  (7.09)  (4.93) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.0280  0.0210  0.0250 
N 22,543   20,781   43,324 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing the year-over-year modification of risk disclosures 
(MOD_RISKDISC) on the absolute year-over-year change in accounting conservatism (ABS_ΔCONS). All 
explanatory variables are absolute values of first differences because the dependent variable is unsigned. 
The original variables are defined in Appendix B2. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, 
Column (2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. Fama-French 48-industry fixed 
effects are included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
 
The foregoing results suggest that conservative reporting through timelier recognition of 
bad news in financial statements makes it less necessary to disclose forward-looking risk 
information in the current annual reports. This effect may spill over to risk disclosure decisions in 
future periods. To test this possibility, I include the lag conservatism variable (i.e., the 
conservatism value of the previous year) as an additional explanatory variable in the main 




coefficients on the lag conservatism measure, LAG_CONS, are not significant across the three 
sample periods. However, the coefficients on the contemporaneous conservatism variable, CONS, 
have magnitudes and significance levels similar to those of the main test without the lag variable 
for all three sample periods. The level of accounting conservatism in the current period appears to 
subsume that of the previous period. The result does not support the existence of a spillover effect. 
Instead, it suggests that the impact of conservative reporting choices on risk disclosures is largely 
confined to the current reporting period. In an untabulated analysis with only the lag conservatism 
variable, the coefficient on the lag conservatism variable is negative and significant for the pre-
2005 period. For the post-2005 period, the coefficient on the lag conservatism variable is 
insignificant for this specification. 
Table 4-8: Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures (Effect of 
Prior Year Conservatism) 
 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 10.1380***  18.5833***  9.8140*** 
 (10.99)  (12.34)  (11.29) 
CONS -1.6732***  -0.4349  -0.9826*** 
 (-3.60)  (-0.89)  (-2.89) 
LAG_CONS -0.5887  0.1919  -0.1266 
 (-1.28)  (0.45)  (-0.40) 
SIZE -0.3107***  -0.3288***  -0.3050*** 
 (-5.18)  (-3.67)  (-5.47) 
LEV -1.6263***  -1.0729**  -1.6924*** 
 (-4.62)  (-2.35)  (-5.62) 
MTB 0.0217  0.0207  0.0285** 
 (1.35)  (1.33)  (2.38) 
ROA -4.1987***  -2.3771***  -3.4409*** 
 (-10.13)  (-4.95)  (-10.62) 
EARNVOL 5.4381***  3.0814***  4.6969*** 
 (8.43)  (3.69)  (8.94) 
ETR -1.3844***  -1.1198***  -1.3165*** 




BIGN 1.3326***  0.6772***  0.8582*** 
 (7.68)  (3.28)  (5.90) 
BETA 0.1229***  0.1521***  0.1577*** 
 (2.86)  (2.58)  (4.40) 
RET 1.8098  8.3751  5.0040 
 (0.48)  (1.39)  (1.48) 
RETVOL 1.0760***  0.3453**  0.7965*** 
 (9.97)  (2.29)  (8.52) 
RETSKEW -0.0451  -0.0244  -0.0341* 
 (-1.51)  (-1.02)  (-1.80) 
TURNOVER 0.1077***  0.0213**  0.0558*** 
 (10.28)  (2.08)  (6.93) 
LITRISK -0.3970  -1.3407  -0.1115 
 (-0.47)  (-0.60)  (-0.12) 
FOLLOW 0.5489***  0.9186***  0.7433*** 
 (6.11)  (6.53)  (8.43) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3710  0.2660  0.5870 
N 22,543   20,903   43,446 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
(CONS) with the first lag of accounting conservatism (LAG_CONS) included. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B2. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, 
and Column (3) for the entire period. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
4.5 Inverse Regression of Accounting Conservatism on Risk Disclosures 
For all tests in previous sections, I use accounting conservatism as the explanatory variable 
and see how its change affects firms’ decisions on risk disclosures. As mentioned earlier, I have 
made this design choice because accounting numbers are usually finalized earlier than qualitative 
disclosures in annual reports.  
As an additional test, I rerun the model in Equation 4-4 but using accounting conservatism 




Duellman (2013), I add a few more variables to control for firms’ decisions in conservative 
reporting.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝜷𝟏𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +   ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (4-5) 
The additional control variables include sales growth (SALESGROWTH), R&D and 
advertising expenses (R&DAD)31, cash flow from operations (CFO), and volatility of revenue 
(σREV). Other control variables are the same as those in Equation 4-4. SALESGROWTH is the 
percentage growth in total sales over the prior year. R&DAD is the sum of R&D expenses and 
advertising expenses scaled by total sales. CFO is cash flow from operations, scaled by average 
total assets. σREV is the standard deviation of the natural log of the total revenue from year t-5 to 
year t-1, scaled by the mean log revenue over the same five-year period.  
Sales growth (SALESGROWTH) is included because it affects accrual changes in inventory 
and accounts receivables. R&D and advertising expenses (R&DAD) reflect regulatory demand for 
conservatism as they are generally expensed in the current period under GAAP. Cash flow from 
operations (CFO) controls for the profitability of the firm. Volatility of revenue (σREV) reflects 
the level of operating uncertainty. Debt holders usually demand greater reporting conservatism 
when operations are more volatile. 
Table 4-9 provides the results of this additional test. The dependent variable is accounting 
conservatism, and the main explanatory variable is the level of risk disclosures. I run this test also 
separately for the three sample periods. As shown in column (1), the coefficient on RISKDISC (risk 
disclosures) is negative and significant for fiscal years before 2005 at the 5% level. Note that the 
 
31 R&D expenses and advertising expenses are grouped together because these two types of expenses 
usually provide future benefits but are expensed in the current period under GAAP as a prudent accounting 




coefficient (−0.0003) is fairly small, relative to the standard deviation of risk disclosures (5.77) and 
that of accounting conservatism (0.114) for years before 2005. This suggests that there is a very 
small change in the level of accounting conservatism given a certain change in the level of risk 
disclosures. The relation does not hold for the period after 2005 or the whole sample period. The 
overall weaker result of the inverse regression is consistent with prior evidence showing that 
recognition usually has a greater impact than disclosure on stock prices (Michels 2017). In other 
words, recognition decisions have a greater economic impact than disclosure decisions from 
investors’ perspectives.  
In an untabulated additional test, I repeat the regression of Equation 4-5 but using the 
lagged risk disclosure variable, to see whether the level of risk disclosures in one year influences 
the firm’s accounting conservatism in the following year. I do not find an effect for any of the three 
sample periods. This lack of result is consistent with managers making conservative recognition 
decisions before risk disclosure decisions.  




Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 0.5809***  0.6785***  0.6160*** 
 (54.53)  (42.49)  (58.29) 
RISKDISC -0.0003**  -0.0000  -0.0001 
 (-1.98)  (-0.14)  (-0.85) 
SIZE -0.0248***  -0.0344***  -0.0292*** 
 (-34.75)  (-41.83)  (-53.38) 
LEV 0.1760***  0.1819***  0.1749*** 
 (43.95)  (40.77)  (57.75) 
MTB -0.0009***  -0.0022***  -0.0017*** 
 (-3.74)  (-12.32)  (-11.73) 
ROA -0.2053***  -0.2899***  -0.2469*** 
 (-32.56)  (-38.99)  (-50.11) 




 (1.20)  (0.41)  (1.91) 
ETR -0.0078**  0.0059**  0.0014 
 (-2.51)  (2.20)  (0.68) 
BIGN 0.0097***  0.0038*  0.0015 
 (4.35)  (1.86)  (1.03) 
BETA -0.0001  0.0056***  0.0068*** 
 (-0.07)  (3.62)  (6.95) 
RET 0.0020***  0.0123***  0.0059*** 
 (3.39)  (12.67)  (11.38) 
RETVOL 0.1120**  0.0506  -0.0186 
 (2.34)  (0.71)  (-0.47) 
RETSKEW -0.0001  -0.0005  -0.0002 
 (-0.22)  (-1.28)  (-0.62) 
TURNOVER 0.0003**  -0.0001  0.0000 
 (2.29)  (-0.72)  (0.22) 
LITRISK 0.0091  0.0984***  0.0272*** 
 (1.00)  (5.17)  (3.16) 
FOLLOW 0.0011  0.0029**  0.0023*** 
 (0.97)  (2.29)  (2.60) 
SALESGROWTH -0.0031**  -0.0009  -0.0015 
 (-2.44)  (-0.45)  (-1.41) 
R&DAD -0.0305***  -0.0325***  -0.0304*** 
 (-3.47)  (-3.24)  (-4.53) 
CFO 0.0951***  0.1334***  0.1086*** 
 (15.34)  (16.24)  (21.58) 
σREV -0.0193***  -0.0266***  -0.0249*** 
 (-5.44)  (-3.68)  (-7.70) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.5760  0.6130  0.5860 
N 28,551   24,934   53,485 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing accounting conservatism on risk disclosures. All variables 
are defined in Appendix B2. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period 
after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the 




4.6 Impact of the SEC Mandate on Risk Factor Disclosures in 2005 
The SEC mandate in 2005 on risk disclosures significantly increased the level of risk 
disclosures in annual reports. This regulation can change firms’ decisions in conservative reporting 
based on the reasoning of my main hypothesis developed in Section 4.2. The underlying rationale 
of my main hypothesis suggests that firms would reduce the level of accounting conservatism in 
response to the SEC mandate. Under the regulation, firms must provide an acceptable level of risk 
disclosures, regardless of the associated cost. If firms see conservative reporting and risk 
disclosures as substitutes, they would decrease the level of reporting conservatism in response to 
the regulation, because doing so would reduce the overall reporting cost.  
The mandate affects all public firms, except for smaller reporting companies. 32  One 
challenge of testing the effect of a regulatory change is to rule out confounding effects of other 
contemporaneous events. Even if a change in accounting conservatism is observed in the post-
period, the change is not necessarily attributable to the specific regulation. To overcome this 
challenge, I use Canadian firms as the control group and test whether US firms subjected to this 
regulation changed their accounting conservatism relative to Canadian firms. For this analysis, I 
exclude Canadian firms that are cross listed on US stock exchanges. I use C-Score developed by 
Khan and Watts (2009) as the main conservatism measure. The construction of the other two 
conservatism measures requires a long time series of data and that significantly limits the sample 
size of the control group, which is fairly small to begin with. I use the following Difference-in-
Differences specification to test whether US firms changed their accounting conservatism after the 
mandate: 
 




𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑅&𝐷𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝜎𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4-6) 
The dependent variable is CSCORE, constructed following Khan and Watts (2009), as 
described in Section 4.3.2.33 POST is a dummy variable, set to one for firm-years having a 10-K 
filing date on or after December 1, 2005, and to zero otherwise. The sample period is the four-year 
period centering on December 1, 2005, two years before and two years after. TREAT is set to one 
for US firms that are subject to the SEC’s regulation and to zero for Canadian firms that are not 
cross listed at a US exchange. SIZE, MTB, LEV, and LITRISK refer to firm size, Market-to-Book 
ratio, financial leverage, and litigation risk. They are defined in the same way as those in Equation 
4-4. Following Ahmed and Duellman (2013), I include the following additional control variables: 
sales growth (SALESGROWTH), R&D and advertising expenses (R&DAD), cash flow from 
operations (CFO), and volatility of revenue (σREV). These variables are defined in the same way 
as those in Equation 4-5, and they are included for the same reason as described in Section 4.5.  
Table 4-10, Panel A provides the sample distributions across the pre-post periods for the 
two groups of firms. There are 1,524 firm-year observations for Canadian firms over the four-year 
period, with 595 in the pre-period and 929 in the post-period. The sample size is much larger for 
US firms, with 9,922 firm years, of which 5,386 belong to the pre-period and 4,536 to the post-
period.  
Table 4-10, Panel B provides the regression results using the model specified in Equation 
4-6. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable is CSCORE, a commonly used firm-level 
conservatism measure that does not require time-series data and thus allows a larger sample for 
the control group. The key variable of interest is the interaction term, TREAT_POST. The 
 
33 Recently, Byzalov and Basu (2021) argue that using measures such as CSCORE constructed from a stage-




coefficient on this variable captures the difference in the pre-post change in accounting 
conservatism between the two groups of firms. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative 
and significant (−0.0369 with t = −2.50). This suggests that, relative to Canadian firms unaffected 
by the regulation, U.S. firms decreased the level of accounting conservatism after they provided 
more risk disclosures in annual reports as required by the SEC. The result is consistent with firms 
treating accounting conservatism and risk disclosures as substitutes and corroborates my findings 
in previous sections of this chapter.34  
Table 4-10: Implication of the SEC Mandate on Risk Disclosures for Accounting 
Conservatism 






Dec 1, 2003 – Nov 30, 2005 (Pre-period) 595 5,386 5,981 
Dec 1, 2005 – Nov 30, 2007 (Post-period) 929 4,536 5,465 
Total 1,524 9,922 11,446 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
 
34 I want to add a caveat that this result is not robust to a constant sample that consists of same firms in the 
pre- and post-periods. I cannot rule out the possibility that the current result is driven by the change in the 
sample composition.  















Note: This table reports the results for the Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis of the change in 
accounting conservatism as measured by CSCORE following the SEC mandate on risk factor disclosures 
in 2005, using Canadian firms as the control group. All variables are defined in Appendix B2. The 
coefficient on TREAT×POST is the DID estimator that captures the difference in the change in accounting 
conservatism between the two groups of firms. A negative coefficient indicates a decrease in conservatism 
for the treatment group relative to the control group. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop the first hypothesis that managers trade off conservative reporting 
and risk disclosures because both conservative reporting and risk disclosures can reduce 
information asymmetry and litigation risk. With two tools that managers can use to achieve the 
same purpose, they would weigh the relative costs and benefits of these two tools and make a 
trade-off to minimize the overall cost. I test this hypothesis using risk disclosures in annual reports 
provided by US firms for fiscal years from 1995 to 2018. I find support for this hypothesis for 
fiscal years before 2005 when risk disclosures were voluntary. The results are robust to alternative 
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similarity as an alternative measure of year-over-year change in risk disclosures, I find that firms 
make smaller updates to risk disclosures when there is a greater change (increase or decrease) in 
accounting conservatism over the previous year.  
For the period after 2005 when risk disclosures have become mandatory in annual reports, 
I do not find evidence that managers trade off conservative accounting and risk disclosures. This 
result is consistent with the notion that the SEC’s regulation constrains managers’ ability to make 
such trade-offs. When managers have less flexibility in trading off these two accounting choices, 
financial statement users may benefit from more transparent information about the risks and 
uncertainties of the firm. On the other hand, the loss of this flexibility can increase firms’ overall 
reporting costs.  
Finally, I test whether the SEC’s 2005 regulation, which exogenously increased the level 
of risk disclosures, has any effect on firms’ conservative reporting decisions. Using Canadian firms 
unaffected by the regulation as the control sample, I find that U.S. firms respond to this regulation 
by decreasing their level of reporting conservatism in the post period. This additional test provides 






Chapter 5  
Costs and Benefits of Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provides evidence that firms trade off conservative reporting and risk 
disclosures. In this chapter, I explore how the costs and benefits of accounting conservatism affect 
such trade-offs. Both accounting conservatism and risk disclosures impose considerable costs on 
firms as discussed in Chapter 4. For example, conservative accounting numbers are less useful for 
valuation purposes (Heflin, Hsu, and Jin 2015; Kim et al. 2019), and risk disclosures may divulge 
proprietary information (Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016). Firms face different levels of costs for these two 
choices, depending on their operating environments, governance structures, and needs for 
financing. Firms achieve a greater decrease in overall cost from a trade-off between these two 
choices when there is a larger difference between these two costs. In other words, firms have 
greater incentives to trade off conservative reporting and risk disclosures when the difference in 
cost is greater between these two choices. By the same reasoning, firms are more incentivized to 
make such trade-offs when the difference in benefit is greater. Empirically, the negative 
association between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures would be stronger in these cases. 
In this chapter, I consider several scenarios, in which the cost of one choice increases 
significantly but the cost of the other choice does not change very much. As a result, there is a 
greater difference in costs between the two choices in these scenarios. I expect that a larger 
difference in cost would create stronger incentives for managers to make trade-offs. I also consider 
a scenario, in which the anticipated benefit increases significantly for conservative reporting but 
not for risk disclosures. I predict that the greater differential in benefit also increases the incentives 




5.2 Hypothesis Development (Hypothesis 2) 
5.2.1 SEO Firms (H2a) 
For the first scenario, I consider seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Prior research suggests that 
SEO firms have incentives to report less conservatively or even choose to report aggressively to 
attract investor attention and increase share issuance prices. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
conservative reporting results in a downward bias in accounting numbers and may limit managers’ 
ability to convey their inside information about a firm’s true financial performance. Prior studies 
show that even sophisticated financial statement users such as financial analysts may not be able 
to fully appreciate the implications of conservative accounting choices (Heflin, Hsu, and Jin 2015; 
Kim et al. 2019). Conservative accounting can be costly if market participants do not fully 
appreciate the valuation implications of conservative accounting numbers and undervalue the stock 
price of the firm.35 Consequently, managers have strong incentives to report aggressively. Prior 
studies show that SEO firms have unusually high discretionary accruals in the period before their 
offerings (Rangan 1998; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998). Overall, these studies suggest that 
conservative reporting is much more costly for SEO firms than for non-SEO firms. 
However, prior studies do not provide a clear indication as to whether firms would perceive 
risk disclosures to be more or less costly for their planned equity offerings. On the one hand, prior 
research suggests that SEO firms may perceive risk disclosures to be more costly since they point 
to potential future bad outcomes. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that SEO firms have the 
intention to hype their stocks through voluntary disclosure. Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) find 
that SEO firms are motivated to engage in perception management by managing upward the tone 
 
35
 The prevalence of managers’ engagement in earnings management to boost firm values suggests that 
managers do not believe the market is efficient enough to fully see through their accounting choices (e.g. 




of qualitative disclosures before security offerings. On the other hand, several studies suggest that 
firms are motivated to increase disclosures before external financing to decrease the cost of equity 
by reducing information asymmetry (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; Marquardt and 
Wiedman 1998; Shroff et al. 2013). These findings imply that it can be more beneficial for SEO 
firms to increase risk disclosures. Overall, it is not clear whether SEO firms would see risk 
disclosures as more or less costly for their equity offerings.  
Based on the foregoing discussion on SEO firms’ reporting and disclosure behaviours, I 
contend that conservative reporting is a more dominant factor than risk disclosures in terms of 
their impact on equity financing cost. I posit that their different impacts on equity financing cost 
create greater incentives for SEO firms to report less conservatively and instead rely more on risk 
disclosures to communicate business uncertainties, relative to non-SEO firms, in the period before 
equity offerings. Therefore, I predict a more negative association between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures for SEO firms. This leads to the following hypothesis stated in 
the alternative form: 
H2a: The association between the level of accounting conservatism and the level of risk 
disclosures is more negative for firms planning seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) relative to 
Non-SEO firms. 
 
As with H2a, I focus my discussion on the cost consideration that creates incentives to trade 
off conservative reporting and risk disclosures when I develop the next two hypotheses (H2b and 
H2c). 
5.2.2 Debt Covenant Violations (H2b) 
The second scenario I consider is when a borrowing firm is close to debt covenant violations 
(DCVs). Covenants are included in debt contracts to mitigate agency conflicts and agency costs 




timelier recognition of bad news and can trigger earlier DCVs, which may result in control right 
transfers to debtholders (Beatty, Weber, and Yu 2008; Nikolaev 2010). DCVs impose significant 
costs on firms and their managers such as renegotiation costs, refinancing and restructuring costs 
(Beneish and Press 1993), and restrictions on firm investments (Chava and Roberts 2008). Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) posit that managers make accounting choices to avoid covenant violations. 
This debt covenant hypothesis has been empirically tested by other researchers (Sweeney 1994; 
Dichev and Skinner 2002) with supporting evidence. Overall, prior studies suggest that 
conservative reporting becomes more costly when firms are close to DCVs. 
On the other hand, when a firm is closer to DVCs, the cost of risk disclosures is not likely to 
increase significantly. Covenants consist of financial covenants and non-financial covenants. 
There is no evidence that any non-financial covenants are directly linked to firms’ risk disclosures 
provided in annual reports. Disclosing more risks may alert debt holders to increase their 
monitoring, but it would not push the firm closer to covenant violations. Based on the foregoing 
discussions about the different impacts on accounting conservatism and risk disclosures on DVCs, 
I posit that when a firm is closer to DCVs, managers have greater incentives to trade accounting 
conservatism for risk disclosures to avoid costly DCVs. Accordingly, I expect that they would rely 
more on risk disclosures to inform outsiders about downside risk and to reduce litigation risk. This 
leads to the following hypothesis in the alternate form: 
H2b: The association between the level of accounting conservatism and the level of risk 
disclosures is more negative for firms close to debt covenant violations (DCVs) relative to those 
far from DCVs. 
 
5.2.3 Proprietary Cost (H2c) 
In this section, I explore how the cost of risk disclosures affects the relation between accounting 




proprietary information about the firm. Concerns over such proprietary costs can reduce corporate 
disclosures (Verrecchia 2001). Empirically, Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012) find that firms with 
larger R&D expenditures, greater advertising expenses, and higher investment in intangible assets 
are more likely to hide information about their major customers in mandatory disclosures. Hope, 
Hu, and Lu (2016) document that firms with higher proprietary costs, proxied by R&D 
expenditures, are less transparent in risk disclosures.  
While the above-mentioned research suggests that proprietary cost consideration may reduce 
the level of risk disclosures, there is no prior evidence suggesting that it may suppress conservative 
reporting. On the contrary, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) find that firms report more conservatively when 
they face greater product market competition (which is another proxy of proprietary costs in the 
literature), presumably to deter the entry of new competitors. In summary, prior research suggests 
that concerns over proprietary costs tend to discourage risk disclosures but are unlikely to reduce 
incentives for conservative reporting. Therefore, I posit that firms facing higher proprietary costs 
have greater incentives to trade off risk disclosures and conservative reporting. This suggests a 
more negative association between the two accounting choices. Accordingly, I have the following 
hypothesis in the alternate form: 
H2c: The association between the level of accounting conservatism and the level of risk 
disclosures is more negative for firms facing greater proprietary costs relative to those facing 
smaller proprietary costs.  
The above three hypotheses (H2a, H2b, and H2c) explore whether and how the relative 
cost of conservative reporting or risk disclosures may increase the incentives for trade-offs 
between these two choices. For the next hypothesis, I explore whether the relative benefit of 




5.2.4 Debt Financing Needs (H2d) 
Prior studies document that conservative accounting can benefit firms through higher credit 
ratings and lower cost of debt because it can mitigate agency conflicts between equity holders and 
debtholders (Ahmed et al. 2002; Zhang 2008; Sunder, Sunder, and Zhang 2018). Anticipating such 
benefits, firms seeking debt financing have stronger incentives to report more conservatively. For 
example, Deng et al. (2018) find that firms with greater needs for debt financing do not decrease 
their level of conservatism even when existing debtholders reduced their monitoring. These firms 
voluntarily supply conservative reporting to satisfy prospective lenders in exchange for a lower 
cost of debt.  
Even though risk disclosures provide information useful for debt holders to better assess credit 
risk (Chiu, Guan, and Kim 2018), a higher level of risk disclosures could increase investors’ risk 
perceptions (Kravet and Muslu 2013). Due to the conflicting evidence of these two prior studies, 
it is not clear whether firms would be motivated to increase the level of risk disclosures when they 
have greater needs for debt financing. Even if firms see a greater necessity to reduce information 
asymmetry by increasing risk disclosures, a higher level of accounting conservatism likely benefits 
the firm more in lowering the cost of debt, relative to increased risk disclosures. This is because 
prior research shows that investors respond more strongly to recognized numbers than to disclosed 
numbers of the same magnitude (Michels 2017). It is likely more so for qualitative disclosures. 
Therefore, I expect that firms having greater needs for debt financing would rely more on 
conservative reporting to reduce information asymmetry about downside risk. In other words, I 
predict that firms with greater needs for debt financing are more incentivized to trade off risk 
disclosures and accounting conservatism. This leads to the following hypothesis stated in the 




H2d: The association between the level of accounting conservatism and the level of risk 
disclosures is more negative for firms with greater needs for debt financing relative to those with 
smaller needs for debt financing.  
5.3 Measures and Empirical Models 
The four hypotheses (H2a through H2d) in this chapter predict that the substitutive effect is 
stronger when managers have greater incentives to make trade-offs due to a larger difference in 
costs or benefits between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. My general approach for 
testing these hypotheses is to first create two sub-samples of firms with stronger and weaker 
incentives and then test the difference in the coefficients of interest between the two groups. I 
describe the detailed research design for testing each hypothesis as follows.  
5.3.1 Measures and Empirical Model for Testing Hypothesis H2a 
For H2a about the incentive created by equity financing, I examine the association between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures in the year before a firm offers additional securities. 
I test whether the association is significantly smaller for SEO firms relative to non-SEO firms, 
using the following model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜷𝟑𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (5-1) 
The above model expands the specification in Equation 4-4 for testing my first hypothesis (H1) 
in Chapter 4. All the control variables are the same as those in Equation 4-4. Following Huang, 
Teoh and Zhang (2014), I identify SEO firms based on the level of Sale of Common and Preferred 
Stock (SSTK) and require the level to be greater than 10% of the beginning total assets in year t+1 
for a firm to be identified as an SEO firm in year t. I construct a control group of non-SEO firms 
with similar characteristics by using propensity score matching. Following Shroff et al. (2013), I 
match the test and control samples by industry-year based on eight variables that proxy for firms’ 




value of equity, Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), sales growth, cash holdings, firm age, common 
stock dividends paid, and cumulative abnormal returns in the prior year. H2a predicts that the 
coefficient on the interaction term, β3, should be negative, consistent with a stronger substitutive 
effect for SEO firms.  
5.3.2 Measures and Empirical Model for Testing Hypothesis H2b 
To capture the distance to covenant violations for testing H2b, I construct a composite measure 
of covenant tightness, following the procedure in Pittman and Zhao (2019), based on the 
definitions of 15 common financial covenants specified in Demerjian and Owens (2016). Actual 
covenant definitions are usually not readily available. Demerjian and Owens (2016) infer covenant 
definitions from a large number of private loan agreements, which provide detailed covenant 
definitions. For example, they find that the minimum interest coverage ratio defined in loan 
agreements is closest to EBITDA/Interest Expense (OIBDPQ/XINTQ for Compustat variables), 
as shown in Table 4 of their paper. Following Pittman and Zhao (2019), I collect data of the stated 
financial covenants from DealScan and estimate the actual covenant ratios (e.g. current ratio) or 
amounts (e.g. tangible net worth) using Compustat data. While doing this, I benefit from the 
DealScan-Compustat link table created by Chava and Roberts (2008), who have been continuously 
updating this dataset and made it publicly available.36 
The detailed procedure to construct the composite index is as follows. First, I compute the 
actual value for each financial ratio at the end of each quarter.37 Second, I compute the slack for 
each ratio as (Actual ratio – Stated covenant ratio)/Stated covenant ratio for a minimum threshold 
 
36 The link table is available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/styled-9/styled-12/index.html.  
37  I illustrate the procedure using ratio-based covenants. Among the 15 common financial covenants 
referenced in Table 4 of Demerjian and Owens (2016), 12 are based on ratios. Three of them are based on 
absolute amounts, which include EBITDA, net worth, and tangible net worth. The slackness for covenants 




covenant and as (Stated covenant ratio – Actual ratio)/Stated covenant ratio for a maximum 
threshold covenant. For example, a minimum threshold covenant could be a current ratio of at least 
1.2, and a maximum threshold covenant could be a debt-to-equity ratio of no more than 1. Third, 
I calculate the aggregate covenant slack for each quarter as the average of the slacks for the 15 
ratios. Fourth, I take the average of the four quarterly covenant slacks as the annual covenant slack 
for a firm.38 A higher value in the annual covenant slack indicates that the firm is further away 
from a covenant violation. Finally, I transform the aggregate slack value for each firm year by 
multiplying by minus one so that a higher value indicates greater covenant tightness, i.e., closer to 
covenant violations.  
I assign firm-year observations with a positive value in covenant slack to the high-tightness 
group (HIGH_TIGHT=1), and the rest to the low-tightness group (HIGH_TIGHT=0). The high 
group faces greater covenant tightness and is closer to covenant violations. A positive value in 
covenant tightness does not necessarily mean that the firm has violated covenant violations due to 
the potential discrepancies between the standard covenant definitions proposed by Demerjian and 
Owens (2016) and the actual covenant definitions stated in loan agreements. I then use the 
following model to test H2b, which predicts a negative coefficient on the interaction term (β3).  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝜷𝟑𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
            (5-2) 
The control variables are the same as those in Equation 4-4 in Chapter 4, as with the models 
for other hypotheses in this chapter.  
 
38 I construct an alternative covenant-tightness measure based on the most-biding covenant for each fiscal 




5.3.3 Measures and Empirical Model for Testing Hypothesis H2c 
For H2c, I measure proprietary cost based on R&D expenditures, following Hope, Hu and Lu 
(2016), who use the level of R&D expenditures as a proxy for proprietary cost and find that firms 
with more R&D expenditures are less transparent in risk disclosures. Firms that invest more 
heavily in R&D are more concerned about revealing sensitive information, which can be used by 
competitors against them. I partition the sample into the high and low groups based on the median 
R&D expenses scaled by beginning total assets, following prior studies (e.g. Ellis, Fee, and 
Thomas 2012; Dambra, Field, and Gustafson 2015). I use the following model to test H2c, which 
also predicts a negative coefficient (β3) on the interaction term.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (5-3) 
5.3.4 Measures and Empirical Model for Testing Hypothesis H2d 
H2d predicts that firms having greater needs for debt financing are more likely to trade risk 
disclosures for conservatism so that they can enjoy a lower cost of debt. I capture the needs for 
debt financing by using the financing deficit measure, following Flannery and Rangan (2006) and 
Deng et al. (2018). This measure could capture financing needs for debt and/or equity. I exclude 
the SEO firms from the sample for testing hypothesis H2d because SEO firms are the focus of 
hypothesis H2a.  
Note that firms’ disclosure choices and financing choices are endogenous. This is a 
common challenge for this line of research. The decision to issue equity or debt and the change in 
the disclosure behaviour could be all driven by a third factor, that is, the presence of a net present 
value project. The availability of such a project may indicate a change in the risk profile of the 
firm. My tests are relatively less affected by this issue because my tests are not on the level of risk 




The financing deficit measure is calculated as cash dividends plus investment and change 
in working capital minus internal cash, i.e., [cash dividends + capital expenditure + change in 
working capital – (income before extraordinary items + depreciation expense)]/total assets.39 A 
higher value of this measure indicates that the firm has a greater financing need. To increase the 
test power, I assign firms to the group of high (low) debt financing needs if the financing deficit 
variable is in the highest (lowest) quintile. Then, I use the following model to test my hypothesis:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐹𝐼𝑁_𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝜷𝟑𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐹𝐼𝑁_𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡            (5-4) 
I predict that the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) is negative. All the control variables 
are the same as those in Equation 4-4 in Chapter 4.  
5.4 Empirical Analysis 
5.4.1 Results of Testing Hypothesis H2a 
In this section, I present the results for testing H2a. This hypothesis predicts that the 
negative relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures is stronger for SEO firms 
than non-SEO firms in the year before equity issuance. This is because SEO firms have greater 
incentives to boost earnings by reporting less conservatively and rely more on risk disclosures to 
communicate uncertainty. I identify 1,277 (501) SEO firms for the period before (after) 2005 and 
create a matched sample of an equal number of non-SEO firms using propensity score matching. 
I conduct the matching at the industry-year level based on eight variables following prior literature 
(Shroff et al. 2013).40 Table 5-1 presents these variables and the differences in their means between 
 
39 This measure considers the flow of cash and ignores a firm’s existing cash holdings. My results in Table 
5-5 are robust to the inclusion of a firm’s existing cash balance in the calculation of the measure. 
40
 To make sure that there are enough observations to estimate the propensity score for each industry year, 




the two groups of firms for the two sample periods. The sample size is larger for fiscal years before 
2005 (1,277 SEO firms) than after 2005 (501 SEO firms). The t-tests show that there is no 
significant difference in firm characteristics between SEO firms and the matched sample.  
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics of SEO Firms and Matched Firms 
 
Panel A: SEO samples – Before 2005 (1,277 SEO firms and 1,277 non-SEO firms) 
 
Variable Mean - SEO 
Mean - Non-
SEO Difference T-stat P-Value 
SIZE 5.484 5.245 0.24 0.47 0.64 
TOBINQ 2.839 2.434 0.41 0.56 0.58 
ROA -0.014 -0.040 0.03 0.35 0.73 
SALESGROWTH 0.158 0.230 -0.07 -0.64 0.53 
CASH 0.209 0.243 -0.03 -0.39 0.70 
FIRMAGE 2.230 2.147 0.08 0.43 0.67 
DIVIDEND 0.004 0.003 0.00 0.10 0.92 
ABRET 1.055 1.121 -0.07 -0.17 0.86 
 
Panel B: SEO samples – After 2005 (501 SEO firms and 501 non-SEO firms) 
 
Variable Mean - SEO 
Mean - Non-
SEO Difference T-stat P-Value 
SIZE 6.045 5.940 0.11 0.91 0.36 
TOBINQ 2.315 2.195 0.12 1.25 0.21 
ROA -0.068 -0.053 -0.01 -1.19 0.24 
SALESGROWTH 0.227 0.227 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CASH 0.217 0.207 0.01 0.70 0.49 
FIRMAGE 2.388 2.420 -0.03 -0.70 0.49 
DIVIDEND 0.012 0.011 0.00 0.79 0.43 
ABRET 0.205 0.209 0.00 -0.09 0.93 
 
Note: This table presents the comparison of matching variables between SEO firms and matched sample. 
All variables are for the fiscal year prior to equity offering. SIZE is the natural log of total assets at fiscal 
year end. TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt, scaled by 
book value of assets. ROA is return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items scaled by 
total assets. SALESGROWTH is the sales growth over the year. CASH is the cash balance scaled by total 
assets. FIRMAGE is the firm age based on the years the firm exists in the COMPUSTAT annual 
fundamental file. DIVIDEND is the cash dividend paid scaled by total assets. ABRET is the annual buy-





Table 5-2 provides the results of regressions using Equation 5-1. Due to the regulation in 
2005, I conduct the tests for the three sample periods separately. The main variable of interest is 
the interaction term, SEO×CONS. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant for 
the period before 2005 (coefficient = −2.6111, t-stat = −2.75). This suggests that the SEO firms 
make a greater trade-off between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures in the year before 
equity offerings, consistent with the prediction of H2a. The coefficient on CONS is not significant, 
suggesting that the matched non-SEO firms do not exhibit a negative relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures for this period. The coefficient on SEO×CONS is not significant 
for the period after 2005 and for the entire period. This is consistent with the argument that the 
regulation in 2005 constrains managers’ ability to trade off conservative reporting and risk 
disclosures even in a circumstance when firms have great incentives to do so.  
H2a focuses on the interaction effect that firms planning equity offerings have greater 
incentives for trade-offs between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures.41 The coefficients 
on conservatism (CONS) are the main effects for non-SEO firms. For the three sample periods, the 
positive coefficients on CONS suggest that these firms do not exhibit a trade-off between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. The main effect for SEO firms is represented by the 
sum of coefficients on conservatism (CONS) and the interactive term (SEO×CONS). F-tests show 
that the sum of coefficients is insignificant for all three sample periods. This suggests that overall 
SEO firms do not exhibit a trade-off between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures, even 
 
41 I test each of my conditioning hypotheses separately. These conditioning variables have low correlations 
with each other, with a few exceptions. Analyst following is highly correlated with litigation risk, for a 
coefficient of 0.42 (pre-2005) and 0.43 (post-2005). For the period after 2005, covenant tightness is highly 




though SEO firms show a greater tendency towards such trade-offs before 2005 relative to non-
SEO firms.  
Table 5-2: Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures for SEO Firms 
 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 4.1710**  11.0405***  2.5908 
 (2.70)  (6.37)  (1.62) 
CONS 1.6218  3.2921**  2.0870** 
 (1.33)  (2.02)  (2.05) 
SEO 1.4220**  1.3208  1.4185 
 (2.41)  (0.36)  (0.87) 
SEO×CONS -2.6111**  -1.4225  -2.3425 
 (-2.75)  (-0.23)  (-0.84) 
SIZE 0.0643  0.1007  0.0860 
 (0.61)  (0.61)  (0.99) 
LEV -2.5966**  -0.3514  -1.8909 
 (-2.21)  (-0.20)  (-1.62) 
MTB -0.0026  0.1056***  0.0372 
 (-0.22)  (8.41)  (1.19) 
ROA -1.3158**  1.2515  -0.6484 
 (-2.49)  (1.21)  (-1.00) 
EARNVOL 4.2540**  1.2191  3.7665** 
 (2.88)  (0.60)  (2.88) 
ETR -3.2028***  -0.9031**  -2.4656*** 
 (-3.65)  (-1.97)  (-5.50) 
BIGN 1.9993***  0.9826  1.5203*** 
 (5.87)  (1.44)  (7.75) 
BETA 0.6678***  -0.0574  0.5523*** 
 (6.03)  (-0.20)  (6.57) 
RET 0.2171**  -0.0767  0.1536 
 (3.20)  (-0.18)  (1.55) 
RETVOL 20.2702**  30.5074  23.7609** 
 (2.22)  (1.41)  (3.07) 
RETSKEW -0.0464  -0.0236  -0.0674 
 (-0.61)  (-0.26)  (-1.03) 
TURNOVER 0.0402**  0.0014  0.0191 
 (2.05)  (0.07)  (1.07) 




 (-0.91)  (-0.40)  (-0.78) 
FOLLOW 0.8862*  0.6128**  0.7800** 
 (1.91)  (2.21)  (2.05) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3550  0.3680  0.5480 
N 2,554   1,002   3,556 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for SEO firms relative to non-SEO firms. All variables are defined in Appendix B2 and Appendix C1. 
Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) 
for the entire period. SEO is an indicator variable equal to one for SEO firms in year t+1, and zero for the 
matched sample. The interaction term SEO×CONS captures the difference in coefficients between the two 
groups of firms. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
 
5.4.2 Results of Testing Hypothesis H2b 
H2b predicts that firms closer to debt covenant violations (DCVs) have greater incentives 
to substitute accounting conservatism for risk disclosures. Following Pittman and Zhao (2019), I 
use the covenant tightness measure to proxy for the distance to DCVs. This measure provides an 
estimate of the distance to DCVs by calculating covenant ratios using financial statement data and 
comparing them with those specified in private loan contracts. A greater value in the tightness 
(TIGHT) measure indicates that the firm is more constrained by debt covenants. For greater testing 
power, I assign firms with a positive TIGHT value to the high-tightness group (HIGH_TIGHT=1) 
group and those with a negative value to the low-tightness group (HIGH_TIGHT=0) group. 
Consistent with my prediction, Table 5-3 shows that the interaction term, HIGH_TIGHT×CONS, 
has a negative and significant coefficient (coefficient = −2.3056 and t-stat = −2.04) in column (1) 
for the sample period before 2005.42 The coefficients on conservatism (CONS) are not significant 
 
42 An untabulated test using the alternative measure based on the most-binding covenant yields comparable 




across all three sample periods, suggesting that firms farther away from DCVs do not exhibit a 
negative relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. For the pre-2005 period, 
the main effect for the high tightness group is also negative and significant (i.e. the sum of 
coefficients on CONS and HIGH_TIGHT×CONS), with a coefficient of –2.9405 and p-value of 
0.0115 (two-tailed). Taken together with earlier results, this suggests that only those firms closer 
to debt covenant violations exhibit a trade-off between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures when risk disclosures were voluntary.  
After the SEC’s mandate, the coefficient on HIGH_TIGHT×CONS becomes positive as 
shown in Column (2), suggesting that firms close to DCVs are more consistent in conservative 
reporting and risk disclosures in the period after 2005.43 In my earlier analysis of SEO firms, the 
interaction term is not significantly different from zero in the post 2005 period, as shown in Table 
5-2. Taken together, the results in Table 5-3 suggest that creditors of firms close to DCVs demand 
more consistent information from conservative reporting and risk disclosures relative to equity 
holders in the period after 2005. For the post-2005 period, the main effect for the high tightness 
group is positive and significant at better than 10% level.  
Table 5-3: Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures Conditional 
on Covenant Tightness 
 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 8.7598***  19.8701***  9.7301*** 
 (6.66)  (8.19)  (6.44) 
CONS -0.6349  -0.4431  -0.4266 
 (-0.87)  (-0.54)  (-0.77) 
HIGH_TIGHT 1.2256*  -1.3781*  0.2050 
 (1.76)  (-1.95)  (0.39) 
 
43 I repeat the test for the post-2005 period using the alternative measure and find that the coefficient on the 




HIGH_TIGHT×CONS -2.3056**  2.7010**  -0.3339 
 (-2.04)  (2.35)  (-0.39) 
SIZE -0.3629***  -0.4016***  -0.3184*** 
 (-4.82)  (-3.21)  (-4.49) 
LEV -0.9674**  0.1605  -0.8581** 
 (-2.07)  (0.26)  (-2.16) 
MTB 0.0379*  0.0004  0.0231 
 (1.79)  (0.02)  (1.63) 
ROA -2.3169***  0.9479  -1.2727** 
 (-3.86)  (1.15)  (-2.51) 
EARNVOL 5.6846***  1.0978  4.1748*** 
 (6.20)  (0.95)  (5.77) 
ETR -0.9521***  -0.9074***  -1.0219*** 
 (-3.27)  (-3.48)  (-5.15) 
BIGN 0.8593***  -0.1392  0.2306 
 (3.41)  (-0.43)  (1.05) 
BETA 0.0759  0.1717*  0.1427** 
 (1.05)  (1.86)  (2.41) 
RET 8.3820  0.8656  9.4168** 
 (1.60)  (0.11)  (2.01) 
RETVOL 0.9261***  0.0957  0.5307*** 
 (6.57)  (0.48)  (4.28) 
RETSKEW -0.0455  -0.0410  -0.0448* 
 (-1.24)  (-1.17)  (-1.71) 
TURNOVER 0.1037***  0.0205  0.0502*** 
 (7.16)  (1.57)  (4.67) 
LITRISK 0.9081  3.6775  2.0037* 
 (0.79)  (1.28)  (1.65) 
FOLLOW 0.5586***  0.6084***  0.6311*** 
 (5.01)  (2.91)  (5.30) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3190  0.2640  0.5620 
N 12,310   10,971   23,281 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for firms with high covenant tightness relative to those with low tightness. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B2 and Appendix C1. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the 
period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. HIGH_TIGHT is an indicator variable equal to one 
for firms with high covenant tightness, and zero for low tightness firms. The interaction term, 
HIGH_TIGHT×CONS, captures the difference in coefficient between the two groups of firms. Fama-




coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
5.4.3 Results of Testing Hypothesis H2c 
H2c predicts that the relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures is more 
negative when firms face greater proprietary costs. Similarly, I assign firms to the high and low-
cost groups based on the median R&D expenditures. Table 5-4 presents the regression results. The 
coefficient on the interaction term, HIGH_R&D×CONS, is negative and significant for the period 
before 2005 as shown in Column (1). This suggests that firms investing more heavily in R&D are 
more likely to trade off accounting conservatism and risk disclosures, consistent with my 
prediction. However, this relation does not hold for the period after 2005, again suggesting that 
the mandate on risk factor disclosures constrains firms’ ability to make such trade-offs by imposing 
a floor level of risk disclosures. Similar to the results about the effect of covenant tightness, the 
coefficients on conservatism (CONS) are not significant for all three sample periods. This suggests 
that firms facing lower proprietary costs do not appear to trade off accounting conservatism and 
risk disclosures. For the high proprietary group, the main effect has a coefficient of –3.75, with a 
p-value of 0.0000 (two-tailed), for the pre-2005 period. Taken together, only firms facing high 
proprietary costs exhibit a trade-off between the two accounting choices when risk disclosures 
were voluntary. For the post-2005 period, the main effect of the group with high proprietary costs 
is not significant, with a coefficient of –0.6384 and a p-value of 0.3630 (two-tailed).  
Table 5-4: Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures Conditional 
on Proprietary Costs 
 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 8.0532***  17.9415***  8.4561*** 
 (9.49)  (13.54)  (10.34) 
CONS -0.3429  -0.5521  -0.2765 




HIGH_R&D 2.6491***  0.2861  1.5169*** 
 (6.13)  (0.50)  (3.99) 
HIGH_R&D×CONS -3.4038***  -0.0863  -1.7288*** 
 (-4.77)  (-0.10)  (-2.87) 
SIZE -0.3512***  -0.3898***  -0.3572*** 
 (-6.53)  (-4.79)  (-7.02) 
LEV -1.7150***  -1.0411**  -1.7518*** 
 (-5.54)  (-2.53)  (-6.48) 
MTB 0.0129  0.0291**  0.0299*** 
 (0.91)  (2.04)  (2.81) 
ROA -4.3232***  -2.6479***  -3.6503*** 
 (-12.28)  (-6.44)  (-13.12) 
EARNVOL 4.1901***  2.6216***  3.7501*** 
 (7.61)  (4.06)  (8.60) 
ETR -1.2897***  -1.1499***  -1.2815*** 
 (-6.01)  (-6.32)  (-8.93) 
BIGN 1.4375***  0.7059***  0.9170*** 
 (9.13)  (3.77)  (6.94) 
BETA 0.1705***  0.1928***  0.1995*** 
 (4.32)  (3.59)  (6.04) 
RET 3.2519  9.6307*  5.4246* 
 (0.98)  (1.74)  (1.80) 
RETVOL 0.9862***  0.3751***  0.8066*** 
 (10.88)  (2.88)  (10.01) 
RETSKEW -0.0512*  -0.0258  -0.0380** 
 (-1.86)  (-1.19)  (-2.19) 
TURNOVER 0.1086***  0.0203**  0.0559*** 
 (11.43)  (2.21)  (7.74) 
LITRISK -0.1303  -1.1238  0.1184 
 (-0.17)  (-0.54)  (0.14) 
FOLLOW 0.6463***  0.9591***  0.7965*** 
 (8.03)  (7.55)  (10.05) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3950  0.3090  0.6000 
N 28,753   24,886   53,639 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for firms with high R&D relative to those with low R&D. All variables are defined in Appendix B2 and 
Appendix C1. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, 




median R&D expenditure and zero otherwise. The interaction term HIGH_R&D×CONS captures the 
difference in coefficient between the two groups of firms. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are 
included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
 
5.4.4 Results of Testing Hypothesis H2d 
H2d predicts that firms with greater needs for debt financing have stronger incentives to 
trade off accounting conservatism and risk disclosures because such firms benefit more from 
conservative reporting through lower cost of borrowing. Table 5-5 provides the regression results 
for testing this hypothesis. HIGH_FIN_NEEDS is an indicator variable equal to one for firms with 
greater financing needs and zero otherwise.  
For this analysis, I exclude firms that issued equity in year t+1, so that the 
HIGH_FIN_NEEDS variable captures the needs for debt financing. These firms are the focus of 
H2d, which predicts that firms are more likely to trade off these two choices in the period before 
their planned equity offerings to reduce the cost of equity. A firm’s financing decision to issue 
debt or equity depends on many factors. According to the pecking order theory, firms will rely 
first on internal funds to finance their investments, then on debts, and finally on equity as the last 
choice (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
The interaction term, HIGH_FIN_NEEDS×CONS, is the main variable of interest, which 
reflects the impact of debt financing incentives on the trade-off between accounting conservatism 
and risk disclosures. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant for the period 
before 2005. This is consistent with the notion that firms with greater needs for debt financing 
benefit more from conservative reporting and they have relatively lower incentives to provide risk 
disclosures. In other words, such firms have a greater tendency to trade off accounting 
conservatism for risk disclosures. Accordingly, we observe a more negative association between 




interaction term is negative but not significant for the period after 2005, probably also due to the 
SEC regulation in 2005. Similar to the tests for the previous two hypotheses, the coefficient on 
conservatism (CONS) is not significant for any of the three sample periods. This suggests that 
firms with smaller needs for debt financing do not exhibit a substitutive relation between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. 
For the group of firms with high needs for debt financing, the main effects are negative and 
significant for both pre and post-2005 periods. The sum of the coefficients on CONS and 
HIGH_FIN_NEEDS×CONS is –3.3499 (p-value of 0.0003, two-tailed) and –2.0835 (p-value of 
0.0277) respectively for the pre and post-periods. Given that the coefficients on conservatism 
(CONS) alone are insignificant, this suggests that only firms with high needs for debt financing 
exhibit a trade-off between conservative accounting and risk disclosures in the pre-2005 period. In 
particular, firms with high needs for debt financing also exhibit a trade-off in the post-2005 period. 
This is in contrast to the result of H1 about the general relation between accounting conservatism 
and risk disclosures for the post-2005 period presented in Table 4-5, which shows an insignificant 
relation between these two accounting choices.  
Table 5-5: Relation between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures Conditional 
on Debt Financing Needs 
 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005  After-2005  All-Years 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant 7.1466***  18.2141***  7.7442*** 
 (4.98)  (10.69)  (6.80) 
CONS -0.8268  -1.0884  -0.9076 
 (-0.89)  (-1.10)  (-1.33) 
HIGH_FIN_NEEDS 1.9701***  1.0046  1.5537*** 
 (3.49)  (1.60)  (3.58) 
HIGH_FIN_NEEDS×CONS -2.5231***  -0.9951  -1.8311** 
 (-2.62)  (-0.95)  (-2.50) 
SIZE -0.2979***  -0.4560***  -0.3528*** 




LEV -2.7315***  -1.8711***  -2.6015*** 
 (-6.18)  (-3.33)  (-7.13) 
MTB 0.0082  0.0430  0.0382** 
 (0.38)  (1.60)  (2.09) 
ROA -3.2031***  -1.3158**  -2.4719*** 
 (-6.71)  (-2.47)  (-6.93) 
EARNVOL 4.0226***  2.5175***  3.6205*** 
 (5.26)  (2.85)  (6.16) 
ETR -1.4605***  -1.1008***  -1.3565*** 
 (-4.05)  (-3.32)  (-5.43) 
BIGN 1.4711***  1.1393***  1.2066*** 
 (6.25)  (4.87)  (6.90) 
BETA 0.9668***  0.2665  0.7784*** 
 (6.80)  (1.57)  (7.12) 
RET 0.0926  0.3494***  0.1718*** 
 (1.26)  (3.60)  (2.84) 
RETVOL 0.3277  22.6912***  7.2730* 
 (0.06)  (2.97)  (1.67) 
RETSKEW -0.0529  -0.1280***  -0.0790** 
 (-1.08)  (-3.24)  (-2.53) 
TURNOVER 0.1043***  0.0089  0.0490*** 
 (7.89)  (0.79)  (5.45) 
LITRISK -0.8247  1.2258  0.1698 
 (-0.82)  (0.45)  (0.17) 
FOLLOW 0.7434***  1.2411***  0.9695*** 
 (6.19)  (7.26)  (8.91) 
Time fixed effects YES  YES  YES 
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.4080  0.3410  0.6000 
N 8,912  7,550  16,462 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for firms with higher needs for debt financing relative to those with lower needs. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B2 and Appendix C1. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the 
period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. HIGH_FIN_NEEDS is an indicator variable equal 
to one for firms with high needs for debt financing and zero otherwise. The interaction term, 
HIGH_FIN_NEEDS×CONS, captures the difference in coefficient between the two groups of firms. Fama-
French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 






In this chapter, I explore how the relative costs and benefits of conservative reporting and 
risk disclosures affect firms’ decisions in coordinating these two choices. I hypothesize that firms 
have greater incentives to trade off conservative reporting and risk disclosures under situations 
where one choice becomes more costly relative to the other choice. Specifically, I look at firms 
planning for equity offerings, firms close to debt covenant violations, firms facing greater 
proprietary cost, and firms having greater needs for debt financing. I find evidence consistent with 
these hypotheses for the period before 2005 when risk disclosures were voluntary. The results do 
not hold for the period after 2005, consistent with the notion that the SEC’s regulation and its 
subsequent enforcement impose a floor level of risk disclosures and thus constrain firms’ ability 
to coordinate conservative reporting and risk disclosure decisions. Moreover, I find that firms 
facing low incentives for trade-offs do not exhibit a substitutive relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures even in the period before 2005. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the relative costs and benefits of conservative reporting and risk disclosures are 





Chapter 6  
Factors Constraining Trade-offs between Accounting Conservatism 
and Risk Disclosures 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider several factors that can potentially constrain firms’ ability to 
trade off conservative reporting and risk disclosures. Broadly speaking, these factors are related to 
the monitoring roles played by various parties. The first factor is litigation risk, which can be seen 
as a form of monitoring by shareholders, who can take legal actions against firms’ information 
misrepresentation. The second is the external monitoring role played by financial analysts, who 
are sophisticated information users. For the third factor, I examine the internal monitoring role 
played by disclosure committees, which are part of the corporate governance structure of some 
firms.  
6.2 Hypothesis Development (Hypothesis 3) 
As described earlier, both conservative reporting and risk disclosures can benefit firms by 
reducing litigation risk. Prior studies find that litigation concern is a key driver of conservative 
reporting choices (e.g. Chung and Wynn 2008; Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang 2016). Firms report 
more conservatively when they face higher litigation risk. On the other hand, one major benefit of 
risk disclosures is that they reduce litigation risk (Field, Lowry, and Shu 2005; Nelson and 
Pritchard 2016). When facing a high level of litigation risk, firms may need to apply both 
conservative reporting and provide risk disclosures at high levels to protect themselves from 
potentially high litigation costs. Therefore, I contend that a high litigation pressure reduces the 




higher litigation risks may exhibit a more positive (i.e., less negative) association between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Formally, I formulate the following hypothesis in 
the alternate form:  
H3a: The association between the level of accounting conservatism and the level of risk 
disclosures is more positive for firms facing high litigation risk relative to those facing low 
litigation risk. 
For the next hypothesis, I explore whether external monitoring by financial analysts may 
constrain firms’ ability to make the tradeoff. Since accounting numbers and risk disclosures are 
included in the same information package, managers face the pressure to provide coherent and 
consistent information. Accounting conservatism requires timelier recognition of losses versus 
gains in earnings. This makes it necessary for managers to discuss and disclose more about the 
risks and uncertainties surrounding potential future losses to justify the accounting numbers that 
have been recognized in financial statements. Prior research suggests that financial statement users 
are sensitive to disagreements between accounting numbers and the tone of qualitative disclosures, 
and they would question the credibility of the information when disagreements are detected (Henry 
2008; Baginski et al. 2016). For example, Baginski et al. (2016) find that when the signal from the 
quantitative news is consistent with that of the linguistic tone, investors react more strongly to the 
linguistic tone. D’Augusta and DeAngelis (2020) find that conservative accounting mitigates 
upward tone management in MD&As of annual reports. These findings suggest that conservative 
accounting numbers (hard information) tend to discipline qualitative disclosures (soft information). 
Overall, the evidence offered by this line of research implies that managers have incentives to 
provide consistent information.  
The pressure faced by firms and managers to maintain consistency in conservative reporting 




financial statement users are better able to detect inconsistencies between quantitative information 
and qualitative disclosures. Financial analysts are sophisticated information users, who regularly 
track firms’ financial reports and collect information from other sources. With their industry 
knowledge and their superior information processing ability, they are better equipped to detect 
inconsistencies in a financial report. Prior studies have documented the monitoring role played by 
financial analysts in improving financial reporting. For example, using brokerage closure as an 
exogenous shock, Irani and Oesch (2013) find that firms with a drop in analyst coverage experience 
a decrease in their reporting quality. When firms’ financial reporting is under the scrutiny of more 
financial analysts, managers face greater pressure to maintain consistency between conservative 
reporting and risk disclosures. Therefore, I expect a greater consistency (i.e., less trade-off) 
between financial accounting conservatism and risk disclosures for firms followed by more 
financial analysts. Formally, I have the following hypothesis in the alternate form:  
H3b: The association between the level of accounting conservatism and the level of risk 
disclosures is more positive for firms followed by a high number of financial analysts relative to 
those followed by a low number of financial analysts.  
For the above hypothesis, I predict that external monitoring by financial analysts mitigates 
the trade-off between conservative reporting and risk disclosures. For the next hypothesis (H3c), I 
examine whether corporate governance, as a form of internal monitoring, plays a similar role. 
Specifically, I focus on the role of disclosure committees, a governance mechanism that has 
received little attention in the academic literature (Bailey, Nash, and Xu 2020). Back in 2002 when 
the SEC enacted management certification of annual and quarterly reports and internal control 
procedures pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it recommended firms form 
committees with the responsibility “for considering the materiality of information and determining 
disclosure obligations on a timely basis” (SEC 2002). Some firms established disclosure 




Practitioners believe that disclosure committees can “help ensure that company filings are 
accurate, complete, timely and fair” (Deloitte 2013). Anecdotal evidence suggests that many firms 
describe disclosure committees as an effective governance mechanism that allows them to provide 
disclosures meeting investor expectations and regulatory requirements (EY 2014; 2015). 
Empirically, Bailey, Nash, and Xu (2020) find that firms with a disclosure committee provide more 
readable 10-K disclosures and file their 10-K Forms in a timelier manner. These findings suggest 
that the presence of a disclosure committee improves disclosure outcomes. If disclosure 
committees promote transparent and faithful disclosures, then a firm with a disclosure committee 
should provide a level of risk disclosures that is more in line with the actual risks and uncertainties 
faced by the firm. The decision about risk disclosures would be less affected by a firms’ recognition 
decisions when it comes to the timing of loss recognition related to conservative reporting. In other 
words, the existence of a disclosure committee may constrain managers’ ability to use risk 
disclosures and conservative reporting as substitutes. This leads to the following hypothesis stated 
in the alternate form:  
H3c: The association between the level of accounting conservatism and the level of risk 
disclosures is more positive for firms having a disclosure committee relative to those having no 
disclosure committee.  
However, it is also possible that the presence of a disclosure committee does not have a 
significant impact on managers’ coordination of conservative reporting and risk disclosures. 
Ultimately, it is senior executives, “who bear express responsibility for designing, establishing, 
maintaining, reviewing and evaluating the issuer's disclosure controls and procedures” (SEC 2002). 
A disclosure committee may play a symbolic role with little impact on a firm’s disclosure policy. 




6.3 Measures and Models for Testing Hypotheses H3a, H3b, and H3c 
In this section, I describe the measures and models for testing my third set of hypotheses. 
For H3a, I assign a firm-year observation to the high (low) litigation risk group based on the 
litigation risk measure developed by Kim and Skinner (2012). The high (low) litigation risk group 
consists of firms whose litigation risk is above (below) the median litigation risk. I expand the base 
model specified in Equation 4-4 in Chapter 4 by including the high-low indicator variable and its 
interaction with accounting conservatism. I use the following model to test H3a:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 +
𝜷𝟑𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
            (6-1) 
The variable, HIGH_LITRISK, is an indicator variable set to one (zero) for the high (low) 
litigation risk group. H3a predicts a positive coefficient on the interaction term, HIGH_LITRISK× 
Conservatism, consistent with the notion that firms have less flexibility to trade off conservative 
reporting and risk disclosures when they face high litigation risk.  
For H3b, I partition the sample into two groups based on the median analyst following. 
Similarly, I use the following model to test this hypothesis.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 +
𝜷𝟑𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
            (6-2) 
The variable, HIGH_FOLLOW, is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the number 
of analysts that follow a firm is above (below) the median. I predict that the coefficient on the 
interaction term (β3) is positive, consistent with firms followed by more financial analysts having 
less flexibility in trading off conservative reporting and risk disclosures.  
For H3c, I measure the existence of a disclosure committee by searching for “disclosure 




disclosure committee if “disclosure committee” is mentioned at least once in any of its SEC filings 
since electronic filing started in 1994. This search relies on a data service provided by SeekEdgar44, 
which provides an engine for quickly searching through all electronic SEC filings, such as 10-Ks, 
10-Qs, proxy statements, among others. I acknowledge that some firms may have a disclosure 
committee but never disclosed this in any of their filings. This measurement error can bias against 
finding results. I use the following model to test H3c:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6-3) 
DISC_COMM is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a disclosure committee and 
zero otherwise. I predict a positive coefficient on the interaction term, 
DISC_COMM×Conservatism. All control variables are the same as those in Equation 4-4 specified 
in Chapter 4. 
6.4 Results of Testing Hypotheses H3a, H3b, and H3c 
6.4.1 Results for H3a 
H3a predicts that when firms face high litigation risk, they may need to supply both 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures at high levels to guard against shareholder litigations. 
This can limit firms’ ability to trade off accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Table 6-1 
presents the results for this test. Across all three sample periods, the coefficient on the interaction 
term, HIGH_LITRISK×CONS, is positive and significant, consistent with my prediction. 
Moreover, the effect appears to be slightly stronger for the period before 2005 when qualitative 
risk disclosures were voluntary, according to the magnitudes and significance levels of the 
coefficients. The coefficients on conservatism (CONS) are negative and significant across the three 
 




sample periods, even for the period after 2005. This suggests that firms facing a lower level of 
litigation risk also trade off conservative reporting and risk disclosures even in the period when 
risk disclosures have become mandatory. Compared with the period when risk disclosures were 
voluntary, the magnitude and significance level are smaller in the mandatory period after 2005. F-
tests show that the sum of the coefficients on CONS and HIGH_LITRISK×CONS is insignificant 
for the pre-2005 or post-2005 period. This suggests that firms facing high litigation risks do not 
exhibit a trade-off between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures for both sample periods.  




Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 9.6038***  18.5988***  9.5069*** 
 (11.45)  (13.70)  (11.53) 
CONS -2.9274***  -1.6133**  -2.0878*** 
 (-5.27)  (-2.43)  (-4.82) 
HIGH_LITRISK -1.2642***  -0.9151**  -1.0783*** 
 (-3.41)  (-2.12)  (-3.65) 
HIGH_LITRISK×CONS 2.4488***  1.7383**  1.9551*** 
 (3.85)  (2.50)  (3.95) 
SIZE -0.3280***  -0.3858***  -0.3353*** 
 (-6.02)  (-4.84)  (-6.61) 
LEV -1.8990***  -1.1562***  -1.8887*** 
 (-6.13)  (-2.81)  (-7.02) 
MTB 0.0202  0.0312**  0.0337*** 
 (1.43)  (2.18)  (3.16) 
ROA -4.2946***  -2.7448***  -3.6959*** 
 (-12.30)  (-6.72)  (-13.43) 
EARNVOL 4.4088***  2.6605***  3.8830*** 
 (7.99)  (4.12)  (8.91) 
ETR -1.4001***  -1.1786***  -1.3576*** 
 (-6.50)  (-6.48)  (-9.42) 
BIGN 1.4476***  0.6897***  0.9117*** 
 (9.21)  (3.68)  (6.93) 




 (3.87)  (3.55)  (5.72) 
RET 4.1954  10.3631*  6.6372** 
 (1.27)  (1.89)  (2.22) 
RETVOL 1.0018***  0.3268**  0.7865*** 
 (11.02)  (2.57)  (9.95) 
RETSKEW -0.0506*  -0.0249  -0.0366** 
 (-1.84)  (-1.15)  (-2.12) 
TURNOVER 0.1087***  0.0188**  0.0550*** 
 (11.39)  (2.05)  (7.60) 
LITRISK -0.1891  -0.9247  0.2886 
 (-0.24)  (-0.43)  (0.33) 
FOLLOW 0.6418***  0.9716***  0.8094*** 
 (7.95)  (7.63)  (10.25) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3920  0.3090  0.5990 
N 28,753   24,886   53,639 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for firms with high litigation risk relative to those with low litigation risk. Column (1) is for the period 
before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. 
HIGH_LITRISK is an indicator variable equal to one for firms with high litigation risk, and zero for low 
litigation risk. The interaction term HIGH_LITRISK×CONS captures the difference in coefficient between 
the two groups of firms. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
6.4.2 Results for H3b 
H3b predicts that external monitoring by financial analysts leads to greater consistency in 
recognition and qualitative disclosure decisions. This is because financial analysts have superior 
information processing ability, and they are more capable of detecting inconsistencies between 
accounting numbers and qualitative disclosures. As predicted, the coefficients on the interaction 
term are positive and significant for all three sample periods, as shown in Table 6-2. Similar to the 
results for H3a, the effect appears to be slightly stronger for the period before the regulation change, 
as indicated by the magnitudes and significance levels of the coefficients. The coefficients on 




firms with lower analyst following also demonstrate a trade-off between accounting conservatism 
and risk disclosures in the period after 2005. The trade-off appears to be weaker in the mandatory 
period than in the voluntary period, based on the magnitude and significance level of the 
coefficients. Similar to H3a, F-tests show that firms followed by more financial analysts do not 
exhibit a negative relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures.  
Table 6-2: Effect of Analyst Monitoring on the Relation between Accounting Conservatism 
and Risk Disclosures 
 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 9.3887***  18.6080***  9.4649*** 
 (11.15)  (13.94)  (11.59) 
CONS -2.6877***  -1.6038**  -2.0416*** 
 (-4.90)  (-2.34)  (-4.65) 
HIGH_FOLLOW -1.5824***  -0.8666*  -1.2722*** 
 (-3.92)  (-1.92)  (-4.10) 
HIGH_FOLLOW×CONS 2.1576***  1.8130**  2.0138*** 
 (3.03)  (2.40)  (3.74) 
SIZE -0.3149***  -0.3818***  -0.3358*** 
 (-5.84)  (-4.71)  (-6.67) 
LEV -1.8438***  -1.1286***  -1.8606*** 
 (-5.96)  (-2.77)  (-6.94) 
MTB 0.0202  0.0319**  0.0348*** 
 (1.42)  (2.22)  (3.25) 
ROA -4.2654***  -2.7080***  -3.6667*** 
 (-12.24)  (-6.63)  (-13.34) 
EARNVOL 4.3933***  2.6494***  3.8656*** 
 (7.97)  (4.10)  (8.86) 
ETR -1.4043***  -1.1757***  -1.3584*** 
 (-6.52)  (-6.47)  (-9.43) 
BIGN 1.4309***  0.6930***  0.9106*** 
 (9.12)  (3.71)  (6.92) 
BETA 0.1448***  0.1901***  0.1869*** 
 (3.67)  (3.53)  (5.66) 
RET 5.3108  11.1362**  7.2592** 
 (1.60)  (2.03)  (2.43) 




 (11.02)  (2.64)  (9.90) 
RETSKEW -0.0522*  -0.0255  -0.0367** 
 (-1.89)  (-1.18)  (-2.12) 
TURNOVER 0.1096***  0.0184**  0.0551*** 
 (11.46)  (2.00)  (7.59) 
LITRISK -0.1070  -0.7527  0.2608 
 (-0.14)  (-0.36)  (0.31) 
FOLLOW 0.8071***  0.9167***  0.8824*** 
 (8.47)  (6.03)  (9.64) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3921  0.3094  0.5991 
N 28,753   24,886   53,639 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for firms with high analyst following relative to those with low analyst following. Column (1) is for the 
period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. 
HIGH_FOLLOW is an indicator variable equal to one for firms with high analyst following, and zero for 
low analyst following. The interaction term, HIGH_FOLLOW×CONS, captures the difference in 
coefficient between the two groups of firms. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
6.4.3 Results for H3c 
To test H3c, I focus on the period after 2005 because few companies have disclosure 
committees for the period before 2005. The SEC recommended firms establish disclosure 
committees in 2002. For this post-2005 period, I find that 3,469 firm-years have a disclosure 
committee and 21,221 firm-years do not. A firm’s decision to establish a disclosure committee is 
not exogenous. To control for differences in observable firm characteristics between those with 
and without a disclosure committee, I adopt a matched sample design using propensity score 
matching. I match on the variables that are used as control variables in Equation 4-4. I perform a 
one-to-one matching with replacement within each industry year.  
The matching process results in 2,001 matched pairs for a total of 4,002 observations. Table 




indicated by DCOM (with a disclosure committee) and Non-DCOM (without a disclosure 
committee). The t-stat shows that there is no significant difference between these two groups of 
firms across all the matching variables. Panel B provides the regression results. The main variable 
of interest is the interaction term, DCOM×CONS. The coefficient on this term is negative but not 
significant. This suggests that there is no significant difference in the relation between 
conservatism and risk disclosures for firms with or without a disclosure committee. Disclosure 
committees seem to play a very limited role in affecting how managers coordinate their decisions 
between conservative reporting and qualitative disclosures. This is probably because managers 
have great discretion over qualitative disclosures due to their soft nature. 
Table 6-3: Effect of Disclosure Committees on the Relation between Accounting 
Conservatism and Risk Disclosures 





DCOM Difference T-stat P-Value 
SIZE 6.926 6.889 0.04 0.09 0.93 
LEV 0.285 0.249 0.04 0.75 0.45 
MTB 2.792 2.654 0.14 0.17 0.86 
ROA 0.035 0.052 -0.02 -0.86 0.39 
EARNVOL 0.054 0.050 0.00 0.28 0.78 
ETR 0.327 0.348 -0.02 -0.44 0.66 
BIGN 0.872 0.872 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BETA 1.142 1.080 0.06 0.61 0.55 
RET -0.058 -0.039 -0.02 -0.35 0.73 
RETVOL 0.027 0.026 0.00 0.51 0.61 
RETSKEW 0.213 0.246 -0.03 -0.30 0.77 
TURNOVER 9.678 8.919 0.76 0.45 0.66 
LITRISK 0.049 0.050 0.00 -0.05 0.96 
FOLLOW 1.989 1.717 0.27 1.23 0.22 
Note: This panel provides the mean values of the matching variables for firms with a disclosure committee 
(DCOM) and the match group (Non-DCOM). The “Difference” column shows the differences between the 
mean values of the two groups of firms. The “T-Stat” and “P-value” show the t-statistics and p-values for 
whether the mean differences are significantly different from zero. All variables are defined in Appendix 














































Industry FE YES 
Adjusted R2 0.2570 
N 4,002 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for firms with disclosure committees relative to those without, for fiscal years after 2005. DCOMM is an 
indicator variable equal to one for firms with a disclosure committee, and zero for the matched sample. The 
interaction term, DCOMM×CONS, captures the difference in coefficients between the two groups of firms. 
Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine whether the monitoring by external and internal parties constrains 
managers’ ability to trade off conservative reporting and risk disclosures. For external monitoring, 
I look at monitoring by shareholders through litigation threats and monitoring by financial analysts 
as sophisticated information users. I find that the trade-off between conservative reporting and risk 
disclosures is weakened when firms face greater litigation risk (i.e., greater monitoring by 
shareholders through litigation threats) and when they are followed by more financial analysts. 
The results hold for both voluntary and mandatory periods of risk disclosures. I find that firms 
with lower litigation risk or smaller analyst following also exhibit trade-offs between the two 
choices in the period when risk disclosures were mandatory. This suggests that those firms with 
weaker monitoring from other parties still use conservative reporting and risk disclosures as 
substitutes even when regulatory oversights set a floor on the level of risk disclosures. Additionally, 
I examine the role of disclosure committees, a form of corporate governance mechanism which 
has received little academic attention. I do not find that disclosure committees play a significant 
role when it comes to influencing managers’ coordination of conservative reporting and risk 
disclosure decisions. This is probably because risk disclosures are qualitative and subject to 




Chapter 7  
Effects of Executive Characteristics and Compensation 
7.1 Introduction 
My hypotheses in previous chapters assume that managers are rational decision-makers 
who make decisions in the best interest of their firms subject to the monitoring of various internal 
and external mechanisms. However, managers, as individuals, are subject to biases and have self-
interest. Such biases, rooted in their personal characteristics, influence their decision-making. A 
line of literature finds that managerial characteristics have a great impact on managers’ reporting 
and disclosure decisions.45 One of these characteristics is overconfidence, which affects managers’ 
conservative reporting decisions (Ahmed and Duellman 2013). In this chapter, I explore whether 
managerial overconfidence plays a role in moderating the relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. Since managers have self-interest, I also investigate how 
personal economic gains from their compensation influence their decisions in risk disclosures and 
in trade-offs between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. In the following, I first discuss 
the related literature and then describe the expected impacts of executive characteristics and 
compensation, without formulating formal hypotheses for this chapter’s tests.  
7.2 Managerial Overconfidence 
7.2.1 Prior Literature 
Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their personal abilities and judgements, and 
the prospects of their firms (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012). They are less likely to recognize 
losses in a timely manner due to their tendency to overestimate future returns of their investment 
 




projects. Consistent with this notion, Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find that overconfident CEOs 
report less conservatively. Several other studies on the reporting and disclosure choices of 
overconfident managers provide evidence consistent with our general expectation of this 
managerial trait. For example, Schrand and Zechman (2012) find that overconfident executives 
are more likely to be associated with financial misreporting, presumably to cover up the reversals 
of their over-optimistic reporting choices made in prior periods. For quantitative disclosures, 
Hribar and Yang (2016) document that overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue earnings 
forecasts and their forecast ranges are narrower. Subsequently, they are more likely to miss their 
forecasts, which prove to be too optimistic. For qualitative disclosures, Davis et al. (2015) find 
that managerial characteristics can explain a significant amount of variation in the tone of earnings 
conference calls. Even though these authors do not directly test the impact of overconfidence, they 
examine the effects of managerial traits such as age, gender, and educational background. These 
factors touch on risk aversion, a construct that to some extent overlaps with overconfidence, since 
overconfident managers engage in more risk taking (Goldberg, Graham, and Ha 2020).  
It is unclear whether overconfident managers would provide fewer or more risk disclosures 
due to the lack of prior research evidence. Since they tend to provide over-optimistic forecasts 
(Hribar and Yang 2016), arguably overconfident managers would provide a lower level of risk 
disclosures. They are more likely to overlook or disregard risks and uncertainties for the following 
two reasons. First, they are optimistic about the prospects of firm performance and may fail to see 
downside risk. Second, they are confident about their ability to manage risks and limit the 
downside even when adverse events do occur. Given prior research showing that overconfident 
managers tend to report less conservatively (Ahmed and Duellman 2013), I expect that firms 




disclosures in that both are likely to be at relatively lower levels. Empirically, I expect that such 
firms would exhibit a more positive relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures.  
An additional consideration about the impact of executive characteristics is whether the 
CEO or the CFO of a firm has a greater impact on firms’ reporting and disclosure decisions. Ge, 
Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011) find that CFO styles affect the accounting choices of firms. Jiang, 
Petroni, and Wang (2010) show that CFOs have a greater influence on earnings management than 
CEOs do. For disclosures in 10-Ks, survey evidence shows that CFOs are more involved in 
preparing MD&A sections in annual reports than CEOs (Amel-Zadeh, Scherf, and Soltes 2019). 
On the other hand, Hsieh, Wang, and Demirkan (2018) find that firms with both overconfident 
CEOs and overconfident CFOs engage more in tax avoidance than firms of other CEO/CFO 
combinations. In my later tests, I consider the effects of both CEO and CFO by constructing a 
composite overconfidence measure. 
7.2.2 Empirical Tests 
In this section, I discuss the measure, empirical model, and results for testing the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on the relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. 
I measure managerial overconfidence following prior studies (e.g. Campbell et al. 2011; 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012; Ahmed and Duellman 2013). This measure is based on the varied 
tendency of executives to hold deep-in-the-money stock options of the firm. Top executives 
typically do not hold a well-diversified portfolio. Their compensation packages usually contain 
large amounts of stock and option grants, subjecting them to overexposure to the idiosyncratic risk 
of their company. After their stock options are vested, they should exercise these options quickly 
to reduce the holdings of their company’s equity (Malmendier and Tate 2005). Overconfident 




even when their options are deep in the money. This is the rationale behind the overconfidence 
measure based on the holdings of deep-in-the-money stock options.  
Consistent with prior studies, I construct overconfidence measures for CEOs/CFOs 
following the steps described in Appendix E1. For each firm-year, I construct an indicator variable, 
OverConf, which is set to one if both the CEO and the CFO of the firm are overconfident and to 
zero if neither the CEO nor the CFO is overconfident. Then, I use the following model to test the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on the relation between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (7-1) 
Table 7-1 provides the regression results using the above model. The coefficient on the 
interaction term, OVERCONF×CONS, captures the difference in the relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures across firms managed by overconfident and non-overconfident 
managers. The coefficient is not significant across the three sample periods. This suggests that 
executive overconfidence does not have a significant impact on the relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. I do not find evidence supporting my earlier conjecture that 
firms with overconfident executives would be more consistent in accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures.  
I conduct two additional un-tabulated analyses to further investigate the effect of managerial 
overconfidence. For the first analysis, I regress conservatism on the overconfidence variable and 
a group of control variables following Ahmed and Duellman (2013). I find that I can replicate their 
finding that managerial overconfidence is negatively associated with accounting conservatism, 
even though their study considers only CEO overconfidence. For the second analysis, I test 




I expand the model for my main hypothesis specified in Equation 4-4 by including the 
overconfidence measure as an additional explanatory variable. I find that the coefficients on the 
overconfidence variable are positive but not significant for the pre-2005 period or the post-2005 
period. For the entire sample period, the coefficient is significant. This suggests that overall 
overconfident managers provide more risk disclosures. I speculate that this counterintuitive finding 
is perhaps because overconfident managers are usually more risk-seeking, and the impact of their 
risk-seeking behaviour on the risk profile of their firm is not adequately captured by conventional 
risk proxies such as stock beta, stock volatility, and earnings volatility.  
Table 7-1: Effect of Managerial Overconfidence on the Relation between Accounting 
Conservatism and Risk Disclosures 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 10.5982***  19.8353***  10.6112*** 
 (4.87)  (6.78)  (4.98) 
CONS -1.6518  0.3079  -0.3513 
 (-1.37)  (0.32)  (-0.46) 
OVERCONF 0.1454  0.9393  0.7957 
 (0.15)  (1.19)  (1.26) 
OVERCONF×CONS 0.1488  -0.9816  -0.6528 
 (0.08)  (-0.70)  (-0.57) 
SIZE -0.3964***  -0.5440***  -0.4991*** 
 (-3.37)  (-4.63)  (-5.73) 
LEV -0.0302  -1.0784*  -0.9837* 
 (-0.04)  (-1.68)  (-1.96) 
MTB 0.0435  0.0110  0.0210 
 (1.58)  (0.65)  (1.38) 
ROA -0.8609  -0.4595  -0.5883 
 (-0.80)  (-0.56)  (-0.90) 
EARNVOL 5.7915***  2.9926***  4.2170*** 
 (4.18)  (2.64)  (4.72) 
ETR -0.6497  -0.4821*  -0.5320** 
 (-1.44)  (-1.96)  (-2.39) 
BIGN 0.4401  0.6323  0.6259* 




BETA 0.4423*  0.0303  0.2131 
 (1.86)  (0.14)  (1.31) 
RET 0.1945*  0.1375*  0.2021*** 
 (1.82)  (1.65)  (2.92) 
RETVOL 39.5648***  9.7291  26.5519*** 
 (3.23)  (1.00)  (3.29) 
RETSKEW 0.0145  -0.0152  -0.0183 
 (0.24)  (-0.44)  (-0.59) 
TURNOVER 0.1146***  0.0439***  0.0607*** 
 (5.30)  (3.20)  (5.08) 
LITRISK 2.0211  0.5894  2.1081 
 (1.40)  (0.21)  (1.43) 
FOLLOW 0.6293***  1.0703***  0.9709*** 
 (3.66)  (5.93)  (6.86) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3860  0.2850  0.5680 
N 5,791   9,878   15,669 
 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
for firms managed by overconfident executives vs those by non-overconfident executives. All variables are 
defined in Appendix B2 and Appendix E2. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column 
(2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. OVERCONF is an indicator variable 
equal to one for firms with both overconfident CEO and overconfident CFO, and zero for those with neither 
overconfident CEO nor overconfident CFO. The interaction term, OVERCONF×CONS, captures the 
difference in coefficient between the two groups of firms. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are 
included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
7.3 Executive Compensation 
7.3.1 Cash Bonuses 
Other than salaries, executives are usually compensated with cash bonuses and equity 
incentives such as restricted stocks and stock options. Among these, cash bonuses represent a 
substantial portion of the compensation packages of CEOs and other executives (Frydman and 
Jenter 2010; Shan and Walter 2016). Prior research shows that cash bonuses are more closely 
linked to earnings-based performance measures (Murphy 1999; Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003). 




compensation. When a greater portion of managers’ compensation depends on bonuses, 
conservative accounting lowers managers’ compensation more pronouncedly. Therefore, 
managers have greater incentives to report less conservatively when cash bonuses account for a 
greater portion of their total compensation.  
On the other hand, risk disclosures are unlikely to have a significant impact on cash bonuses 
since they neither affect reported numbers nor affect how bonuses are calculated based on those 
numbers. When their compensation depends more on cash bonuses, managers likely have stronger 
incentives to rely on risk disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and litigation risk. 
Empirically, firms would exhibit a stronger negative association between conservatism and risk 
disclosures when their executives are compensated more with cash bonuses.  
7.3.2 Equity Incentives 
To better align the interest between executives and shareholders, equity incentives are 
included as a key component of executive compensation packages. Several studies document that 
equity incentives change managers’ reporting and disclosure behaviours. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) find that a firm engages more in earnings management when its CEO’s 
compensation is more closely linked to the share price of the firm (as measured by the change in 
the value of a CEO’s stock and option holdings due to one percentage point increase in the 
company stock price, commonly referred to as Delta). Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the 
likelihood of accounting restatement increases with the Delta of the CEO’s stock option holdings. 
Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) find that a firm is more likely to make restatements when 
its CEO holds a large amount of in-the-money stock options. Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010) find 
that a higher Delta of CEO’s or CFO’s equity portfolios is associated with an increased likelihood 




stock price provides incentives for upward earnings management. Stock options render managers’ 
wealth to be more sensitive to both changes in stock price (Delta) and changes in stock price 
volatility (Vega). Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2013) find that Vega is positively 
associated with financial misreporting and its effect subsumes that of Delta.  
For disclosures, Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that the proportion of stock-based 
incentives in the CEO’s compensation package is positively related to disclosure quality, proxied 
by management earnings forecast frequency and analysts’ subjective ratings of firm’s disclosure 
practice. Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) provide evidence suggesting that CFOs with large option 
holdings hide bad news to prevent or delay stock price declines. This finding implies that option 
holdings can discourage managers from disclosing risks and uncertainties, which point to potential 
future bad outcomes. Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) do not distinguish the effects of Delta and Vega. 
Larger option holdings usually indicate a high level of both Delta and Vega. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that an increase in risk disclosures is associated with 
higher stock volatility. This suggests that managers with a larger Vega can benefit from a higher 
level of risk disclosures. Taken together with the finding in Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011), empirically 
it is not clear whether Vega would be positively or negatively associated with the level of risk 
disclosures.  
In summary, prior research suggests that a greater portion of bonus in the compensation 
package may increase the incentives for managers to trade off conservative reporting and risk 
disclosures. On the other hand, prior research does not provide a clear indication as to how equity 
incentives (Delta and Vega) may affect managers’ decisions in risk disclosures. In the next section, 
I conduct tests to explore the effects of these two important components of the executive 




7.3.3 Empirical Results 
In this section, I describe the measures, model, and regression results for testing the effects 
of executive compensation. Following Deng et al. (2018), I measure the executive bonus intensity 
by using the ratio of the top five executives’ total bonuses to their total compensation. The results 
are robust to measuring the bonus intensity based on the compensation of CEO and CFO only. 
Following prior studies (e.g. Core and Guay 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006), I 
estimate the Delta and Vega using the modified Black and Scholes (1973) option valuation model. 
Based on the calculations, Delta captures the change in the value (in million dollars) of the 
executive compensation portfolio when the stock price increases by 1%. Vega captures the change 
in the value (in million dollars) of the executive compensation portfolios (including both stocks 
and stock options) when the annualized stock volatility increases by 1%. I further transform the 
raw Delta (Vega) as the logarithm of (1+ raw Delta (Vega)). For empirical tests, I focus on the 
Delta and Vega of CFOs because prior research suggests that CFOs play a greater role in 
determining the contents of annual reports (Amel-Zadeh, Scherf, and Soltes 2019). Moreover, I 
find that the Delta/Vega of the CFO is highly correlated with those of the CEO. Including both 
may cause collinearity issues.  
I use the following model to test the effects of executive compensation on risk disclosures.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (7-2) 
The control variables are the same as those in Equation 4-4 in Chapter 4. Bonus is the ratio of 
the top five executives’ total bonuses to their total compensation as described above. DeltaCFO 




term, Bonus×Conservatism, captures whether the relation between accounting conservatism and 
risk disclosures varies with the level of bonus intensity. 
Table 7-2 provides the regression results using the model specified in Equation 7-2. To 
increase the power of the test, I focus on firm-year observations for which the bonus intensity 
variable is not zero. About 25% of firm-years have zero values for this variable. To observe the 
main effects of the compensation-related variables, I first run Equation 7-2 without the interaction 
term. Panel A provides the results for the main effects of the three compensation-related variables 
on risk disclosures. Across the three sample periods, the coefficients on bonus intensity (BONUS) 
are negative and significant at better than 5% levels. This suggests that managers provide more 
risk disclosures when a greater portion of their compensation comes from cash bonuses. For equity 
incentives, the Delta of the CFO (DELTACFO) is not associated with the level of risk disclosures, 
as the coefficients are not significant. The Vega of the CFO (VEGACFO) is positive and significant 
for the period before 2005 and for the entire sample period both at better than 1% levels. This 
suggests that when CFOs benefit more from an increase in the stock price volatility of the firm, 
they provide more risk disclosures. As described earlier, prior research finds that an increase in 
risk disclosures is associated with an increase in future stock return volatility (Kravet and Muslu 
2013). CFOs appear to understand the implication of risk disclosures for stock return volatility.  
Table 7-2, Panel B provides the regression results using Equation 7-2 with the interaction 
term between bonus intensity and accounting conservatism. The coefficients on the interaction 
term, BONUS×CONS, are positive and significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively for 
periods before 2005, after 2005, and the entire period. These results suggest that the negative 
relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures decreases with the level of bonus 




managers should have greater incentives to trade off conservative reporting and risk disclosures 
when their compensation depends more on reported earnings. The conflicting result is perhaps 
because executives compensated with a greater portion of cash bonuses, relative to those with a 
greater equity component, are more risk-averse and self-select to work for firms offering such pay 
structures. These firms likely face lower risks and uncertainties and are more affected by the 
flooring effect, which limits the negative association between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures. The results in Panel A show that firms compensating their managers with more cash 
bonuses provide a lower level of risk disclosures.  
For both tests, I use the Delta/Vega of the CFO. The results are slightly weaker when I use 
the Delta/Vega of the CEO. This is consistent with prior survey evidence that CFOs play a greater 
role in disclosure decisions for annual reports (Amel-Zadeh, Scherf, and Soltes 2019).  
Table 7-2: Effect of Executive Compensation on the Relation between Accounting 
Conservatism and Risk Disclosures 
Panel A: Impact of executive compensation on risk disclosures (main effects) 
DV=RISKDISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 11.5913***  20.2379***  11.4017*** 
 (6.07)  (9.33)  (6.83) 
CONS -1.6858*  -1.8332*  -1.8425*** 
 (-1.72)  (-1.93)  (-2.63) 
BONUS -0.0130**  -0.0274**  -0.0192*** 
 (-2.28)  (-2.55)  (-3.51) 
DELTACFO -0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
 (-0.07)  (0.32)  (0.15) 
VEGACFO 0.0040***  0.0029  0.0038*** 
 (2.75)  (1.54)  (3.07) 
SIZE -0.5469***  -0.5732***  -0.5732*** 
 (-4.88)  (-4.23)  (-6.35) 
LEV -0.6040  -0.9911  -1.0991** 
 (-0.90)  (-1.34)  (-2.12) 




 (1.79)  (0.75)  (2.40) 
ROA -0.9676  -0.6796  -0.8462 
 (-0.95)  (-0.72)  (-1.20) 
EARNVOL 4.7578***  2.6981**  3.8969*** 
 (3.81)  (2.05)  (4.25) 
ETR -0.9334**  -0.3214  -0.5740** 
 (-2.22)  (-0.97)  (-2.17) 
BIGN 0.7069  0.5885  0.6157* 
 (1.31)  (1.54)  (1.81) 
BETA 0.1810**  0.1354  0.2119*** 
 (2.12)  (1.27)  (3.04) 
RET 34.4726***  26.9189**  34.5045*** 
 (3.04)  (2.42)  (4.05) 
RETVOL 0.5835***  -0.1650  0.3139** 
 (2.77)  (-0.71)  (2.02) 
RETSKEW 0.0167  -0.0447  -0.0300 
 (0.31)  (-1.01)  (-0.86) 
TURNOVER 0.1173***  0.0338**  0.0726*** 
 (6.53)  (2.43)  (6.29) 
LITRISK 0.5353  1.5270  1.5108 
 (0.43)  (0.54)  (1.26) 
FOLLOW 0.7255***  0.8608***  0.8564*** 
 (4.55)  (4.35)  (6.31) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2 0.3880  0.3030  0.5850 
N 7,228   5,611   12,839 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
(CONS) and several compensation-related variables, including bonus intensity (BONUS), CFO’s pay 
sensitivity to the firm’s stock price (DELTACFO), and CFO’s pay sensitivity to the firm’s stock volatility 
(VEGACFO). All variables are defined in Appendix B2 and Appendix E2. Column (1) is for the period 
before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. Fama-
French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
Panel B: Impact of executive compensation on risk disclosures with the interactive effect 
DV=RISK_DISC 
Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant 12.4024***  20.8148***  12.1227*** 




CONS -3.2223**  -2.8384***  -3.1209*** 
 (-2.55)  (-2.68)  (-3.82) 
BONUS -0.0543**  -0.0936**  -0.0662*** 
 (-2.42)  (-2.54)  (-3.56) 
BONUS×CONS 0.0817*  0.1299**  0.0929*** 
 (1.92)  (1.97)  (2.72) 
DELTACFO -0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
 (-0.09)  (0.38)  (0.19) 
VEGACFO 0.0040***  0.0030  0.0038*** 
 (2.73)  (1.58)  (3.08) 
SIZE -0.5479***  -0.5716***  -0.5757*** 
 (-4.89)  (-4.22)  (-6.39) 
LEV -0.5970  -1.0385  -1.1131** 
 (-0.89)  (-1.40)  (-2.15) 
MTB 0.0446*  0.0172  0.0412** 
 (1.78)  (0.77)  (2.39) 
ROA -1.0628  -0.7213  -0.9366 
 (-1.04)  (-0.76)  (-1.33) 
EARNVOL 4.7434***  2.6969**  3.8898*** 
 (3.80)  (2.05)  (4.24) 
ETR -0.9371**  -0.3320  -0.5713** 
 (-2.23)  (-1.00)  (-2.16) 
BIGN 0.7089  0.5912  0.6108* 
 (1.31)  (1.55)  (1.80) 
BETA 0.5832***  -0.1687  0.3297** 
 (2.77)  (-0.72)  (2.13) 
RET 0.1777**  0.1225  0.2078*** 
 (2.08)  (1.16)  (2.98) 
RETVOL 35.2129***  26.7019**  34.8066*** 
 (3.11)  (2.40)  (4.08) 
RETSKEW 0.0139  -0.0429  -0.0315 
 (0.26)  (-0.97)  (-0.90) 
TURNOVER 0.1169***  0.0336**  0.0722*** 
 (6.50)  (2.42)  (6.27) 
LITRISK 0.5076  1.5269  1.4689 
 (0.40)  (0.55)  (1.23) 
FOLLOW 0.7268***  0.8580***  0.8585*** 
 (4.56)  (4.33)  (6.33) 
Year FE YES   YES   YES 




Adjusted R2 0.3890  0.3040  0.5850 
N 7,228   5,611   12,839 
Note: This table reports the results of regressing risk disclosures (RISKDISC) on accounting conservatism 
(CONS) and several compensation-related variables, including bonus intensity (BONUS), CFO’s pay 
sensitivity to the firm’s stock price (DELTACFO), and CFO’s pay sensitivity to the firm’s stock volatility 
(VEGACFO), as well as the interaction between BONUS and CONS. All variables are defined in Appendix 
B2 and Appendix E2. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 
2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. Fama-French 48-industry fixed effects are included. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (2-tailed). 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine the effects of executive characteristics and compensation on the 
relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. Unlike previous chapters, this 
chapter recognizes that managers, as decision-makers for choices in conservative reporting and 
risk disclosures, are individuals subject to behavioral biases and self-interest. I test whether and 
how CEO/CFO overconfidence may affect their decisions in coordinating these two choices. I do 
not find evidence that this managerial characteristic has an impact on the relation between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. My second test looks at how executive 
compensation affects risk disclosure decisions. I find that CFO Vega is positively associated with 
the level of risk disclosures. This seems to suggest that CFOs understand the positive effect of risk 
disclosures on stock return volatility. Quite puzzlingly, I find that when cash bonuses make up a 
greater portion of executive compensation, managers make a smaller trade-off between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. Taken together, these results suggest that the interaction among 





Chapter 8  
Stock Market Consequences of Trade-offs between Accounting 
Conservatism and Risk Disclosures 
8.1 Introduction 
My results in previous chapters suggest that firms trade off accounting conservatism and 
risk disclosures, and such trade-offs seem to be motivated by incentives for reducing the overall 
reporting cost related to the two accounting choices. If this is the case, then such strategies should 
be welcomed by investors. On the other hand, such trade-offs could reduce the amount of 
information available to investors, making it harder for investors to assess business risks and 
uncertainties faced by the firm. Mangers may abuse such strategies and lower the transparency 
about firms’ risks and uncertainties. If this is the case, then investors would react negatively. For 
example, managers may excessively delay the recognition of bad news and try to cover the ground 
through risk disclosures. Investors and other financial statement users may eventually detect 
conflicting signals between quantitative numbers and qualitative disclosures and would question 
the credibility of the information (Henry 2008; Baginski et al. 2016; D’Augusta and DeAngelis 
2020). Therefore, it is not clear, ex-ante, how investors would react to firms’ trade-offs between 
these two accounting choices.  
To understand the consequences of trade-offs between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures, I perform stock returns analyses similar to Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009). These 
authors investigate the relation between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting 
aggressiveness. For qualitative disclosures, a few studies conduct market tests in similar veins to 
explore the pricing implication of the interaction between hard accounting numbers and soft 




helps market participants better price qualitative disclosures. D’Augusta and DeAngelis (2020) 
document that conservative reporting helps investors see through managers’ manipulation of 
linguistic tone in MD&A disclosures.  
For my analyses, I calculate cumulative abnormal returns over several windows from 10-
K filing dates, ranging from 30 days to 240 days. I stop at 240 days to avoid the confounding effect 
of the announcement and filing of next year’s financial results. With approximately 252 trading 
days in a year, firms are close to announcing their earnings for the next reporting period at the 
240th trading day from their 10-K filing dates. Prior research finds that it takes a long time for 
investors to interpret and react to the information in 10-K filings (You and Zhang 2009). However, 
there is no consensus over how long it takes for the information to be fully reflected in stock prices. 
Kravet and Muslu (2013) examine the informativeness of risk disclosures using a window of 60 
trading days after 10-K filing. D’Augusta and DeAngelis (2020) test the pricing implications of 
accounting conservatism and abnormal tones for windows from three months to as long as 36 
months after 10-K filing. A window of 240 days should be long enough for investors to interpret 
the disclosures and revise their expectations. Using a longer window increases the risk of 
subjecting the results to confounding effects of other firm disclosures. 
Based on these cumulative abnormal returns, I examine how the stock market prices the 
relation between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. I rank firm-years into quintiles 
based on their levels of accounting conservatism and risk disclosures and analyze stock returns of 
these firms in ways similar to Sloan (1996), Xie (2001) and Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009). This 
process classifies firm-years into a 5-by-5 matrix, that is, 25 portfolios. Those firm-year 
observations on or close to the diagonal show a more complementary relation between accounting 




test how the stock market values firms with different strategies in the coordination of conservative 
reporting and risk disclosures.  
8.2 Distribution of Firm Years based on Quintiles of Accounting Conservatism and Risk 
Disclosures 
Table 8-1 presents the frequencies of firm-years for each quintile combination of accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures for the entire sample period. Because I rank firms annually by 
Fama-French 12 industries, there is a slight difference in the sum of frequencies across the five 
quintiles. Firm-years in cells far off the diagonal (e.g., those highlighted in yellow) exhibit a more 
substitutive relation between conservative reporting and risk disclosures. Those on the diagonal 
(highlighted in green) exhibit a more complementary relation. If the distribution of firm-years were 
random across all quintile combinations, we would observe an equal number of firm-years in each 
cell, approximately 2,150 (53,799/25). Q5Q5 on the diagonal has 1,943 firm-year observations, 
the smallest among all cells, suggesting that fewer firms provide accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures both at very high levels. On the contrary, Q1Q1 has the largest number of observations 
(2,325), suggesting that a large number of firms have low levels in both accounting conservatism 
and risk disclosures. Overall, there is no clear pattern in where those over-represented cells are 
located in the matrix.  
The distribution of firm-years does not show noticeable patterns in the matrix for the period 
before 2005 or after 2005. For brevity, I do not tabulate the numbers separately for these two 





Table 8-1: Distribution of Firm-Years across Quintile Combinations of Accounting Conservatism 
and Risk Disclosures 
 
 Risk Disclosures Quintiles 












Q1 2,325 2,153 2,065 2,076 2,233 10,852 
Q2 2,157 2,130 2,189 2,090 2,191 10,757 
Q3 2,126 2,128 2,138 2,184 2,176 10,752 
Q4 2,102 2,153 2,188 2,207 2,107 10,757 
Q5 2,158 2,203 2,174 2,183 1,943 10,661 
Total 10,868 10,767 10,754 10,740 10,650 53,779 
Note: This table provides the distribution of firm-year observations across each combination of 
conservatism quintile and risk disclosures quintile for the entire sample period. Q1 is the lowest quintile 
and Q5 the highest quintile. For example, the number in cell Q1Q5 indicates that there are 2,233 firm-year 
observations for which the level of accounting conservatism is in the first quintile (Q1) and the level of risk 
disclosures in the fifth quintile (Q5). Firms are ranked annually by Fama-French 12 industries 
independently based on the levels of accounting conservatism and risk disclosures.  
 
8.3 Regression Results 
To explore how investors interpret the relation between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures, I conduct additional analysis by regressing cumulative abnormal returns on quintiles 
of conservatism and risk disclosures, the interaction between them, and variables that affect stock 
returns according to prior research. This analysis is similar to stock return tests in Hanlon (2005) 
and Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009). I use the following model for this test: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + 𝜷𝟏𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (8-1) 
 
The dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative abnormal return over windows from 30 days 
to as long as 240 days since 10-K filing, at a 30-day interval. For example, the 240-day CAR is 
the abnormal return cumulated over [0, 240], where “0” indicates the 10-K filing date. I estimate 




based on the composite conservatism measure at year t. QuinRisk is the quintile rank based on the 
risk disclosures measure at year t. QuinSize, QuinMTB, QuinCFO, and QuinPE are the quintile 
ranks based on size, market-to-book (MTB) ratio, cash flow from operations (CFO), and price-to-
earnings (PE) ratio at year t. All quintile variables are ranked annually by Fama-French 12 
industries. I do not include the year and industry fixed effects for this reason. 
For each firm-year, HIGH is set to one when the absolute difference between QuinCons and 
QuinRisk is greater than or equal to three and set to zero when QuinCons and QuinRisk are equal. 
In other words, the high trade-off group (HIGH=1) consists of firm-year observations in the yellow 
cells in Table 8-1 and the low trade-off group (HIGH=0) corresponds to the green cells.46 The high 
(low) group exhibits a more substitutive (complementary) relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures.  
To find out how the market reacts to trade-offs between accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures, I run regressions using the model in Equation 8-1. Table 8-2 provides the regression 
results for several observation windows across three sample periods. If the expected return model 
(for estimating abnormal returns) and the additional control variables fully capture non-
diversifiable risks, then there should be no loading on β1, β2, and β3 in Equation 8-1, assuming 
investors properly impound the information of conservatism and risk disclosures into stock prices. 
The coefficients on conservatism (β1) are not significant, except for the 90-day window before 
2005. This suggests that investors overall correctly interpret the implication of accounting 
conservatism. The coefficients on risk disclosures (β2) are negative and significant for 30-day, 60-
day, and 90-day windows for the period before 2005. This suggests that risk disclosures provide 
additional information not captured by conventional risk factors. 
 




For the period before 2005 when risk disclosures were voluntary, the coefficients on HIGH for 
high trade-off firms are negative but not significant for any observation window. This suggests 
that the market fully anticipates such a strategy when risk disclosures were voluntary. For the 
period after 2005 when risk disclosures became mandatory, the coefficients on HIGH are negative 
and significant for most observation windows. At the end of the 240-day period, the coefficient on 
HIGH is no longer significant. This suggests that investors initially interpret the trade-off between 
conservative reporting and risk disclosures as sending a negative signal, for the period when risk 
disclosures have become mandatory. In earlier chapters, I find that the SEC’s regulation on risk 
factor disclosures in 2005 overall constrains managers’ ability to trade off conservative reporting 
and risk disclosures. Investors appear to initially punish firms that trade off these two choices, for 
the period after 2005 when firms are expected to provide more complementary information about 
business uncertainties as required by the securities regulator. It takes the stock market 
approximately 210 days to understand the implication of such trade-offs. After about 210 trading 
days, the stock market reverses the earlier negative reaction to the high trade-off group relative to 
the low group. The stock return trajectory of the high group suggests that firms should provide 
more complementary information between conservative reporting and risk disclosures so that 
investors can more quickly assess risks and uncertainties faced by firms.  
To provide the full time-series of data, I plot the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 
the entire observation window for the period after 2005 in Figure 4, since the regression analysis 
shows that there is a significant difference in stock returns between the high and low trade-off 
groups for this period. The horizontal axis represents the days relative to 10-K filing and the 
vertical axis represents the CARs. The yellow curve shows the CARs of the high trade-off group 




difference in CARs between the two groups of firms. The high trade-off firms underperform the 
low trade-off firms throughout the first 100 days after 10-K filing. After that, the high trade-off 
firms catch up and overtake the low trade-off firms in abnormal returns. Towards the end of the 
observation window, there is no noticeable difference in returns between the two groups of firms. 
The pattern is largely in line with the earlier regression analysis, except that the reversal of the 
high group’s returns relative to the low group occurs much earlier than that indicated by the 
regression result.  
In Chapter 4, I find that firms do not exhibit a trade-off between accounting conservatism 
and risk disclosures after risk disclosures became mandatory in 2005. The results in this chapter 
suggest that investors prefer more complementary information, i.e., less trade-off between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures. If the tendency for reduced trade-offs between the 
two accounting choices in the post-2005 period is due to the SEC’s regulation that constrains firms’ 
flexibility in making such trade-offs, then investors’ negative reaction documented in this chapter 
may indicate that the regulation is beneficial to investors and leads to a positive outcome from the 
perspectives of the stock market. However, my tests do not consider all social costs and benefits 





Table 8-2: Stock Market Reactions to Trade-offs between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures 
 
Panel A: Windows over 30 days ([0, 30]) and 60 days ([0, 60]) from 10-K filing 
 
  Window = 30 Days  Window = 60 Days 
DV=CAR 
  Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years   Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant  -2.4257***  -0.3533  -1.6076***  -2.8662**  -0.6652  -1.9287** 
  (-3.09)  (-0.56)  (-3.10)  (-2.56)  (-0.67)  (-2.52) 
QuinCons  0.0911  0.0910  0.1107  0.0154  0.2181  0.1270 
  (0.87)  (1.06)  (1.58)  (0.10)  (1.61)  (1.23) 
QuinRisk  -0.2039**  0.0183  -0.0843  -0.3125**  0.0713  -0.1234 
  (-2.22)  (0.27)  (-1.45)  (-2.43)  (0.67)  (-1.45) 
HIGH  -0.3006  -0.4604**  -0.4137**  -0.2600  -0.5505  -0.4892* 
  (-1.06)  (-2.15)  (-2.28)  (-0.64)  (-1.62)  (-1.82) 
QuinSize  1.4772***  0.5452***  1.0309***  2.1895***  1.3153***  1.7483*** 
  (11.67)  (5.61)  (12.51)  (11.87)  (8.53)  (14.28) 
QuinMTB  -1.8314***  -1.2803***  -1.5729***  -3.2922***  -1.9923***  -2.7201*** 
  (-15.21)  (-13.80)  (-20.27)  (-18.83)  (-13.73)  (-23.42) 
QuinCFO  0.6458***  0.5187***  0.6044***  1.0675***  0.4553***  0.8460*** 
  (6.09)  (5.76)  (8.42)  (6.89)  (3.06)  (7.78) 
QuinPE  0.1052  0.0540  0.0943  0.0539  -0.2722**  -0.0800 
  (0.97)  (0.63)  (1.33)  (0.35)  (-2.05)  (-0.77) 
Adjusted R2   0.028   0.021   0.024   0.039   0.022   0.031 







Table 8-2: Stock Market Reactions to Trade-offs between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Windows over 90 days ([0, 90]) and 120 days ([0, 120]) from 10-K filing 
 
  Window = 90 Days  Window = 120 Days 
DV=CAR 
  Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years   Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant  -5.0467***  -1.1385  -3.4008***  -4.2048**  -1.0212  -2.8778** 
  (-3.55)  (-0.93)  (-3.48)  (-2.46)  (-0.65)  (-2.41) 
QuinCons  0.4236**  0.2238  0.3687***  0.1020  0.0565  0.1169 
  (2.24)  (1.34)  (2.82)  (0.45)  (0.27)  (0.74) 
QuinRisk  -0.3854**  0.1814  -0.1076  -0.2937  0.1350  -0.0662 
  (-2.39)  (1.38)  (-0.99)  (-1.51)  (0.80)  (-0.50) 
HIGH  -0.7152  -1.0206**  -1.0093***  -0.8664  -1.2062**  -1.2196*** 
  (-1.41)  (-2.40)  (-2.97)  (-1.43)  (-2.23)  (-2.95) 
QuinSize  3.1850***  1.6313***  2.4047***  3.8604***  2.0180***  2.9201*** 
  (13.88)  (8.59)  (15.62)  (13.97)  (8.26)  (15.44) 
QuinMTB  -4.6986***  -2.6649***  -3.7948***  -5.6421***  -3.3342***  -4.5963*** 
  (-21.41)  (-14.27)  (-25.49)  (-21.08)  (-14.28)  (-25.02) 
QuinCFO  1.7059***  0.6091***  1.3031***  1.4901***  0.6298***  1.1965*** 
  (8.79)  (3.27)  (9.51)  (6.35)  (2.70)  (7.13) 
QuinPE  -0.3895*  -0.2678  -0.3120**  -0.5723**  -0.1000  -0.3281** 
  (-1.90)  (-1.61)  (-2.31)  (-2.36)  (-0.48)  (-2.01) 
Adjusted R2   0.050   0.024   0.038   0.048   0.023   0.036 






Table 8-2: Stock Market Reactions to Trade-offs between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Windows over 150 days ([0, 150]) and 180 days ([0, 180]) from 10-K filing 
 
  Window = 150 Days  Window = 180 Days 
DV=CAR 
  Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years   Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (3)   (3) 
Constant  -5.2276***  -0.2043  -3.0506**  -5.9851***  -1.5478  -4.0596*** 
  (-2.69)  (-0.11)  (-2.25)  (-2.84)  (-0.78)  (-2.74) 
QuinCons  0.1406  -0.0365  0.0998  0.1332  -0.1135  0.0557 
  (0.54)  (-0.15)  (0.55)  (0.47)  (-0.42)  (0.28) 
QuinRisk  -0.2312  0.1466  -0.0183  -0.4201*  0.1087  -0.1373 
  (-1.05)  (0.77)  (-0.12)  (-1.79)  (0.52)  (-0.85) 
HIGH  -1.0677  -1.7805***  -1.6334***  -1.0894  -2.1784***  -1.8434*** 
  (-1.56)  (-2.90)  (-3.48)  (-1.47)  (-3.17)  (-3.56) 
QuinSize  4.3238***  2.1218***  3.2108***  4.9216***  2.8614***  3.8613*** 
  (14.04)  (7.88)  (15.26)  (14.64)  (9.29)  (16.47) 
QuinMTB  -6.1552***  -3.8397***  -5.0966***  -7.2642***  -4.6283***  -6.0594*** 
  (-20.61)  (-14.73)  (-24.84)  (-22.35)  (-15.69)  (-27.03) 
QuinCFO  1.4323***  0.6930***  1.1885***  1.6160***  1.0328***  1.4680*** 
  (5.29)  (2.61)  (6.20)  (5.56)  (3.49)  (7.01) 
QuinPE  -0.7503***  -0.1171  -0.4319**  -0.5910**  -0.2587  -0.4204** 
  (-2.72)  (-0.48)  (-2.30)  (-1.96)  (-0.94)  (-2.02) 
Adjusted R2   0.045   0.023   0.034   0.050   0.028   0.040 






Table 8-2: Stock Market Reactions to Trade-offs between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Windows over 210 days ([0, 210]) and 240 days ([0, 240]) from 10-K filing 
 
  Window = 210 Days  Window = 240 Days 
DV=CAR 
  Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years   Before-2005   After-2005   All-Years 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant  -2.9842  2.0283  -0.7975  -1.2731  4.0958*  0.9718 
  (-1.28)  (0.94)  (-0.48)  (-0.49)  (1.72)  (0.53) 
QuinCons  0.1741  -0.2189  0.0351  0.2652  -0.4045  0.0029 
  (0.55)  (-0.74)  (0.16)  (0.77)  (-1.26)  (0.01) 
QuinRisk  -0.5174**  0.0911  -0.2000  -0.6344**  -0.0080  -0.3175 
  (-1.97)  (0.40)  (-1.12)  (-2.21)  (-0.03)  (-1.64) 
HIGH  -0.7539  -1.9296***  -1.5784***  -0.2099  -1.4842*  -1.0316* 
  (-0.92)  (-2.61)  (-2.81)  (-0.23)  (-1.86)  (-1.68) 
QuinSize  4.9451***  2.6074***  3.7377***  5.8850***  3.4714***  4.6663*** 
  (13.25)  (7.78)  (14.34)  (14.46)  (9.75)  (16.62) 
QuinMTB  -8.1697***  -4.8532***  -6.6590***  -9.1307***  -5.7651***  -7.6210*** 
  (-22.77)  (-14.90)  (-26.78)  (-23.10)  (-16.41)  (-27.99) 
QuinCFO  1.5944***  0.6104*  1.2915***  1.4059***  0.6122*  1.2063*** 
  (4.92)  (1.90)  (5.58)  (3.96)  (1.77)  (4.77) 
QuinPE  -0.8044**  -0.4981  -0.6467***  -1.1335***  -1.0030***  -1.0608*** 
  (-2.42)  (-1.64)  (-2.81)  (-3.08)  (-3.05)  (-4.16) 
Adjusted R2   0.052   0.026   0.039   0.054   0.034   0.044 






Table 8-2: Stock Market Reactions to Trade-offs between Accounting Conservatism and Risk Disclosures (Continued) 
 
Note: This table provides the results for regressing Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) on the quintiles of accounting conservatism and risk 
disclosures, and the interaction between them. The CARs are cumulated over the period from the 10-K filing date to the days indicated by the 
windows at the top of each column. For example, “Window = 30 Days” indicates that the abnormal return is cumulated over [0, 30], where “0” 
represents the 10-K filing date. QuinCons is the quintile rank of conservatism. QuinRisk is the quintile rank of risk disclosures. HIGH is coded as 
one when the absolute difference between QuinCons and QuinRisk is greater than or equal to three and as zero when QuinCons and QuinRisk are 
equal. QuinSize, QuinMTB, QuinCFO and QuinPE are the quintile ranks of firm size, Market-to-Book (MTB) ratio, and Cash flow from operations 
(CFO), and price-to-earnings (PE) ratio respectively. All quintiles are ranked annually by Fama-French 12 industries. All variables are defined in 
Appendix F1. Column (1) is for the period before fiscal year 2005, Column (2) for the period after 2005, and Column (3) for the entire period. 
Coefficients that are significant at 5% levels are bolded for QuinCons, QuinRisk, and HIGH. Influential observations with an absolute R-Student 
value greater than two are removed, accounting for 4.5%, 3.7%, and 4.10% of all observations respectively for pre-2005, post-2005, and all-years. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 









Note: This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from 10-K filing for firms with high and 
low trade-off between accounting conservatism and risk disclosures for the period after 2005. The 
horizontal axis represents the days relative to 10-K filing, where “0” marks the 10-K filing date. The vertical 
axis represents the CARs in percentage. The yellow curve represents the CARs of the HIGH trade-off group, 
defined as firm-years with the absolute difference between quintile ranks of conservatism and risk 
disclosures greater than or equal to three. The green curve represents the CARs of the LOW trade-off group, 
defined as firm-years with the same ranks in conservatism and risk disclosure quintiles. The red curve 
shows the difference in CARs between the HIGH group and LOW groups (HIGH-LOW).  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the stock market consequences of trade-offs between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. I find that the market fully anticipated firms to trade off 
conservative reporting and risk disclosures in the period when risk disclosures were voluntary. 
However, after the SEC mandated risk factor disclosures in 10-Ks, investors appear to expect firms 
to provide more complementary information between conservative accounting numbers and risk 
disclosures. In the period of mandatory risk disclosures, firms that engage more in trade-offs 




trading days for investors to understand the implication of such trade-offs. Overall, the evidence 
in this chapter suggests that it is beneficial for firms to provide more complementary information 
in conservative reporting and risk disclosures so that investors can quickly assess the risks and 





Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
This study examines the relation between conservative reporting and textual risk 
disclosures in 10-K filings. I hypothesize that managers treat these two accounting choices as 
substitutes to reduce the overall reporting and disclosure costs associated with communicating 
business uncertainties since both of the two choices can achieve this objective. Using a large 
sample of U.S. firms over fiscal years from 1995 to 2018, I find a negative relation between 
accounting conservatism and risk disclosures when qualitative risk disclosures were voluntary in 
years before 2005, suggesting that managers trade off these two choices before the SEC mandated 
risk disclosures. I further find that the negative relation is stronger when firms are planning for 
equity offerings, are closer to debt covenant violations, face greater proprietary cost, or have 
greater needs for debt financing. Under each of these conditions, managers have greater incentives 
to make such trade-offs, because one of the two choices becomes more cost-effective relative to 
the other for communicating business uncertainties. The negative relation does not hold for the 
period after 2005 when risk disclosures became mandatory. I contend that the lack of results in the 
post-2005 period is likely because the SEC’s regulation sets a lower bound in the level of risk 
disclosures and thus constrains managers’ ability to trade off these two accounting choices. Using 
the SEC’s regulation as an exogenous shock that increases the level of risk disclosures, I find some 
evidence that firms reduced the level of conservative reporting in response to the regulation. This 
evidence is consistent with my main finding that managers see conservative reporting and risk 
disclosures as substitutes.  
Additional analyses show that the substitutive relation is weakened when firms face greater 




off for the full sample in the post-2005 period, my conditioning analyses show that firms with 
lower litigation risk or analyst following still exhibit a negative relation between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures even after the SEC mandated risk disclosures. Overall, my 
results suggest that regulatory oversight mitigates but does not eliminate managers’ ability to trade 
off these two choices when firms face a lower level of monitoring by shareholders or financial 
analysts.  
Although prior research suggests that managers, as individuals, are subject to behavioral 
biases and are driven by self-interest, I do not find executive overconfidence or compensation has 
a significant impact on their coordination of conservative reporting and risk disclosures. 
Overconfident managers do not appear to supply accounting conservatism and risk disclosures in 
a more complementary manner, contrary to prior studies which imply that their overoptimism 
would lead to lower levels of both accounting conservatism and risk disclosures (Ahmed and 
Duellman 2013; Hribar and Yang 2016). For equity incentives, I find that the Vega of CFO’s 
equity holdings is positively associated with the level of risk disclosures. This is consistent with 
the argument that CFOs understand the implication of risk disclosures in that an increase in risk 
disclosures may lead to greater stock return volatility (Kravet and Muslu 2013). Managers benefit 
more from an increase in volatility when the value of their equity holdings is more sensitive to 
stock volatility (i.e., having a greater Vega).  
Finally, I examine the stock market implications of the trade-off between accounting 
conservatism and risk disclosures. I do not find a significant difference in stock returns between 
firms that make greater or smaller trade-offs in the period when risk disclosures were voluntary. 
This is consistent with the notion that investors expected managers to make such trade-offs when 




mandatory, I find that firms appearing to have engaged in more trade-offs between these two 
accounting choices initially have lower stock returns relative to those firms that have provided 
more complementary information in conservative accounting numbers and risk disclosures. This 
result suggests that investors react negatively to trade-offs between conservative reporting and risk 
disclosures when the SEC has expressly required firms to be more transparent in risk disclosures. 
Investors appear to interpret a high level of trade-offs in the post period as a signal about firms’ 
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 2 
Appendix A1 
Sample Risk Disclosures 
 
Sample 1:  
 
Part of this portfolio includes minority equity investments in several publicly traded companies, the values 
of which are subject to market price volatility. For example, as a result of market price volatility of our 
publicly traded equity investments, we experienced a $5.76 billion ($3.81 billion, net of tax) decrease in 
net unrealized gains during fiscal 2001 on these investments. As of July 28, 2001, our publicly traded equity 
investments had gross unrealized losses of $784 million. Recent events have adversely affected the public 
equities market and general economic conditions may continue to worsen. As a result, subsequent to fiscal 
2001, we may recognize in earnings declines in fair value of our publicly traded equity investments below 




Sample 2:  
 
For the fourth quarter of fiscal 2010, we recognized an impairment loss of approximately $37.4 million on 
goodwill allocated to the Hardware, software and related technology sales segment as a result of 
deteriorating trading conditions of this segment, particularly at Net1 UTA, and uncertainty surrounding 
contract finalization dates which will impact future cash flows. A further deterioration in the Hardware, 
software and related technology sales segment, or in any other of our businesses, may lead to additional 
impairments in future periods. (NET 1 UEPS TECHNOLOGIES INC., filed on August 25, 2011) 
 
 
Sample 3:  
 
Our sales to branches, agencies and departments of the US government and their contractors were $304.3 
million (17.4% of consolidated sales) in fiscal 2018 (See Note 13 of Notes to Consolidated Financial 
Statements). The majority of our US government sales is for products and services supporting DoD logistics 
and mobility strategy and is, therefore, subject to changes in defense and other governmental agency 
funding and spending. Our contracts with the US government and their contractors are typically agreements 
to provide products and services at a fixed price and have a term of one year or less, frequently subject to 
extension for one or more additional periods of one year at the option of the government customer. Sales 
to agencies of the US government and their contractors are subject to a number of factors, including the 
level of troop deployment worldwide, competitive bidding, US government funding, requirements 






Sample Risk Factor Summary 
 
Our business is subject to numerous risks and uncertainties that represent challenges that we face in 
connection with the successful implementation of our strategy and the growth of our business. In particular, 
the following considerations, among others, may offset our competitive strengths or have a negative effect 
on our business strategy or operating results, which could cause a decline in the price of shares of our 
common stock: 
 
• The COVID-19 pandemic adversely affected our business in 2020. The extent to which COVID-
19 will impact our future operations is highly uncertain and cannot be predicted at this time; 
• Our business and operating results may be significantly impacted by general economic conditions, 
the health of the U.S. residential real estate industry and risks associated with our real estate assets; 
• We have a history of losses, and we may not achieve or maintain profitability in the future; 
• We operate in a competitive and fragmented industry, which could impair our ability to attract users 
of our products, which could harm our business, results of operations and financial condition; 
• We have identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting and may 
identify additional material weaknesses in the future or fail to maintain an effective system of 
internal control over financial reporting, which may result in material misstatements of our 
consolidated financial statements or cause us to fail to meet our periodic reporting obligations; 
• Our business is dependent upon access to desirable inventory. Obstacles to acquiring attractive 
inventory, whether because of supply, competition, or other factors may have a material adverse 
effect on our business, sales and results of operations; 
• We operate in a highly regulated industry and are subject to a wide range of federal, state and local 
laws, rules and regulations. Failure to comply with these laws, rules and regulations or to obtain 
and maintain required licenses, could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results 
of operations; 
• Our growth depends in part on the success of our strategic relationships with third parties; 
• We process, store and use personal information and other data, which subjects us to governmental 
regulation and other legal obligations related to privacy, and violation of these privacy obligations 
could result in a claim for damages, regulatory action, loss of business, or unfavorable publicity; 
and 
• We utilize a significant amount of debt and financing arrangements in the operation of our business, 
and so our cash flows and operating results could be adversely affected by required payments of 
debt or related interest and other risks of our debt financing. 
 






Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 4 
Appendix B1 
Procedures to Construct Risk Disclosure Measures 
 
I take the following steps to download and parse 10-K filings and construct textual risk measures.  
 
Step 1: Download 10-K filings 
Downloading 10-K filings involves three sub-steps.  
Step 1.1: Download the crawler index files from the SEC’s website. The index files contain the company 
name, form type, CIK number, filing date, and URL of each filing. The SEC provides a separate index file 
for all filings submitted to the EDGAR database in each calendar quarter. For example, the index file for 
Q4 2020 is located at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/full-index/2020/QTR4/crawler.idx. The 
screenshot in Figure 2 shows part of the index file for this quarter. The file contains the information for all 
types of forms. The form type for annual reports is “10-K”. 
Figure 2: Crawler Index of SEC Filings 
 
 
The SEC offers another type of index file. This second type of index file provides the URL for the complete 
text submission file of each filing. The complete submission file packages in a single text file the key 
component of the filing as well as all the related appendices and attachments. Prior studies usually collect 
URLs from this type of index file and download the complete submission files of 10-K filings. The 




directly to download the needed filings. For example, the following link provides access to the complete 
text file of a 10-K: 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000165204416000012/0001652044-16-000012.txt 
The disadvantage is that the complete submission file contains many unnecessary contents, for example, 
XBRL tags and other attachments, which are not useful for constructing textual measures. It is much larger 
and takes longer to pre-process.  
Step 1.2: Extract the URLs for 10-Ks in the HTML format. The URLs from the previous step provide access 
to the so-called crawler webpages, as shown in Figure 3. A crawler webpage provides the URL link for the 
10-K filing in the HTML format (Seq 1, “FORM 10-K”) as well as those for exhibits, graphic attachments, 
and XBRL files. For my analysis, I am interested only in the disclosures in the main body of the 10-K, same 
as many prior studies using 10-Ks. It is more efficient to download and process 10-Ks packaged in the 
HTML format.  




I extract the link behind “goog10-k2015.htm” in the above screenshot. This is the URL for the 10-K in the 
HTML format. I also extract the link for the “Complete submission text file” in case the link for the 10-K 
in the HTML format is not available. The links for the “Complete submission text file” are readily available 
in the other type of index file.  
Step 1.3: Download 10-K filings using the URLs for HTML files or the URLs for complete submission 
files when the former is not available.  
Step 2: Preprocess 10-K filings 
 
I preprocess 10-K filings by removing exhibits and all tags except for table tags largely following the first-
stage parsing procedure of Loughran and McDonald (2011). The detailed procedure is available at 
https://sraf.nd.edu/data/stage-one-10-x-parse-data/.  
One important difference is that I keep all tables and table tags at this stage. The table tags are useful for 
further cleaning 10-K filings. Another important difference is that I tag the Item headings based on their 
HTML formatting. The headings are useful for extracting specific sections, e.g., Item 1A, from the 10-K, 




Another important difference is that I maintain the paragraph structure of a 10-K by replacing HTML tags 
indicating the start/end of a paragraph with two blank lines. My later sentence tokenization is conducted 
within each paragraph. This increases the accuracy of sentence tokenization.  
Step 3: Clean up 10-K filings. 
I further clean up the 10-K filings from the previous steps to make them ready for calculation of textual 
measures. I first clean up the table of contents. For 10-K filings in the HTML format, I identify the Table 
of Contents as the table (enclosed in <table> and </table>) with more than ten Item headings. For 10-Ks 
filed in text format only, I identify the Table of Contents as the block of text that contains more than ten 
references of “Item” and the total number of characters divided by the number of “Item” references is less 
than 300.  
Then, I remove tables in which more than 15% of characters are digits. I also remove the cover page of the 
10-K and the list of exhibits, which are usually included in Item 14 or Item 15. Occasionally, one paragraph 
is shown on two adjacent pages, separated by a page number. I remove the page number and combine the 
two partial paragraphs into a single paragraph.  
I also remove short paragraphs which have less than 80 characters. These are predominantly headings. 
Finally, I remove the dots from common abbreviations, for example, “No.”, so that the sentence 
tokenization algorithm will not treat the dot that is part of an abbreviation as a full stop, thus, the end of a 
sentence.  
Step 4: Generate risk disclosure measures. 
 
I tokenize the clean text from the previous step into sentences. I do this within the boundary of each 
paragraph. To get all the sentences of a 10-K, I collect the sentences from each paragraph. If a sentence 
contains any of the following keywords, I count the sentence as a risk-related sentence. Then I calculate the 
risk disclosure measure as the number of risk-related sentences divided by the total number of sentences in 
a 10-K, and multiplied by 100. These keywords include can/cannot, could, may, might, risk*, uncertain*, 
likely to, subject to, potential*, vary*/varies, depend*, expos*, fluctuat*, possibl*, susceptible, affect, 
influenc*, and hedg* (where * denotes suffixes). 
I calculate cosine similarity between 10-Ks of two adjacent years using TextDistance. This is a Python 
library that calculates the text distance between two documents using many different algorithms. More 
information about this library can be found at https://pypi.org/project/textdistance/.  
The cosine similarity is bounded between 0 and 1. A higher value indicates two documents are more similar. 
Two documents with a similarity of one are considered identical. I further convert the cosine similarity 
measure into the modification measure as 1 − Cosine similarity. After this transformation, a higher value 
indicates that the 10-K is more different from that of the previous year. In other words, the firm has made 
more updates to the 10-K relative to the previous year.  
I calculate the specificity measure (Hope et al. 2016) using the Stanford Named Entity Recognizer (NER). 
I use the 7-category classifier, which classifies named entities into seven categories, including Location, 
Person, Organization, Money, Percent, Date, and Time. The idea behind this measure is that these specific 
terms provide concrete information and a greater percentage of such terms in the text indicates that the 





I calculate the fog index by replicating the Perl library, “Lingua::EN::Fathom - Measure readability of 
English text” (https://metacpan.org/pod/Lingua::EN::Fathom), in Python. Li (2008) uses this Perl library to 






Variable Definitions for Empirical Tests in Chapter 4 
 
The following table provides the definitions of all variables used in empirical tests in Chapter 4. 
 
Variable Definition Source 
 Conservatism measures  
CONS Composite measure of conservatism, equal to the 
average of annual standardized values of CSCORE, 
CRATIO, and EARNSKEW 
Compustat and 
CRSP 
   
CSCORE Annual standardized value of firm-level conservatism 
measure developed by Khan & Watts (2009), through a 
linear transformation in the form of [(raw value – 
annual minimum value)/(annual maximum value – 
annual minimum value)  
Compustat and 
CRSP 
   
CRATIO Annual standardized value of firm-level conservatism 
ratio developed by Callen et al. (2010), through a 
linear transformation in the form of [(raw value – 
annual minimum value)/(annual maximum value – 
annual minimum value)]. When there is a positive 
shock, the ratio is multiplied by −1, so that the 
interpretation is consistent with asymmetric timeliness 
in recognition of bad news. The standardization is 
conducted separately for positive and negative shocks. 
Compustat and 
CRSP 
   
EARNSKEW Annual standardized value of (−1) * (Skewness of 
earnings – skewness of cash flow from operations), 
where skewness is defined as E[(x −μ) 3]/σ3, and 
estimated using quarterly data over year t−4 to t, for at 
least nine quarters’ data. The standardization is the 
same linear transformation as with CSCORE and 
CRATIO. When cash flow from operations is not 
available, it is calculated as Funds from operations − 
ΔCurrent assets + ΔCurrent liabilities + ΔCash − 
ΔDebt in current liabilities.  
Compustat 
  
 Textual measures  
RISKDISC The number of sentences containing any of the risk-
related keywords per Kravet and Muslu’s (2013) word 
list in the entire 10-K, scaled by the total number of 
sentences in the entire 10-K, then multiplied by 100 
EDGAR 
   
MOD_RISKDISC 1−Cosine similarity between risk-related sentences at 
year t over year t−1 
EDGAR 
  
 Control variables  




   
MTB Market to Book ratio, calculated as market value of 
equity divided by book value of equity at fiscal year 
end 
Compustat 
   
LEV Financial leverage, calculated as total debts (long-term 
plus short-term) divided by total assets at end of fiscal 
year 
Compustat 
   
ROA Net income before extraordinary items, scaled by total 
average assets 
Compustat 
   
EARNVOL Earning volatility, calculated as the standard deviation 
of net income scaled by total assets over year t-5 to 
year t-1 
Compustat 
   
ETR Effective tax rate, calculated as total tax expenses 
divided by pre-tax income 
Compustat 
   
BIGN Indicator variable set to one for firms with Big N 
auditors and zero otherwise 
Compustat 
   
BETA Stock return beta estimated over the 12-month period 
ending three months after the fiscal year-end 
CRSP 
   
RET Buy-and-hold return over the 12-month period ending 
three months after fiscal year end 
CRSP 
   
RETVOL Standard deviation of stock return over the 12-month 
period ending three months after fiscal year end 
CRSP 
   
RETSKEW Skewness of stock return over the 12-month period 
ending three months after the fiscal year-end 
CRSP 
   
TURNOVER Average daily stock turnover over the 12-month period 
ending three months after fiscal year end 
CRSP 
   
LITRISK Litigation risk for a firm-year estimated using the 
coefficients from Table 7, model (2), of Kim and 
Skinner (2012).  
Compustat and 
CRSP 
   
FOLLOW Log(1 + number of analysts providing estimates at the 
last month of the fiscal year) 
IBES 
   
Additional variables for Equation 4-5 and Equation 4-6 
POST Indicator variable set to one for firm-years where 10-K 
filing dates are between November 1, 2005 and 
October 30, 2007, and to zero for firm-years where 10-
K filing dates are between November 1, 2003 and 






file 10-Ks, the dates are deemed as the 90th day after 
fiscal year end.  
   
TREAT Indicator variable set to one for US firms and to zero 
for Canadian firms that are not cross listed on any US 
stock exchange 
Compustat 
   
CFO Cash flow from operations, scaled by average total 
assets 
Compustat 
   
R&DAD Sum of R&D expense and advertising expense, scaled 
by total sales 
Compustat 
   
σREV Coefficient of variation of total sales, where the 
standard deviation and mean are calculated from 







Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter 5 
Appendix C1 
Variable Definitions for Empirical Tests in Chapter 5 
 
The following table provides the definitions of additional variables used for empirical tests in Chapter 5. 
Control variables already defined in Chapter 4 are not included.  
 
Variable Definition Source 
   
 Variables for H2a  
SIZE Natural log of total assets at fiscal year end Compustat 
   
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of equity plus 
book value of debt, scaled by book value of assets 
Compustat and 
CRSP 
   
ROA Net income before extraordinary items, scaled by 
total average assets 
Compustat 
   
SALESGROWTH Sales growth, calculated as the percentage of annual 
growth in total sales 
Compustat 
  
CASH Cash balance scaled by total assets Compustat 
   
FIRMAGE Firm age, calculated as log(1+ years the firm exists in 
the COMPUSTAT annual fundamental file) 
Compustat 
   
DIVIDEND Cash dividend paid, scaled by total assets Compustat 
   
ABRET Annual buy-hold abnormal return ending three 
months after the fiscal year end 
CRSP 
   
SEO Indicator variable set to one for firms whose level of 
Sale of Common and Preferred Stock (SSTK) is 
greater than 10% of beginning total assets at year t+1 




 Variable for H2b  
HIGH_TIGHT Indicator variable set to one for firms whose 
covenant tightness measure is positive and to zero 
otherwise. The covenant tightness measure is 
constructed following Pittman and Zhao (2019). 
Firms in the high tightness group (HIGH_TIGHT=1) 
are closer to debt covenant violations.  
Dealscan and 
Compustat 
   
 Variable for H2c  
HIGH_R&D Indicator variable set to one for firms whose levels of 





otherwise. The level of R&D expenditures is 
calculated as the R&D expenses scaled by beginning 
total assets. 
   
 Variable for H2d  
HIGH_FIN_NEEDS Indicator variable set to one for firms whose 
financing needs are above the median and to zero 
otherwise. The level of financing needs is calculated 
as [cash dividends + capital expenditure + change in 
working capital – (income before extraordinary items 
+ depreciation expense)]/total assets, following 








Appendix D: Appendix for Chapter 6 
Appendix D1 
Variable Definitions for Empirical Tests in Chapter 6 
 
The following table provides the definitions of additional variables used for empirical tests in Chapter 6. 
Variables already defined in previous chapters are not included.  
 
Variable Definition Source 
HIGH_LITRISK Indicator variable set to one for a firm whose 
predicted litigation risk is above the median and to 
zero otherwise. Litigation risk for a firm year is 
estimated using the coefficients from Table 7, model 
(2), of Kim and Skinner (2012). 
Compustat and CRSP 
   
HIGH_FOLLOW Indicator variable set to one for a firm followed by 
more analysts than the median firm and to zero 
otherwise 
IBES 
   
DISC_COMM Indicator variable set to one if a firm has a disclosure 
committee and to zero otherwise. The existence of a 
disclosure committee is determined by searching for 
“disclosure committee” in all electronic filings of the 








Appendix E: Appendix for Chapter 7 
Appendix E1 
Procedure for Constructing the Overconfidence Measure 
 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Campbell et al. 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012; Ahmed 
and Duellman 2013), I take the following steps to construct overconfidence measures for 
CEO/CFO using compensation data from Compustat Execucomp:  
• Calculate the average value per option (C) as (value of exercisable unexercised 
options/number of exercisable unexercised options), or OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL 
/OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM based on Execucomp variables.  
• Calculate the average exercise price per option (X) as the difference between the stock 
price (S) at fiscal year end and the average value per option (C), i.e., PRCC_F − C, where 
PRCC_F is the Compustat variable for stock price at fiscal year end.  
• Calculate the degree of option-in-money as the ratio between the average value per option 
(C) and the average exercise price per option (X), i.e., C/X, or C/(PRCC_F − C).  
• Create an indicator variable, Holder67, and set it to one from the first year in which the in-
money ratio (C/X) exceeds 0.67 if this occurs at least twice during the sample period. 
For each firm-year, an executive is deemed to be overconfident if Holder67 equals one and not 






Variable Definitions for Empirical Tests in Chapter 7 
 
The following table provides the definitions of additional variables used for empirical tests in Chapter 7. 
Variables already defined in previous chapters are not included.  
 
Variable Definition Source 
OVERCONF Indicator variable set to one if both the CEO and 
CFO of a firm are overconfident per the 
overconfidence measure in Campbell et al. 2011 and 
to zero if neither of them is overconfident 
Compustat Execucomp 
   
BONUS Ratio of the top five executives’ total bonuses to their 
total compensation 
Compustat Execucomp 
   
DELTACFO log(1+ raw Delta of the CFO’s executive 
compensation portfolios, including both stocks and 
options). The raw delta is calculated using the 
modified Black and Scholes (1973) option valuation 
model, following prior studies (e.g. Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen 2006). This measure captures the 
sensitivity of the CFO’s wealth to the change in the 
stock price of the firm.  
Compustat Execucomp 
and CRSP 
   
VEGACFO log(1+ raw Vega of the CFO’s executive 
compensation portfolios, including both stocks and 
options). The raw Vega is calculated using the 
modified Black and Scholes (1973) option valuation 
model, following prior studies (e.g. Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen 2006). This measure captures the 
sensitivity of the CFO’s wealth to the change in the 








Appendix F: Appendix for Chapter 8 
Appendix F1 
Variable Definitions for Empirical Tests in Chapter 8 
 
The following table provides the definitions of additional variables used for empirical tests in Chapter 8. 
Variables already defined in previous chapters are not included.  
 
Variable Definition Source 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return estimated using the 3-
factor Fama-French model plus momentum, starting 
from the 10-K filing date, and ending on the date 
depending on the window; for example, CAR 
(Window=30) is the CAR over [0, 30], i.e., from the 
10-K filing date to the 30th day after the filing date.  
Compustat and CRSP 
   
QuinCons Quintile of the composite conservatism measure as 
defined in Appendix B2, ranked annually by Fama-
French 12 industries  
Compustat and CRSP 
   
QuinRisk Quintile of the RISKDISC (risk disclosures) variable 
as defined in Appendix B2, ranked annually by 
Fama-French 12 industries 
EDGAR 
   
HIGH Indicator variable, set to zero for a firm year if the 
absolute difference between QuinCons and QuinRisk 
is greater than two and set to one if these two quintile 
ranks are equal. The HIGH group, thus, exhibits a 
greater substitutive relation, or trade-off, between 
conservatism and risk disclosures.  
Compustat and CRSP 
   
QuinSize Quintile of the SIZE (firm size) variable as defined in 
Appendix B2, ranked annually by Fama-French 12 
industries 
Compustat 
   
QuinMTB Quintile of the MTB (market to book) variable as 
defined in Appendix B2, ranked annually by Fama-
French 12 industries 
Compustat and CRSP 
   
QuinCFO Quintile of the CFO (cash flow from operations) as 
defined in Appendix B2, ranked annually by Fama-
French 12 industries  
Compustat 
   
QuinPE Quintile of the price-to-earnings ratio, ranked 
annually by Fama-French 12 industries 
Compustat 
 
